Federal Register: December 29, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 249)
DOCID: FR Doc 05-24555
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
CFR Citation: 14 CFR Parts 401, 415, 431, 435, 440, 450, and 460
Docket ID: [Docket No. FAA-2005-23449; Notice No. 05-17]
RIN ID: RIN 2120-AI57
NOTICE: Part II
DOCUMENT ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
SUBJECT CATEGORY:
Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight Participants
DATES: Send your comments on or before February 27, 2006.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY:
The FAA proposes requirements for human space flight of crew and space flight participants as required by the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004. If adopted, this rulemaking would establish requirements for crew qualifications, training, and notification. It would also establish training and informed consent requirements for space flight participants. The rulemaking would also modify existing financial responsibility requirements to account for the FAA's new authority for space flight participants and crew, and to issue experimental permits. The experimental permit is the subject of a separate rulemaking. The FAA is conducting this rulemaking in order to fulfill its responsibilities under the new act. The requirements are designed to provide an acceptable level of safety to the general public, and to notify individuals on board of the risks associated with a launch or reentry.
SUMMARY:
Transportation Department, Federal Aviation Administration,
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of written comments.
We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. The docket is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section of this preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. You may also review the docket using the Internet at the web address in the ADDRESSES section.
Privacy Act: Using the search function of our docket Web site, anyone can find and read the comments received into any of our dockets, including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 1947778) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.
Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments we receive.
If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this proposal, include with your comments a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard and mail it to you.
Proprietary or Confidential Business Information
Do not file in the docket information that you consider to be proprietary or confidential business information. Send or deliver this information directly to the person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. You must mark the information that you consider proprietary or confidential. If you send the information on a disk or CD ROM, mark the outside of the disk or CD ROM and also identify electronically within the disk or CD ROM the specific information that is proprietary or confidential.
Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when we are aware of proprietary information filed with a comment, we do not place it in the docket. We hold it in a separate file to which the public does not have access, and place a note in the docket that we have received it. If we receive a request to examine or copy this information, we treat it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). We process such a request under the DOT procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.
Availability of Rulemaking Documents
You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
(1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket
Management System (DMS) Web page (http://
http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/index.cfm; or [[Page 77263]]
(3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html .
You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 2679680. Make sure to identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number of this rulemaking.
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding commercial space
transportation safety is found under the general rulemaking authority,
49 U.S.C. 322(a), of the Secretary of Transportation to carry out
Subtitle IX, Chapter 701, 49 U.S.C. 7010170121 (Chapter 701).
Additionally, the recently enacted Commercial Space Launch Amendments
Act of 2004 (the CSLAA), describes in more detail the scope of the
agency's authority. Under 49 U.S.C. 70105(b)(4), no holder of a license
or permit may launch or reenter crew unless the crew has received
training and has satisfied medical or other standards specified in a
license or permit in accordance with FAA regulations. This rulemaking
would impose crew qualification and training requirements and implement
the statutory requirement that an operator advise the flight crew that
the U.S. Government has not certified the launch vehicle as safe.
Section 70105(b)(5) provides for the FAA to promulgate regulations for
the holder of a license or permit to inform a space flight participant
in writing about the risks of launch or reentry. Under the FAA's public
safety mandate, the FAA here proposes training and security requirements for a space flight participant.
Table of Contents
I. Background
II. General Discussion of the Proposals
A. Launch and Reentry With Crew
1. Definitions Applicable to Crew
2. Authority and Process
3. Pilot and Remote Operator Qualifications
4. Medical Standards for Crew
5. Crew Training
6. Crew Notification
7. Environmental Control and Life Support System
8. Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression
9. Human Factors
10. Verification Program
11. Crew and Space Flight Participant Waiver of Claims Against U.S. Government
B. Launch and Reentry With a Space Flight Participant
1. Risk to Space Flight Participants
2. Informed Consent
3. Physical Examination
4. Space Flight Participant Training
5. Security Requirements
C. Financial Responsibility and Waiver of Liability
1. Proposal To Combine Parts 440 and 450
2. Customers of Permittee
3. Space Flight Participants and Crew
III. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
IV. The Proposed Amendment
I. Background
Chapter 701 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation and, through delegations, the FAA's Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, to oversee, license, and regulate both launches and reentries, and the operation of launch and reentry sites when carried out by U.S. citizens or within the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105; U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, Commercial Space Transportation Delegations of Authority, N1100.240 (Nov. 21, 1995). Chapter 701 directs the FAA to exercise this responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, and to encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launch and reentry by the private sector. 49 U.S.C. 70105, 70103.
