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Federal Register: April 4, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 65)

DOCID: FR Doc 03-8203

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NOTICE: NOTICES

ACTION: Reports and guidance documents; availability, etc.:

DOCUMENT ACTION: Notice of availability.

SUBJECT CATEGORY:

Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding Mode Change Limitations Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

DATES: The NRC staff issued a Federal Register Notice (67 FR 50475, August 2, 2002) which provided a model safety evaluation relating to modification of requirements regarding TS mode change limitations; \1\ similarly, the NRC staff, herein provides a Model Application, including a revised model safety evaluation. The NRC staff can most efficiently consider applications based upon the Model Application, which reference the model safety evaluation, if the application is submitted within a year of this Federal Register Notice.
\1\ [In conjunction with the proposed change, technical specifications (TS) requirements for a bases control program, consistent with the TS Bases Control Program described in Section 5.5 of the applicable vendor's standard TS (STS), shall be incorporated into the licensee's TS, if not already in the TS. Similarly, the STS requirements of SR 3.0.1 and associated bases shall be adopted by units that do not already contain them.]

DOCUMENT SUMMARY:

Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model application relating to the modification of requirements regarding technical specifications (TS) mode change limitations. The purpose of this model is to permit the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to modify requirements for TS mode change limitations as generically approved by this notice. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the model applies could request amendments utilizing the model application.

SUMMARY:

Consolidated line item improvement process; mode change limitations; requirements modification; technical specification improvement; model application,

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Background

Regulatory Issue Summary 200006, ``Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the standard technical specifications (STS) in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on proposed changes to the STS following a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or to proceed with announcing the availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those licensees opting to apply for the subject change to technical specifications are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plantspecific information. The included model safety evaluation provides the justification for the changes, stands alone, and is not an endorsement of the TSTF359, Revision 8, Change Description and Justification. Each amendment application made in response to the notice of availability will be processed and noticed in accordance with applicable NRC rules and procedures.

This notice involves the modification of requirements regarding mode change limitations in technical specifications. The change referenced in the Federal Register Notice (FRN) 67 FR 50475, of August 2, 2002, is TSTF359, Revision 7. TSTF359, Revision 8, incorporates most, but not all responses to the public comments. Two additional changes to TSTF359, Revision 8, are required and discussed in this notice. TSTF359, Revision 7; TSTF359, Revision 8; and TSTF359, Revision 8, as modified; can all be viewed on the NRC's Web page at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/techspecs/changesissuedforadoption.html .

Applicability

This proposed change to modify technical specification requirements for TS mode change limitations is applicable to all licensees who currently have or who will adopt, in conjunction with the proposed change, technical specification requirements for a bases control program consistent with the Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program described in section 5.5 of the applicable vendor's STS, and STS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.1 and associated bases.

To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, the staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed by TSTF359, Revision 8, as modified, using the CLIIP to include bases for the proposed technical specification consistent with the bases proposed in the TSTF359, Revision 8, as modified by staff responses to public comments 8 and 20 below. In addition, for those licensees that have not adopted requirements for a bases control program or STS SR 3.0.1 by converting to the improved STS or by other means, the staff requests that they include the requirements for a bases control program and STS SR 3.0.1 and associated bases consistent with the STS, in your request for the proposed change. The need for a bases control program stems from the need for adequate regulatory control of some key elements of the proposal that are contained in the proposed bases for Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4, SR 3.0.4, and SR 3.0.1. The staff is requesting that the bases be included with the proposed license amendments because, in this case, the changes to the technical specifications and changes to the associated bases form an integrated change to a plant's licensing basis. To ensure that the overall change, including the bases, includes the appropriate regulatory controls, the staff plans to condition the issuance of each license amendment on incorporation of the changes to the bases document and on ensuring the licensee's TS have a bases control program for controlling changes to the bases. The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the changes without the requested bases and bases control program. Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may, however, require additional justification, additional review by the NRC staff and may increase the time and resources needed for the review.

Public Notices

The staff issued a Federal Register Notice (67 FR 50475, August 2, 2002) that requested public comment on the NRC's pending action to approve modification of technical specification (TS) requirements regarding mode change limitations. In particular, following an assessment and draft safety evaluation by the NRC staff, the staff sought public comment on proposed changes to the standard technical specifications (STS), designated as TSTF359, Revision 7. TSTF359, Revision 8, incorporates most, but not all responses to the public comments. Two additional changes to TSTF359, Revision 8, are required and discussed in this notice. TSTF359, Revision 7; TSTF359, Revision 8; and TSTF359, Revision 8, as modified; can all be viewed on the NRC's Web page at, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/techspecs/changesissuedforadoption.html. The TSTF359, Revision 7,
change request, the TSTF359, Revision 8, change request, the TSTF359, Revision 8, change request as modified by this notice, as well as the NRC staff's safety evaluation may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records are accessible electronically from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public Library component on the NRC Web site, (the Electronic Reading Room).

In response to the notice soliciting comments from interested members of the public about modifying the TS requirements regarding mode change limitations, the staff received eight sets of comments (three from individual licensees, one from an industry contractor, and four from members of the public). Specific comments on the model SE are discussed below:

1. Comment: The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 3.0, ``Technical Evaluation'' states, ``Good practice should dictate that such transitions should normally be initiated only when all required equipment is operable and that mode transition with inoperable equipment should be the exception rather than the rule.'' If the required risk evaluation determines that it is acceptable to enter a Mode with certain required equipment inoperable, then this restriction is unnecessary. There may be some situations that recur routinely where the plant would benefit by changing modes with certain equipment inoperable. If the risk evaluation has determined that this change in modes is acceptable, then it should not matter if it is done routinely or as an ``exception rather than the rule.''