In September 2000, the FAA issued regulations for licensing reusable launch vehicle (RLV) missions and for the conduct of space reentry activities. Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations; Final Rule, 65 FR 56618, 56620 (Sept. 19, 2000). Later, the FAA developed ``Draft Guidelines for Licensed Suborbital RLV Operations With Flight Crew,'' (Oct. 7, 2003).
Historically, license applicants have consisted of operators of expendable launch vehicles, which do not carry crew or passengers. Accordingly, the FAA's regulation of space launch activities has mainly addressed the safety of the uninvolved public from launch hazards. New developments in technology, potential markets, and the law have changed this. Lured by a prize of $10 million, a group of inventors and entrepreneurs began working to create suborbital reusable launch vehicles to take private citizens into space for short periods of weightlessness and a view of outer space and their home planet. The X Prize Foundation, which set up a $10 million prize for this contest, modeled the prize after early aviation prizes, intending the X Prize to jumpstart the space tourism industry.
The FAA in April 2004, issued two RLV mission specific licenses:
one for Scaled Composites and one for XCOR Aerospace in accordance with
14 CFR parts 431 and 440. These licenses apply to suborbital RLV
missions with a pilot on board.\1\ The FAA used the draft flight crew
guidelines to assist in these two license application evaluations. To
protect the safety of the uninvolved public, the FAA imposed
operational requirements, as well as a system safety process to
identify hazards and risk mitigation measures, including operational
constraints. Operational constraints included restraints on the trajectory of SpaceShipOne over specific populated areas.
\1\ The FAA treats a pilot as part of a flight safety system for protecting the public.
Scaled Composites won the X Prize on October 4, 2004, by being the first to finance privately, build, and launch a vehicle able to carry three people to an altitude of 100 kilometers (62 statute miles). Scaled Composites' SpaceShipOne had to return safely to Earth, and then repeat the trip within two weeks.
Although Scaled Composites won the prize, other developers were contestants and are still working to reach space. More than 20 teams from seven countries registered to compete. Concurrent with Scaled Composites winning the X Prize, a new company, Virgin Galactic, announced that it would offer rides to space on a new model of the vehicle that won the prize. Space may soon open up to citizen explorers, businesses, and tourists.
In December 2004, Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act. The CSLAA requires that a phased approach be used in regulating commercial human space flight; that is, regulatory standards governing human space flight must evolve as the industry matures. In the near term, the CSLAA requires that the FAA: (1) Issue guidelines or advisory circulars to guide the implementation of the CSLAA as soon as practical after the date of its enactment; (2) issue proposed regulations relating to crew, space flight participants, and permits for launch or reentry of reusable suborbital rockets not later than December 23, 2005; and (3) issue final regulations not later than June 23, 2006. On February 11, 2005, the FAA issued ``Draft Guidelines for Commercial Suborbital Reusable Launch Vehicle Operations With Flight Crew'' and ``Draft Guidelines for Commercial Suborbital Reusable Launch Vehicle Operations With Space Flight Participants.''
The CSLAA made the FAA responsible for the safety of space flight
participants and crew. The CSLAA limits, however, the FAA's ability to [[Page 77264]]
carry out that responsibility for eight years from the date of
enactment. The CSLAA requires that a space flight participant be
informed of the risks of taking a ride on a rocket, and the FAA may
issue regulations requiring space flight participants to undergo an appropriate physical examination.\2\
\2\ The FAA has decided against prescribing specific medical
requirements for space flight participants at this time. Instead, the FAA issued guidelines recommending that space flight
participants obtain an evaluation of their medical history to
determine whether a physical examination might be appropriate.
``Draft Guidelines for Commercial Suborbital Reusable Launch Vehicle
Operations with Space Flight Participants,'' Federal Aviation Administration (Feb. 11, 2005).
These rules also would apply to expendable launch vehicle (ELV) launches with humans on board. Although the FAA prepared this NPRM to accommodate reentry and reusable launch vehicles, the FAA is aware that there are plans to launch crewed vehicles on ELVs. Expendable launch vehicles could carry humans on board as they did during the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs. This could involve mounting crew capsules on ELVs in order to launch crew or space flight participants to orbit. Unless the National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) or the Department of Defense conducted the launch for the Federal Government, the FAA would license these activities as commercial launches and reentries and the requirements proposed here would apply.
The requirements proposed as a new part 460 would apply to licensees and permittees under Chapter 701, and to crew and space flight participants on board a launch vehicle and to a remote operator. This rulemaking proposes crew notification, medical, qualification, and training requirements. The FAA would also establish requirements governing environmental control and life support systems, smoke detection and fire suppression, and human factors. The FAA would require an operator to account for human factors whenever the crew must perform safetycritical roles. Additionally, the FAA proposes to require an operator to implement a verification program sufficient to verify the integrated performance of a vehicle's hardware and any software in an operational flight environment before allowing a space flight participant to be on board.
The FAA would also impose requirements for space flight participants. This rulemaking would require an operator to inform a space flight participant of the risks of space travel generally and of the operator's vehicle in particular. An operator would also have to advise a space flight participant that the U.S. Government has not certified the vehicle as safe for carrying flight crew or space flight participants. Although the FAA continues to recommend that a prospective space flight participant obtain a physical examination before embarking on a journey to space, the FAA does not propose to require it here. This rulemaking would require training and general security requirements for a space flight participant.
Finally, the FAA proposes to implement the changes to its financial risk sharing and responsibility requirements due to the recently enacted Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004. In brief, the CSLAA requires crew and space flight participants to enter into reciprocal waivers of claims with the U.S. Government. Crew includes flight crew and any remote operator. The CSLAA expressly excludes space flight participants for eligibility from indemnification against third party claims. Launches and reentries performed pursuant to a permit are also excluded from eligibility for indemnification. The FAA is otherwise addressing its new authority under the CSLAA to issue permits in a separate rulemaking.
II. General Discussion of the Proposals
The proposed requirements would apply to licensees and permittees
under Chapter 701, and to crew and space flight participants on board a
launch vehicle. This rulemaking would define crew and flight crew and
propose crew notification, medical, qualification, and training
requirements. It would also impose informed consent and training requirements for space flight participants.
A. Launch and Reentry With Crew
1. Definitions Applicable to Crew
This rulemaking would apply to flight crew and any remote operator not on board the vehicle. The only ground crew to which this rulemaking would apply is a remote operator.
In keeping with the statutory definition, the FAA would define crew to mean any employee or independent contractor of a licensee, transferee, or permittee, or of a contractor or subcontractor of a licensee, transferee, or permittee, who performs activities in the course of that employment directly relating to the launch, reentry, or other operation of or in a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle that carries human beings. Although the CSLAA only mentions employees as being eligible for the status of crew, the FAA considers flight crew part of the flight safety system. Therefore the FAA proposes to treat as crew any human being who is part of the flight safety system, regardless of whether the person's status is that of an employee or independent contractor. The FAA would treat as crew those persons on board a vehicle and any remote operator of the vehicle. A remote operator would only include someone engaged actively in controlling the vehicle, and not someone with some ability to affect the vehicle but no ability to control its course. Congress provided the agency some latitude in determining what individuals on the ground to include in the definition of crew. This has implications for safety, notification requirements, and crew waivers of liability against the U.S. Government. The CSLAA itself defines crew broadly to include a person ``who performs activities in the course of that employment directly relating to the launch, reentry, or other operation of or in a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle that carries human beings.'' 49 U.S.C. 70102(2). The House proposed this definition in H.R. 3752, a predecessor bill to H.R. 5382, which was enacted as the CSLAA. Accordingly, the House Report accompanying H.R. 3752 may be useful in interpreting the CSLAA. The report states that the FAA should not interpret the definition of crew ``overly broadly'' to encompass individuals with peripheral roles, such as sales agents or insurance providers. Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, H.R. 3752, H. Rep. 429, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 1, 2004). Nonetheless, the House Science Committee contemplated that the FAA would apply it more broadly than pilots or remote operators of a launch vehicle. Id.