Staff Response: The statement reiterates a longstanding staff position. On June 4, 1987, Generic Letter 8709 provided the first step in mode change flexibility, allowing mode changes where action requirements permitted continued operation for an indefinite [[Page 16581]]
period (the starting point for the current increase in flexibility). As part of the discussion, that letter stated:

For an LCO that has Action Requirements permitting continued operation for an unlimited period of time, entry into an operational mode or other specified condition of operation should be permitted in accordance with those action requirements * * *. However, nothing in this staff position should be interpreted as endorsing or encouraging a plant startup with inoperable equipment. The staff believes that good practice should dictate that plant startup should normally be initiated only when all required equipment is operable and that startup with inoperable equipment must be the exception rather than the rule.
Any risk, whether large or small, should be incurred only when necessary. With appropriate planning, it should not be necessary to ``routinely'' start up with inoperable equipment.

2. Comment: Section 2.0, first paragraph, second to last sentence: Change ``provide'' to ``provides.''

Staff Response: The staff agrees.

3. Comment: Section 3.0, second paragraph, third sentence: Change ``plants'' to ``plant's.''

Staff Response: The staff agrees.

4. Comment: Section 3.0, second paragraph, fourth sentence: Change ``allowances'' to ``allowance.''

Staff Response: The staff agrees.

5. Comment: Section 3.1.1, fifth paragraph, third sentence: Change ``the systems/components not to be granted the LCO 3.0.4 or SR 3.0.4 allowances for the various modes listed'' to ``the systems/components not to be granted the LCO 3.0.4 or SR 3.0.4 allowances for the various modes are listed.''

Staff Response: The staff agrees.

6. Comment: Section 3.1.2, first paragraph, second sentence: change ``delta DCDF'' to ``delta CDF.''

Staff Response: The staff agrees.

7. Comment: Section 2.1 Proposed Change to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 where it talks about SR 3.0.4 wording changes (about halfway through 5th paragraph on page 50478): The revised new wording, ``The revised SR 3.0.4 will conform to the changes to LCO 3.0.4 and read: ``Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency.'' is incompatible with TSTF 359 regarding the new SR 3.0.3 on missed surveillances that the NRC recently approved.

New SR 3.0.4 requires Surveillances to be met within their specified Frequency prior to entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability. If SR 3.0.3 is applied to a missed Surveillance and a risk evaluation supports a delay beyond 24 hours, new SR 3.0.4 would only allow this delay to be applied in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in which the plant is operating at the time of discovery that the Surveillance has been missed. While this provision does not prevent a shutdown, it would prevent entry into a higher MODE of operation with a Surveillance that had not been performed within its specified Frequency.

To address this situation, SR 3.0.4 needs to be modified to state that SR 3.0.4 prohibits entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO unless the associated Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. The bases for SR 3.0.4 need to be modified also to provide the flexibility for entry into higher MODES with a missed Surveillance since the equipment is still OPERABLE and the risk evaluation is still valid for this situation. SR 3.0.3 evaluation considers missed surveillance equipment to be still OPERABLE, and new SR 3.0.4 would allow going up in MODES except that it specifically says no mode entry ``unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency.'' and doesn't talk about OPERABLE equipment.

To fix this, reword new SR 3.0.3 to say, ``Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3.'' (And add the bases wording indicated above.)

Rev. 7 of TSTF 359 had addressed this issue but it does not appear to be addressed by the NRC in the FR notice. Staff Response: The staff agrees. SR 3.0.4 will be modified to included the phrase, ``* * * , except as provided by SR 3.0.3.'' The bases wording will be modified accordingly.

In reviewing LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4, the redundancy in stating the criteria (items a, b and c) for allowing entry into a Mode or other specified condition in the Applicability is unnecessary. The listing of the criteria (items a, b and c) are more appropriately stated in LCO 3.0.4, since it controls the Mode transition; the LCO is not met due to a SR not being met. Therefore, to eliminate the redundancy and make the statements more accurate, SR 3.0.4 is changed to read, in its' entirety:
``Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's
Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.''

Related consistency changes are made throughout the SE.

8. Comment: If the NRC requires a Revision 8 be prepared before the Notice of Availability is published, then the Notice of Availability should use that revision (8) as the basis for licensee applications.

Staff Response: The staff agrees; the staff will reference the latest approved TSTF359 revision; TSTF359, Revision 8, as modified by the response to Comment 20 below and the following modification to the TSTF359 Revision 8 LCO 3.0.4 bases Insert. The 11th paragraph shall be rewritten to read:
``Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for no more than the duration of the applicable ACTIONS Completion Time or until the LCO is met or the unit is not within the Applicability of the TS.''

9. Comment: For Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) with Mark 1 containments, the Table lists the Hardened Wetwell Vent as such a SSC that should be excluded. However, the Hardened Wetwell Vent is not a SSC included within Technical Specifications (TS). Thus, the proposed TSTF implies that TS Actions should be applied to a nonTS SSC. This is inappropriate and not necessary to properly manage overall risk. The existing plant programs that implement paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) are the appropriate mechanism for this specific SSC. Consequently, we request that TSTF359 be clarified to not include the Hardened Wetwell Vent.

Staff Response: The tables included in TSTF359 and the draft safety evaluation were provided by the BWR Owners Group as a result of generic analysis, which the staff has reviewed and accepted. The analysis and tables are comprehensive and do cover systems that are not in TS. The staff does not believe that the presence in the analysis and tables implies that TS actions are required for those systems such as the Hardened Wetwell Vent system.