The FAA's proposed definition of crew would include all crew on
board, namely the flight crew \3\, as part of the crew, and thus give a
broader meaning to ``crew'' than one consisting of only a pilot or
remote operator. Because Congress contemplated operation of or in a
vehicle (emphasis added), Congress appears to have intended some
persons on the ground to be included as part of the crew. A remote
operator of a vehicle satisfies the Congressional direction to include
some ground crew as part of the crew. Also, a remote operator is
someone whose employment would directly relate to a launch or reentry, thus satisfying the other statutory prong.
\3\ The FAA proposes to define flight crew as crew that is on board a vehicle during a launch or reentry.
[[Page 77265]]
If Congress meant to include as ground crew those who are involved only in preparation but who are not on board during flight, certain perverse consequences would ensue. For example, under such an interpretation, the CSLAA would require an operator to inform employees working on the ground that the U.S. Government has not certified a vehicle as safe for carrying crew or space flight participants. 49 U.S.C. 70105(b)(4)(B). In light of the fact that those employees would not be on board, this would not be a meaningful exercise because they do not need the warning. A statute should not be read to reach an irrational result, and the FAA will not do so here.
XCOR commented on the FAA's February 11, 2005 draft guidelines on flight crew. Those comments are available in the docket. XCOR commented that flight crew, in the RLV community, is usually taken to mean those crewmembers whose roles are essential to public safety. XCOR believes that the definition of flight crew in the guidelines is too broad because it would include a pilot, a flight engineer, and a steward. XCOR maintains that although a pilot's function is essential to public safety, and a flight engineer's function may be essential to public safety, a steward's duty to maintain the safety and comfort of passengers is not essential to public safety if the vehicle is designed or operated so that unruly or panicked passengers cannot interfere with the operation of the vehicle. Consequently, XCOR would define what commercial aviation calls ``cabin crew,'' those crewmembers aboard a vehicle whose roles are not essential to public safety, to distinguish them from those crewmembers aboard the vehicle whose roles are essential to public safety. Furthermore, XCOR recommends a definition of flight crew that excludes cabin crew so that the qualification, training, and medical guidelines for flight crew would not apply to such cabin crew as a steward.
The FAA's training proposal should alleviate XCOR's concerns in
this area. Although the FAA proposes to employ a definition of flight
crew that would encompass the same persons as the definition of the
draft guidelines, the FAA would not require all members of a flight crew to undergo the same training or to possess the same
qualifications. Most of a flight attendant's or steward's duties will
not affect public safety. Those duties would not be the subject of
regulatory oversight. However, some duties might affect public safety,
such as preventing space flight participants from having access to the
flight deck and interfering with the pilot. In order to address the
various flight crew roles and responsibilities, the FAA proposes that
each flight crew member train for his or her role. This would mean that
a flight attendant or steward would not be required to undergo
unnecessary training, only that required for his or her role. 2. Authority and Process
The CSLAA allows the FAA to impose crew training requirements. Additionally, the FAA retains full authority to continue protecting the uninvolved public. Accordingly, as it has in the past, the FAA finds that it needs to protect the crew when it is part of the flight safety system, and proposes crew training requirements that are intended for the safety of members of the public, including those on the ground, in the air, and in space. In a piloted vehicle, the vehicle's flight crew is an integral part of its flight safety system. This is because they are in a position to respond to risk to the public, such as aborting the flight or maneuvering a vehicle away from populated areas. For purposes of public safety, therefore, the FAA proposes a number of crew training requirements.
In brief, the FAA would require that crew be properly trained. As authorized by the CSLAA, the FAA would require each crew member to receive training and satisfy medical or other standards as specified in a license or permit. 49 U.S.C. 70105(b)(4)(A). As is the case now, this means that the FAA will be able to add terms and conditions specific to a particular vehicle to a license or permit. If for example, a particular situation required additional training measures, the FAA would impose them through the license or permit process. Where the FAA proposes a performance standard, the agency also proposes that an operator describe to the FAA during the license or permit process the measures it would take to satisfy that performance standard. Accordingly, the FAA proposes some changes to parts 415, 431 and 435 to ensure that an operator demonstrates how it will achieve compliance before it obtains a license.\4\ Where the FAA requirements would be more specific, the FAA does not propose to require a demonstration from an applicant, merely compliance. For example, an applicant would not have to demonstrate that informed consent has been obtained from a space flight participant as part of its application process. \4\ Likewise, for an applicant seeking an experimental permit under 49 U.S.C. 70105a, the FAA is currently conducting another rulemaking to ensure that a permit applicant demonstrates compliance with proposed part 460.
3. Pilot and Remote Operator Qualifications
The FAA would require, for purposes of proposed part 460, that a pilot and any remote operator of a launch or reentry vehicle that will operate in the National Airspace System (NAS), possess an FAA pilot certificate with an instrument rating and that they demonstrate the knowledge of the NAS necessary to operate the vehicle. The pilot or remote operator would also need to have the aeronautical experience and skills necessary to pilot and control the vehicle. In order to obtain a pilot certificate, a person must become educated in the rules of operating in the NAS. A pilot certificate also provides evidence of a person's skill level. When the FAA licensed SpaceShipOne missions, the agency accepted the pilots' commercial pilot certificates as demonstrating adequate skills. A person holding a sport pilot certificate or a student pilot would be unlikely to satisfy this standard.
The FAA does not propose to specify the particular kind of pilot certificate required nor what category, class, type or instrument ratings are needed because different operators are proposing vehicles of varied and unique designs. For example, there are numerous possible vehicle configurations and operations: vertical takeoff and landing and horizontal takeoff and landing. A vehicle may or may not be a winged vehicle, and it may or may not be air launched. It may land powered like an airplane or unpowered like a glider. Accordingly, the FAA would assess, through the licensing or permitting process, the type of pilot certificate, flight experience, and missionspecific training for proposed operations that a pilot possessed. For example, during its licensing evaluation, the FAA took into consideration the extensive missionspecific training that the SpaceShipOne pilots underwent with a ground simulator and aircraft with operating characteristics similar to SpaceShipOne and that these pilots possessed commercial pilot certificates.
The FAA proposes to require an instrument rating as well. The FAA anticipates that regardless of the kind of vehicle used, there will be times when a pilot will be relying on instrument skills and competency. Accordingly, a person who held an instrument rating would indicate an appropriate level of skill and competency to pilot these launch and reentry vehicles.
[[Page 77266]]
The FAA's February 11, 2005 draft crew guidelines recommend that a pilot hold ratings to operate one or more aircraft with similar characteristics for as many phases of the mission as practicable. The guidelines use the term ``as practicable'' because the FAA realizes that some launch vehicles will not possess operating characteristics similar to existing aircraft. The FAA continues to consider this advisable, but because of the differences in proposed vehicles and the likelihood that there will be vehicles without characteristics similar to aircraft, the FAA will not, other than an instrument rating, mandate such a requirement through regulation. Nonetheless, if an operator proposed to demonstrate the adequacy of the training of its crew by showing that a pilot held ratings for similar operations, the FAA would look favorably on such a demonstration. In addition to holding commercial pilot certificates, the SpaceShipOne pilots held ratings to operate aircraft with similar characteristics for certain phases of flight of SpaceShipOne and underwent rigorous training.