[[Page 16582]]

10. Comment: Second, this table and the accompanying markup of the actual TS pages for BWRs included in TSTF359, Revision 7, state that the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4.b exclusion note should be added to the TS LCO 3.4.9, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling SystemCold Shutdown, such that a MODE change from MODE 5 to MODE 4 would be precluded with LCO 3.4.9 not met. However, LCO 3.0.4 only applies to MODE changes in MODES 1, 2, or 3. Thus, the proposed change to LCO 3.4.9 is inconsistent with the existing wording of the LCO 3.0.4 applicability. Therefore, we believe that the LCO 3.0.4 Note to LCO 3.4.9 should not be included in the proposed changes.

Staff Response: The notes limiting the applicability (to Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 for PWRS, and to Modes 1, 2, and 3 for BWRs) of the current STS LCO 3.0.4 and STS SR 3.0.4 are holdovers from the existing Standard Technical Specifications (STS). The notes limiting the applicability of LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 are no longer needed and are removed by TSTF 359, Revision 8. The industry owners groups' analyses would subsequently support adding notes to various TS, as defined by the tables of higher risk systems in the FRN, precluding entry into Modes 5 and 6 for PWRs, and Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs. However, the addition of notes in these cases is made unnecessary by action statements that require immediate completion times, which means that entry into the Mode or other specified condition in the Applicability is not allowed and the notes would be superfluous.

11. Comment: Two editorial corrections to TSTF359, Revision 7, are needed. First, in INSERT 6 (SR 3.0.4 BASES) the word ``that'' in the second line, after the word ``Surveillance,'' should be deleted. Second, the second sentence to INSERT 8 (RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY BASES) should be deleted, since it is redundant to the existing Bases and therefore need not be included.

Staff Response: The staff agrees.

12. Comment: Reliance on a licensee's 50.65 (a)(4) ``program'' appears to be a flawed basis. While this proposed change to the TS as well as the previous one for surveillance interval and completion time extensions (66 FR 49714) rely on the ``program'', that program is not required by 50.65 (a)(4) to be a written program, it's not required by the regulation to meet the risk management objectives of RG 1.177 or any other standard, nor does it require a licensee to find any particular level of risk to be unacceptable. It, in fact, only requires that the risk be assessed (without specifying a method, a degree of rigor or even that the assessment be documented) and managed (with no definition what that means). While Page 23 of the document states ``Risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, ``Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.'', licensee adherence to this standard or the NUMARC guidance it endorses is neither required in the regulation nor are any licensees committed to those documents through their license or FSAR. The fact that licensees will be inspected in this area using IP 71111.13 and Supplemental IP 62709 is of little value if those inspections are not being done against specific standards that the licensees are required to meet rather than the general standard of (a)(4) which has the limitations discussed above.

Staff Response: A licensee adopting this change will be required to commit in the bases to the Technical Specifications to follow Regulatory Guide 1.182. In addition, the licensee will be required to adopt a bases control program identical to that contained in the Standard Technical Specifications. Regulatory Guide 1.182, ``Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants,'' endorses NUMARC 9301 Section 11, ``Assessment of Risk Resulting from Performance of Maintenance Activities,'' which provides risk assessment and management ``methods that are acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the provision of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4).'' NUMARC 9301 Section 11 requires that this assessment process be
proceduralized. Furthermore, Inspection Procedure 71111.13 provides inspection guidance on, among other things, the verification of the performance of maintenance risk assessments, the adequacy of risk assessments and the management of the resulting risk.

13. Comment: It is noted that the Standard TS Bases for the revised TS 3.0.4 has not been provided for comment. Are the standards above such as Reg Guide 1.182 being included in the TS Bases and therefore subject to the bases control program? If not, why not?

Staff Response: The proposed STS bases are included in TSTF359 and were open for comment. The portion of the question related to the TS Bases and bases control program was answered in the response to comment 12 above.

14. Comment: Notwithstanding statements like ``Good practice should dictate that such transitions should normally be initiated only when all required equipment is operable and that mode transition with inoperable equipment should be the exception rather than the rule'' and ``* * * the expected low frequency of the proposed mode changes with inoperable equipment * * *'', isn't it just as likely (and perfectly acceptable under this proposed change) that once the licensee has justified a mode change with a certain piece of equipment inoperable during a particular startup, that during subsequent startups the licensee could actually plan into the startup the return of that equipment after the Mode change it was required for, by using that previous assessment? What would prevent the licensee from doing that (assuming other system alignments are equivalent)? Taking it a step further, what will prevent the licensee from, over time, developing a whole combination of assessments that justify not having multiple pieces of equipment operable during a particular mode change and routinely using those assessments in subsequent startups? Similarly, wouldn't the proposed TS allow multiple mode changes in the same startup with same piece(s) of inoperable equipment as along as the assessment covers each mode? Is that what was intended?

Staff Response: See the response to comment 1 above. It is acceptable for licensees to utilize preexisting risk assessments, as long as they adequately address the existing plant conditions. The applicability of TS frequently covers multiple modes, and therefore mode changes within the applicability of the TS would be allowed, as long as the risk assessment is reevaluated prior to each mode change.

15. Comment: [Page 21][The SE] states ``For systems and components which are not higher risk, any temporary risk increase associated with the proposed allowance will be smaller than what is considered acceptable when the same systems and components are inoperable at power. This is due to the fact that the CTs associated with the majority of TS systems and components were developed for power operation and pose smaller plant risk for action statement entries initiated or occurring at lower modes operation as compared to power operations.'' The first sentence above is only restricted by whether something is higher or lower risk but the justifying statement only applies to the majority of TS systems which are associated with power operations. What is the minority of TS systems for which plant risk is higher in lower modes of operation? Are all those systems on the list of higher risk systems? If all those systems are not included on the list of high risk systems
[[Page 16583]]
how is the first quoted sentence true?! How do the lists of high and low risk systems at power and in lower modes discussed in this proposal compare with the results of the shutdown risk analysis the NRC now has underway? If there are differences what is the justification?

Staff Response: The ``minority of TS systems for which plant risk is higher in lower modes of operation,'' are those systems identified in the analyses and listed in the SE. These systems are determined by a qualitative analysis that compares risk in the shutdown mode with that at power. The qualitative analysis also takes into account potential risk increases (e.g., due to realignments and human errors) when entering a new mode or configuration. Those systems that have a potential to be more important to risk in the lower modes, are conservatively selected and mode changes are precluded when there is an inoperability associated with any of these potentially higher risk systems. The lists of ``higher risk'' systems, being based on both deterministic and probabilistic arguments with conservative assumptions, are not expected to conflict with the results of any shutdown risk analysis.

16. Comment: Appendix A ExamplesIn a number of the examples it says ``if there is reasonable assurance'' that the inoperable component will be restored within the CT, a risk assessment has been done, and the requisite risk management actions have been taken. Where does this need for ``reasonable assurance'' come from and how does the LCO require it? If a component is inoperable, what in the new LCO prevents the licensee from assuming the full CT in the risk assessment, managing the risk for that full time and simply hoping (whether that is reasonable or not) that they will get the component back before the end of the CT?

Staff Response: Unplanned reactor scrams and unplanned power changes are two of the Reactor Safety Performance Indicators that the ROP utilizes to assess licensee performance and inform the public. Thus, the ROP provides a disincentive to entering a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of an LCO and moving up into power operation (Mode 1), when there is a significant likelihood that the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the completion time. Additional disincentives are the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 10 CFR
50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) reporting requirements. NUREG1022, ``Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,'' makes it clear that a report is required when a nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications is initiated or completed.

17. Comment: Carrying the logic above a step furtherWhat in the LCO (not in some voluntary cumulative risk monitoring) will prevent a licensee from changing Mode without a piece of equipment after doing the assessment and management of risk, reaching the CT, returning to a nonapplicable mode doing another assessment for the same piece of equipment that is still inoperable, changing Mode again with the proper management of the risk and simply hoping that the equipment is operable before the CT expires yet again?

Staff Response: While feasible from a legalistic perspective, such actions by a licensee would be indication of a poorly run plant and should result in close scrutiny by plant management and the NRC. Such licensee actions would constitute clear evidence of poor performance that would be reviewed by the performance based ROP, and management corrective oversight should result. Also, see the related response to comment 16 above.

18. Comment: Are the provisions of SR 3.0.2 applicable if a licensee changes mode without first doing a required surveillance? If the provisions are to be applicable, there appears to be a problem in the language of SR 3.0.2. For example, if the surveillance has a 7day frequency but has not been performed for some months, the wording of SR 3.0.2 would require that the surveillance be performed within 1.25 times ``as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of Frequency is met.'' Given that the surveillance had last been performed months before application of 1.25 from the previous performance would appear problematic. The language of SR 3.0.2 appears to assume (based on the present requirements of SR 3.0.4 that the surveillance be successfully performed within the required frequency before the mode change) that there will be a previous ``infrequency'' performance of the surveillance from which the 1.25 can be measured. Assuming that the 1.25 interval is supposed to be available, it should start from the time of entry into the applicable Mode, however that does not appear to be ``a specified condition of Frequency'' as now defined in TS usage examples or bases.

Staff Response: SR 3.0.2 (25% extension) does not apply; the SR must be met within the required action completion time, except as provided by SR 3.0.3.

19. Comment: Is the ``which ever is greater'' provision of SR 3.0.3 meant to apply to cases where a licensee changes modes without performing a surveillance? While the word ``discover'' would appear to argue against such a use, the first sentence of the Bases for SR 3.0.3 make it less clear ``* * * when a surveillance has not been met * * *''?

Staff Response: See the response to Comment 7 above. The applicable portion of SR 3.0.4 will be reworded to say, ``Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3.''

20. Comment: Section 3.1.3 states ``It should be noted that, the risk assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4(b) and SR 3.0.4(b), must take into account all inoperable TS equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the licensee's normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope.'' How is the NRC going to require this ``must'' provision if it is not incorporated into the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the TS themselves, the license or the plant FSAR?

Staff Response: If TS equipment is not covered by the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) program, in order to transition up in mode with that TS equipment inoperable, the licensee would have to incorporate it into the program. The following sentence is to be added to the onesentence fourth paragraph of the LCO 3.0.4 bases insert that begins, ``The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches * * *'':

The risk assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4 (b), must take into account all inoperable TS equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the licensee's normal 10 CFR

50.65(a)(4)risk assessment scope.''

21. Comment: Similarly Section 3.1.3 goes on to state ``The requirements associated with the proposed change are established to ensure that such conditions will not occur.'' What is the legal basis for calling voluntary conformance with the guidelines of RG 1.174, 1.177 and 1.182, a set of requirements? Will findings under the ROP that find deviations from implementation of these standards constitute legal violations?

Staff Response: Paragraph (a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65, by itself, does not prohibit putting a plant in highrisk configurations due to maintenance activities. It only requires that maintenancerelated risk be assessed
[[Page 16584]]
and managed. The industry guidance for implementation of (a)(4), the revised Section 11 of NUMARC 9301, as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, is more restrictive. Section 11 states that configurations for which the incremental core damage probability (ICDP) is greater than 10EXP5 should not be entered voluntarily. While the regulatory guidance is not a regulatory requirement with respect to compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the requirements associated with the proposed change to TS 3.0.4 are a different matter.