The FAA considered two alternatives to its proposed requirements. The FAA considered not requiring a pilot certificate at all, and only relying on the proposed performance requirement that a pilot possess the necessary skills and experience. This is because possession of a pilot certificate could demonstrate that a pilot possessed the skills and experience necessary to control the vehicle. Thus, a requirement to possess a pilot certificate might be redundant. Alternatively, the FAA could require that the pilot or any remote operator possess a commercial pilot certificate to demonstrate the minimum pilot skills required by 14 CFR part 61. In that case, the FAA would likely require in the final rule that a pilot or any remote operator hold a valid and current commercial pilot certificate with an instrument rating. Additionally, the FAA would require that the pilot or remote operator possess aeronautical experience and skills necessary to pilot and control the launch and reentry vehicle being applied for. The aeronautical experience would include a certain amount of aeronautical experience in an aircraft in flight, instrument training, and training in the launch and reentry vehicle being applied for. The FAA may still adopt one of these proposals and requests comment on these options as well.
Conversely, the FAA considered proposing that a remote operator not
be required to possess a pilot certificate. In this case, a remote
operator would still have to demonstrate knowledge of the NAS and have
the aeronautical experience and skills necessary to pilot and control
the vehicle. In aviation, there is no consensus on whether requiring
piloting experience is necessary or appropriate for remote operators.
The U.S. Air Force currently requires such experience for remote
operators of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).\5\ Thus, U.S. Air Force
remote operators are experienced pilots who have at least one
operational tour of duty in another combat aircraft. Unlike the U.S.
Air Force, the U.S. Army does not require a remote operator of a UAV to be a pilot.
\5\ The applicability depends, at least in part, on whether
controlling the vehicle involves ``stickandrudder'' control
inputs, or simply punching buttons to send commands to a vehicle autopilot.
Regardless of vehicle design, having a pilot certificate and aeronautical experience provides evidence of a basic level of knowledge of and experience with the NAS, such as communications, navigation, airspace limitations, and other aircraft traffic avoidance, that will help promote public safety. Furthermore, a pilot with an instrument rating has been trained to fly and navigate entirely by reference to flight instruments.
The FAA requests comments on whether a remote operator of a launch or reentry vehicle with a human on board should possess a pilot certificate. The FAA anticipates that a pilot certificate would serve as the clearest indication that a person has the necessary knowledge of the NAS and safety issues. The FAA recognizes, however, that there may be other, less burdensome methods of demonstrating compliance and requests comment accordingly.
4. Medical Standards for Crew
The FAA would require that each member of the flight crew and any remote operator possess and carry a secondclass airman medical certificate issued in accordance with 14 CFR part 67 and issued within 12 months prior to launch or reentry. The physical and mental state of the flight crew has to be sufficient to perform safetyrelated roles.
Secondclass airman medical certification standards have provided an acceptable level of safety for commercial pilots for many years. Commercial pilots are medically certificated to a level between a private pilot and an airline transport pilot; the former requiring less stringent vision standards and having longer certificate validity, and the latter requiring more stringent cardiovascular and certificate validity standards. An FAA secondclass airman medical certificate is issued to an applicant who may reasonably be expected, for the year long duration of the certificate, to perform safely the duties required to exercise commercial pilot privileges.
Different aviation pilot certificates require different medical certificates. The validity of a particular airman medical certificate relates to the aviation privilege being exercised. For example, a firstclass airman medical certificate is valid for 6 months for aviation privileges requiring a firstclass airman medical certificate, for 12 months for those requiring a secondclass airman medical certificate, and for 24 or 36 months for those requiring a thirdclass airman medical certificate. Because space operations are not defined in terms of privileges being exercised, the FAA does not need to set forth a particular validity structure. Furthermore, for purposes of space operations, the FAA does not need to describe a medical certificate by the aviation operations for which it is valid. In the space context, the FAA only requires that it be issued within the past 12 months, in keeping with the 12month validity period used in aviation for pilots exercising commercial pilot privileges.