Unlike (a)(4), the revised TS 3.0.4 is intended to ensure that highrisk configurations are not allowed; although like (a)(4), the TS is also intended to ensure that any risk that is allowed is adequately managed. Therefore, mode changes with a potentially ``higherrisk system'' inoperable (see definition of ``higher risk system'' in the SE) are prohibited by the TS; and in addition to this restriction, the revised TS 3.0.4 will also require licensees to comply in all other respects with their programs established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Note that the Commission has determined that such a program is a satisfactory replacement for a configuration risk management program (CRMP). With regard to the basis for treatment of RG 1.182 provisions, it is noted that: (1) The regulatory guide is one way to meet the TS requirements; (2) the licensee would commit to follow RG 1.182 in the TS Bases (see also the staff's response to Comment No. 12); and, (3) if the licensee did not follow RG 1.182, the ROP would inspect the licensees process for acceptability.

With regard to ROP inspection findings in support of the requirements in the proposed change to TS 3.0.4, the associated TS Bases will reference the provisions of certain regulatory guides and the industry guidance that they endorse. This will, in effect, make a licensee's compliance with the provisions of certain otherwise voluntary industry guidance documents be governed by the TS Bases Control Program. It is envisioned that the significance of this potential TS violation, to the extent that the violation involves inadequate risk assessment and/or inadequate risk management, will be determined in a manner similar to that in which the significance of (a)(4) violations is determined. When issued, the specialized significance determination process (SDP) designed for (a)(4) violations would be used under such circumstances.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of March 2003.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William D. Beckner,
Program Director, Operating Reactor Improvements Program, Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Model Safety Evaluation

1.0 Introduction

On July 17, 2002, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Risk Informed Technical Specifications Task Force (RITSTF) submitted proposed change, TSTF359, Revision 7, to the standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 14301434) on behalf of the industry. TSTF359, Revision 7, is a proposal to change the STS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.4 requirements regarding mode change limitations. The proposed change would modify LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 by risk informing limitations on entering the mode of applicability of a LCO. The first Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) Federal Register Notice with respect to this change was published on August 2, 2002, requesting public comments. In response to the public comments, the NRC staff decided that TSTF359, Revision 7, be revised. The RITSTF submitted TSTF359, Revision 8, on December 4, 2002. Two additional changes were deemed necessary. The NRC staff has prepared this revised model safety evaluation incorporating changes resulting from public comments. TSTF359, Revision 8, as modified, provides the complete approved change. This proposal is one of the industry's initiatives under the riskinformed technical specifications program. These initiatives are intended to maintain or improve safety while reducing unnecessary burden and to make technical specification requirements consistent with the Commission's other riskinformed regulatory requirements, in particular the maintenance rule.

The current technical specifications (TS) specify that a nuclear power plant cannot go to higher modes of operation \2\ (i.e., move towards power operation) unless all TS systems, normally required for the higher mode, are operable. This limitation is included (with several exceptions for some plants) in LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4. LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 in the STS currently state in part that when an LCO or SR is not met, ``entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the applicability shall not be made except when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the applicability for an unlimited period of time.'' The industry believes that this requirement is unnecessarily restrictive and can unduly delay plant startup while considerable resources are being used to resolve startup issues that are risk insignificant or low risk. A maintenance activity that takes longer than planned can delay a mode change and adversely impact a utility's orderly plant startup and return to power operation. The objective of the proposed change is to provide additional operational flexibility without compromising plant safety.
\2\ MODE numbers decrease in the transition ``up to a higher mode of operation;'' power operation is MODE 1.

The proposed changes to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 would allow, for systems and components, mode changes into a TS condition that has a specific required action and completion time. The licensee will utilize the LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 allowances only when they determine that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied within the LCO completion time (CT), after the mode change. In addition, the LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 allowances can be applied to values and parameters in specifications when explicitly stated in the TS (nonsystem/ component TS such as: Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity). These changes are in addition to the current mode change allowance when a required action has an indefinite completion time. The LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 mode change allowances are not permitted for the systems and components (termed ``higher risk'') listed in Section 3.1.1, ``Identification of RiskImportant TS Systems and Components,'' for the modes specified. Two examples are: (1) Westinghouse plants cannot transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4 without a High Head Safety Injection System train operable; and, (2) Westinghouse plants cannot transition up into any mode with an inoperable required emergency diesel generator.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

In 10 CFR 50.36, the Commission established its regulatory requirements related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS are required to include items in the following five specific categories related to station operation: (1) Safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. The rule does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), the ``Limiting conditions for operation [[Page 16585]]
are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specification * * *'' By convention, the LCOs are contained in Sections 3.1 through 3.10 of the TS. TS Section 3.0, on ``LCO and SR Applicability,'' provides details or ground rules for complying with the LCOs. LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 address requirements for LCO compliance when transitioning between modes of operation.

Technical specifications have taken advantage of risk technology as experience and capability have increased. Since the mid1980's, the NRC has been reviewing and granting improvements to technical
specifications that are based, at least in part, on probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) insights. In its final policy statement on technical specification improvements of July 22, 1993, the Commission stated that it expects that licensees will utilize any plant specific PRA or risk survey in preparing their technical specificationrelated submittals. In evaluating these submittals, the staff applies the guidance in RG 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk Informed Decisions on PlantSpecific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' dated July 1998 and in RG 1.177, ``An Approach for PlantSpecific, RiskInformed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,'' dated August 1998. The staff has appropriately adapted this guidance to assess the acceptability of upward mode changes with equipment inoperable. This review had the following objectives:
[sbull] To ensure that the plant risk does not increase unacceptably during the actual implementation of the proposed change (e.g., when the plant enters a higher mode while an LCO is not met). This risk increase is referred to as ``temporary.''
[sbull] To compare and assess the risk impact of the proposed change to the acceptance guidelines of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement, as documented in RG 1.174. The risk impact, which is measured by the average yearly risk increase associated with the change, aims at minimizing the ``cumulative'' risk associated with the proposed change so that the plant's average baseline risk is maintained within a minimal range.
[sbull] To assess the licensee's ability to identify risk significant configurations resulting from maintenance or other operational activities and take appropriate compensatory measures to avoid such configurations.

The staff reviewed the reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the non higherrisk systems and components, and related guidance to assess and manage the risk of upward mode changes. The Commission has found that compliance with the industry guidance for implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), as endorsed by RG 1.182 and mandated by LCO 3.0.4, SR 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.3, satisfies the configuration risk management objectives of RG 1.177 for technical specification surveillance interval and completion time extensions. Reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) processes that are consistent with the provisions of the NRCendorsed industry guidance was also found adequate for managing risk of missed surveillances as described in the Federal Register on September 28, 2001 (66 FR 49714).

The staff review also had the objective of ensuring that existing inspection programs have the necessary controls in place to allow NRC staff to oversee the implementation of the proposed change, reliance on 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) processes or programs, and the ability to adequately assess the licensee's performance associated with risk assessments. The review encompassed inspection procedures (i.e., NRC Inspection Procedure 62709 (12/28/00), ``Configuration Risk Assessment and Risk Management Process,'' and NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.13 (1/17/02), ``Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control''), the significance determination process (SDP) (i.e., draft ``Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process''), enforcement guidance (i.e., draft Enforcement Manual Section 8.1.11, ``Actions Involving the Maintenance Rule''), and the associated reactor oversight process.

2.1 Proposed Change to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4

Currently LCO 3.0.4 does not allow entrance into a higher mode (or other specified condition) in the applicability when an LCO is not met, except when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in that mode or condition indefinitely or a specific exception is granted. Similarly, when an LCO's surveillances have not been met within their specified frequency, entry into a higher mode (or other specified condition) is not allowed by SR 3.0.4. The current STS \3\ LCO 3.0.4 reads:
\3\ Plant specific wording for current equivalent LCO 3.0.4 is similar to current STS LCO 3.0.4 wording.
``When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications. These exceptions allow entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered allow unit operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability only for a limited period of time.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in [MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 {for PWRs{time} ][MODES 1, 2, and 3 {for BWRs{time} ].''

The revised LCO 3.0.4 will read:
``When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made
(a) When the associated Actions to be entered permit continued operation in that MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time, or
(b) After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications, or
(c) When an allowance is stated in the individual value or parameter Specification.

This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.''

The current STS \4\ SR 3.0.4 reads:
\4\ Plant specific wording for current equivalent SR 3.0.4 is similar to current STS SR 3.0.4 wording.
``Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in [MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 {for PWRs{time} ][MODES 1, 2, and 3 {for BWRs{time} ].''

The revised SR 3.0.4 will conform to the changes to LCO 3.0.4 and read:
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``Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCO's
Surveillances have been met within their specified frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.''

The proposed LCO 3.0.4(a) retains the current allowance for when the required actions allow indefinite operation. The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allows entering modes or other specified conditions in the applicability except when higherrisk systems and components (listed in Section 3.1.1), for the mode being entered, are inoperable. The decision for entering a higher mode or condition in the applicability of the LCO will be made by plant management after the required risk assessment has been performed and requisite risk management actions established, through the program established to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Entry into the modes or other specified conditions in the applicability of the TS shall be for no more than the duration of the applicable required actions completion time, or until the LCO is met. Current notes in individual specifications that permitted mode changes are now encompassed by LCO 3.0.4(b) and can be removed. Notes that prohibit mode changes under LCO 3.0.4(b) must be added (i.e., for higherrisk systems and components). The proposed LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance can involve multiple components in a single LCO or in multiple LCOs; however, use of the LCO 3.0.4(b) provisions are always contingent upon completion of a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) based risk assessment.

The notes limiting the applicability (to Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 for PWRS, and to Modes 1, 2, and 3 for BWRs) of the current STS LCO 3.0.4 and STS SR 3.0.4 are holdovers from the existing Standard Technical Specifications (STS). The notes limiting the applicability of LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 are no longer needed and are removed by TSTF359, Revision 8. The industry owners groups analyses would subsequently support adding notes to various TS, as defined by the tables of higherrisk systems, precluding entry into Modes 5 and 6 for PWRs, and Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs. However, the addition of notes in these cases is made unnecessary by action statements that require immediate completion times, which means that entry into the Mode or other specified condition in the Applicability is not allowed and the notes would be superfluous.

LCO 3.0.4 allowances related to values and parameters of TS are not typically addressed by LCO 3.0.4(b) risk assessments, and are therefore addressed by a new LCO 3.0.4 (c). LCO 3.0.4 (c) refers to allowances already in the TS and annotated in the individual TS. LCO 3.0.4 (c) also allows for entry into the modes or other specified conditions in the applicability of a TS for no more than the duration of the applicable required actions completion time or until the LCO is met or the unit is not within the Applicability of the TS.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

During the development of the current STS, improvements were made to LCO 3.0.4, such as clarifying its applicability with respect to plant shutdowns, cold shutdown mode and refueling mode. In addition, during the STS development, almost all the LCOs with completion times greater than or equal to 30 days, and many LCOs with completion times greater than or equal to 7 days, were given individual LCO 3.0.4 exceptions. During some conversions to the STS, individual plants provided acceptable justifications for other LCO 3.0.4 exceptions. All of these specific LCO 3.0.4 exceptions allow entry into a mode or other specified condition in the TS applicability while relying on the TS required actions and associated completion times. The proposed change under evaluation would provide standardization and consistency to the use and application of LCO 3.0.4, both internal to and between each of the specifications and STS NUREGs. This proposed change will also ensure consistency through the utilization of appropriate levels of risk assessment of plant configurations for application of LCO 3.0.4. However, nothing in this safety evaluation should be interpreted as encouraging upward mode transition with inoperable equipment. Good practice should dictate that such transitions should normally be initiated only when all required equipment is operable and that mode transition with inoperable equipment should be the exception rather than the rule.