Applicants for any class of airman medical certificate must meet minimum vision, hearing, mental, neurological, and basic cardiovascular standards. Such standards are required to ensure that pilots are able to perform their aviation duties safely. For example, commercial pilots need adequate intermediate vision to monitor aircraft instruments, and other cockpit equipment, and adequate color vision to be able to distinguish aviation signal colors. They need an acceptable level of hearing to be able to communicate with Air Traffic Control, any flight crew, other crewmembers, or passengers. They require mental stability to exercise sound judgment.
Part 67 was developed for aviation. The FAA will, through licensing and permitting, acquire experience with medical certification of space flight crews. The FAA considers, howeverat least during these early stages, primarily of suborbital space flightthat secondclass airman medical certification standards would provide a minimum level of medical certification adequate for space flight crews to perform safetycritical roles.
In addition to requiring a secondclass medical certificate, the
FAA proposes a performance standard, which could be tailored to the
different stresses caused by different vehicles. The performance
standard would require each member of the crew to be able to withstand the
[[Page 77267]]
stresses of space flight sufficiently to carry out his or her role on board so that the vehicle will not harm the public.
The FAA does not, at this early stage of development of the industry, presume to anticipate what environmental stresses any particular crew member may have to endure to operate a vehicle. Nonetheless, although different vehicles may impose different stresses, those stresses are likely to include microgravity, acceleration, and vibration. Different vehicles and flight profiles may subject those on board to different stresses. The FAA therefore would not want yet to impose requirements that apply across the board, preferring, instead, to evaluate each separately through the licensing or permitting process. For example, SpaceShipOne's pilots underwent training that included aerobatic maneuvers and unusual attitude recovery training to match the anticipated stresses of the eventual flight environment. Unusual attitudes may include high rates of roll and allattitude spins. The FAA found that SpaceShipOne's pilot training demonstrated the ability to withstand the anticipated stresses, such as those due to vehicle acceleration and deceleration.
The FAA would implement this broad performance standard on a case bycase basis. An operator would have to demonstrate satisfaction of this standard in the course of applying for a license, a permit or a modification to a license or permit. Grant of a license or permit would be conditioned, as it is now, on an operator abiding by the representations made in its application. The FAA anticipates that an operator may change crew members from time to time. Because the initial grant of a license or permit may have been conditioned on the acceptability of the original crew, the FAA would have to modify the license. Alternatively, the FAA could foresee an operator describing its testing process sufficiently to demonstrate that the operator would be able to ascertain whether an individual crew member could withstand the specific stresses of a given vehicle.
The casebycase assessments of whether a flight crew member satisfied the proposed performance standard of withstanding the stresses of space flight would serve two purposes. The assessments would ensure that any particular member of the flight crew could perform his or her duties in whatever environment was proposed. Additionally, these assessments would provide data for the FAA to develop more concrete standards as the industry progresses. The FAA does not expect orbital commercial human space flight to occur in the immediate future. Nonetheless, it does anticipate its eventual appearance, and recognizes that different standards may be required for orbital and suborbital flights. The FAA will gather data for the development of those standards over time.
5. Crew Training
The FAA would require each member of a crew be trained to ensure that the vehicle will not harm the public. The crew would also be trained to respond to planned and anomalous events. The FAA would require an operator to develop a mission and configurationspecific training program for a pilot and any remote operator and define standards by which the pilot and remote operator would be trained so that the vehicle would not harm the public. The operator's training program would include for each mission, either simulation training, training on a similar aircraft, flight testing, or another training method approved by the FAA.