The current LCO 3.0.4(a) allowances are retained in the proposal and do not represent a change in risk from the current situation. The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances apply to systems and components, and require a risk assessment prior to utilization to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained. The LCO 3.0.4(c) allowances apply to parameters and values which have been previously approved by the NRC in a plant's specific TS. The licensee will provide in their TS Bases a discussion and list of each NRCapproved, LCO 3.0.4(c)specific value and parameter allowance. The bases of LCO 3.0.4 will be revised to explain the new allowances and their utilization.

The staff did a qualitative assessment of the risk impact of the proposed change in LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances by evaluating how the licensee's implementation of the proposed riskinformed approach is expected to meet the requirements of the applicable RGs. The staff referred to the guidance provided in RG 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in RiskInformed Decisions on Plant Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' and in RG 1.177, ``An approach for PlantSpecific, RiskInformed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications.'' RG 1.177 provides the staff's recommendations on utilizing risk information to assess the impact of proposed changes to nuclear power plant technical specifications on the risk associated with plant operation. Although RG 1.177 does not specifically address the type of generic change in this proposal, the staff considered the approach documented in RG 1.177 in evaluating the risk information provided in support of the proposed changes in LCO 3.0.4.

The staff's evaluation of how the implementation of the proposed riskinformed approach, used to justify LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances, agrees with theobjectives of the guidance outlined in RG 1.177 is discussed in Section 3.1. Oversight of the riskinformed approach associated with the LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances is discussed in Sections 3.2.

3.1 Evaluation of Risk Management

Both the temporary and cumulative risk of the proposed change are adequately limited. The temporary risk is limited by the exclusion of higherrisk systems and components, and completion time limits contained in technical specifications (Section 3.1.1). The cumulative risk is limited by the temporary risk limitations and by the expected low frequency of the proposed mode changes with inoperable equipment (Section 3.1.2). Adequate NRC oversight of the licensee's ability to use the LCO 3.0.4(b) provisions under appropriate circumstances, i.e., to identify risksignificant configurations when entering a higher mode or condition in the applicability of an LCO (Section 3.1.3) is provided by NRC inspection of the licensee's
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implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) as applied to the proposed change. 3.1.1 Temporary Risk Increases

RG 1.177 proposes the incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and the incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) as appropriate measures of the increase in probability of core damage and large early release, respectively, during the period of implementation of a proposed TS change. In addition, RG 1.177 stresses the need to preclude potentially high risk configurations introduced by the proposed change. The ICCDP associated with any specified plant condition, such as the condition introduced by entering a higher mode with plant equipment inoperable, is expressed by the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN04AP03.023
Where:
[Delta]R = the conditional risk increase, in terms of core damage frequency (CDF), caused by the specified condition
d = the duration of the specified plant condition
R1 = the plant CDF with the specified condition permanently present
R0 = the plant CDF without the specified condition

The same expression can be used for ICLERP by substituting the measure of risk, i.e., large early release frequency (LERF) for CDF. The magnitude of the ICCDP and ICLERP values associated with plant conditions applicable to LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances can be managed by controlling the conditional risk increase, [xutri]R (in terms of both CDF and LERF) and the duration, d, of such conditions. The following sections discuss how the key elements of the proposed riskinformed approach, used to justify LCO 3.0.4(b) allowances, are expected to limit [xutri]R and d and, thus, prevent any significant temporary risk increases.

Identification of RiskImportant TS Systems and Components

A major element that limits the risk of the proposed mode change flexibility is the exclusion of certain systems and associated LCOs for the mode change allowance. Technical specifications allow operation in Mode 1 (power operation) with specified levels of inoperability for specified times. This provides a benchmark of currently acceptable risk against which to measure any incremental risk inherent in the proposed LCO 3.0.4(b). If a system inoperability accrues risk at a higher rate in one or more of the transition modes than it would in Mode 1, then an upward transition into that mode should not be allowed without demonstration of a high degree of experience and sophistication in risk management. However, the risk management process evaluated in Section 3.1.3 is adequate if higherrisk systems/components are excluded from the scope of LCO 3.0.4(b).

The importance of most TS systems in mitigating accidents increases as power increases. However, some TS systems are relatively more important during lower power and shutdown operations, because: [sbull] Certain events are peculiar to modes of plant operation other than power operation,
[sbull] Certain events are more probable at modes of plant operation other than power operation,
[sbull] Some modes of plant operation have less mitigation system capability than power operation.

The risk information submitted in support of the proposed changes to LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 includes qualitative risk assessments performed by each owners group to identify higher risk systems and components at the various modes of operation, including transitions between modes, as the plant moves upward from the refueling mode of operation toward power operation. The owners groups' generic qualitative risk assessments are included as attachments to TSTF359, Revision 8. Each of the owners groups' generic qualitative risk assessments discuss the technical approach used and the systems/ components subsequently determined to be of higher risk significance; the systems/components not to be granted the LCO 3.0.4 allowances for the various modes are listed. The owners groups generic qualitative risk assessments are:
[sbull] BWR owners' group RiskInformed Technical Specification Committee, ``Technical Justification to Support RiskInformed Improvements to Technical Specification Mode Restraints for BWR Plants,'' General Electric Company GENE A1300464 (Rev[2])
[sbull] ``B&W owners group Qualitative Risk Assessment for Increased Flexibility in MODE Restraints,'' Framatome Technologies BAW 2383
[sbull] Combustion Engineering owners group (CEOG) Task 1181, ``Qualitative Risk Assessment for Relaxation of Mode Entry Restraints,'' CE Nuclear Power LLC, CE NPSD1207 (Rev[0])
[sbull] ``WOG Qualitative Risk Assessment Supporting Increased Flexibility in MODE Restraints.''

Following interactions with the staff, all owners groups used the same systematic approach in their qualitative risk assessments to identify the higherrisk systems in the STS, consisting of the following steps:
[sbull] Identification of plant conditions (i.e., plant parameters and availability of key mitigation systems) associated with changes in plant operating modes while returning to power
[sbull] Identification of key activities that have the potential to impact risk and which are in progress during transitions between modes while the plant is returning to power
[sbull] Identification of applicable accident initiating events for each mode or other specified condition in the applicability [sbull] Identification of the higherrisk systems and components by combining the information in the first three steps (qualitative risk assessment)

The risk assessments properly used the results and insights from previous deterministic and probabilistic studies to systematically search for plant conditions in which certain key plant components are more important in mitigating accidents than during operation at power (Mode 1). This search was systematic, taking the following factors into account for the various stages of returning the plant to power: [sbull] The status of accident mitigation and normally operating systems
[sbull] The status of key plant parameters such as reactor coolant system pressure
[sbull] The key activities that are in progress during transitions between modes which have the potential to impact risk (e.g., the transfer from auxiliary to main feedwater at some PWR plants when Mode 1 is entered)
[sbull] The applicable accident initiating events for each mode of plant operation
[sbull] Design and operational differences among plants or groups of plants

The following systems and components were identified by each of the four owners groups as higherrisk systems and components, when the plant is entering a new mode.
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System BWR type Entering mode Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) Plants High Pressure Coolant Injection BWR 3 & 4............. 2, 1. (HPCI) System.
High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS).... BWR 5 & 6............. 2, 1. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling BWR 3, 4, 5 & 6....... 2, 1. (RCIC) System.
Isolation Condenser................ BWR 2................. 2, 1. Diesel Generators (including other All................... All. Emergency/Shutdown AC Power
Supplies).
Hardened Wetwell Vent System....... BWR 2, 3 & 4 with Mark 3, 2, 1. I Containment.
Residual Heat Removal System....... All................... 4. System Entering mode Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group (B&WOG) Plants Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) & Hydro 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. Electric Units for Oconee.
Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System............... 1.
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) System................ 5, 4.
Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) Plants Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)............. 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. Auxiliary Feedwater/Emergency Feedwater (AFW/ 4, 3, 2, 1. EFW) System.
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) System... 4, 3 (below 1700 psia). LTOP/PORVs (when used for Low Temperature 5, 4 (below set temperature) Overpressure Protection (LTOP)).
Shutdown Cooling System (Low Pressure Safety 5.
Injection (LPSI) pumps).
Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Plants Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)............. 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (for plants 4, 3, 2, 1. depending on AFW for startup).
High Head Safety Injection System.............. 4.
Cold Overpressure Protection System............ 5, 4.

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System............. 5.

If a licensee identifies a higherrisk system for only some of the modes of applicability, the TS for that system would be modified by a note that reads, for example, ``LCO 3.0.4(b) is not applicable when entering MODE 1 from MODE 2.'' Systems identified as higher risk for Modes 5 and 6 for PWRs, and Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs, are also excluded from transitioning up to the mode of higher risk, and as previously discussed, notes for those transitions are superfluous. In addition, mode transitions for Modes 5 and 6 for PWRs, and Modes 4 and 5 for BWRs, will be addressed by administrative controls.

In summary, the staff's review of the owners groups qualitative risk assessments finds that they are of adequate quality to support the application (i.e., they identify the higherrisk systems and components) associated with entering higher modes of plant operation with equipment inoperable while returning to power.
[Plant Specific changes will be described here.]

Limited Time in TS Required Actions

Any temporary risk increase will be limited by, among other factors, duration constraints imposed by the TS CTs of the inoperable systems. For the systems and components which are not higher risk, any temporary risk increase associated with the proposed allowance will be smaller than what is considered acceptable when the same systems and components are inoperable at power. This is due to the fact that CTs associated with the majority of TS systems and components were developed for power operation and pose a smaller plant risk for action statement entries initiated or occurring at lower modes of operation as compared to power operation.

The LCO 3.0.4(b) allowance will be used only when the licensee determines that there is a high likelihood that the LCO will be satisfied following the mode change. This will minimize the likelihood of additional temporary risk increases associated with the need to exit a mode due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT. In most cases, licensees will enter into a higher mode with the intent to move up to Mode 1 (power operation). As discussed in Section 3.2, the revised reactor oversight process monitors unplanned power changes as a performance indicator. The reactor oversight process thus discourages licensees from entering a mode or other specified condition in the applicability of an LCO, and moving up in power, when there is a likelihood that the mode would have to be subsequently exited due to failure to restore the unavailable equipment within the CT. Another disincentive for licensees to enter a higher mode when an LCO is not met is related to reporting requirements. 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 make it clear that a report is required when a nuclear plant shutdown or mode change is required by TS. The NRC's oversight program will provide the framework for inspectors and other staff t

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

Robert Dennig, Mail Stop: O-12H4, Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 0001, telephone 3014151161.
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