The FAA would require an operator to ensure that any crewtraining device used to meet the training program requirements realistically represented the vehicle's configuration and mission or the operator would have to inform the crew member being trained of the differences. XCOR through its comments on the FAA's February 11, 2005 draft guidelines on flight crew states that some early flight crew training devices will not be realistic. According to XCOR, this lack of realism will not mean they are useless as training devices because it may be better to train the flight crew on a simulator with known differences from the flight article than not to train them on a simulator at all. XCOR recommended that training devices with known dissimilarities be allowed but the dissimilarities should be minimized, and flight crew should be aware of the differences in behavior between the training device and the flight article.
The FAA would require crew training to include nominal (i.e., normal) and nonnominal flight conditions. Training to respond to planned and unplanned events would allow the crew to better respond to emergencies. The crew would obtain a competent understanding of vehicle systems, vehicle characteristics, and vehicle capabilities, as well as operational, malfunction, and contingency procedures. The nonnominal situations would include aborts and emergencies.
The FAA would require additional training for a pilot and any remote operator of a launch or reentry vehicle. A pilot would have to undergo training in procedures that direct the vehicle away from the public in the event the flight crew had to abandon the vehicle during flight. The pilot and any remote operator would also have to train in each mode of control or propulsion, including any transition between modes, so that the pilot would be able to control the vehicle throughout the flight regime. For example, the pilot and any remote operator would have to be able to maintain control of a vehicle during a transition from aerodynamic control surfaces to a reaction control system and vice versa. Likewise, training would be necessary for any transition from an airbreathing to a rocket propulsion system and viceversa.
The FAA proposes a number of requirements for a training program. The FAA would require an operator to continually update its training program to ensure that training incorporated lessonslearned from both training and operational missions. This would be accomplished with a documented system to track revisions and updates. To that end, the FAA would require a training program to capture, in writing, lessons learned as experience was gained. Experience will reveal additional events and anomalies to which a crew would have to respond. The flight crew should be prepared for events and anomalies discovered during training and mission operations. The FAA would require a licensee or permittee to document the training completed by each member of the crew and maintain the documentation for each active member of the crew. Accurate documentation is important for tracking and ensuring that crew are uptodate with their training requirements.
The FAA would require an operator to establish a recurrent training
schedule and ensure that all crew qualifications and training were
current before starting to operate a vehicle with humans on board. This
would ensure that all crew were qualified and had received the
necessary training at the time of operation. The FAA's February 11,
2005 crew guidelines recommended that prior to each mission, the flight
crew receive vehicle and missionspecific training. Rocketplane
Limited, Inc. through its April 28, 2005 comments on the FAA's crew
guidelines stated that retraining would be an important requirement if
there were periods of inactivity between flights. Rocketplane Limited,
Inc. recommended retraining be required when more than thirty days elapsed between flights rather than
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requiring it prior to each mission. XCOR stated that common sense
should determine the appropriate level of training necessary to safely
conduct the flight. Hence, the FAA would require an operator to establish a recurrent training schedule.
6. Crew Notification
The FAA would require an operator to inform, in writing, any individual serving as flight crew and each remote operator, that the United States Government has not certified the launch vehicle as safe for carrying crew or space flight participants. If someone is operating a vehicle remotely, the FAA believes that Congress intended that the operator advise the remote operator of the risks he or she is taking with the people on board.
7. Environmental Control and Life Support System
The proper functioning of the crew is necessary to ensure protection of the public. The FAA would require an operator to provide atmospheric conditions adequate to sustain life and consciousness for all inhabited areas within a launch or reentry vehicle. The flight crew could perform the roles necessary to carry out this proposed requirement. Proper environmental control is essential for people and for the functioning of safetycritical equipment on board a vehicle.
There are many aspects to controlling the atmosphere of a vehicle
that an operator would have to consider. The FAA proposes to require an
operator to monitor and control the composition and any revitalization
of the atmosphere to maintain safe levels for flight crew respiration
during nominal and nonnominal operations. The atmosphere in inhabited
areas should have safe levels of oxygen and carbon dioxide to allow
normal respiration. Because of normal human metabolic effluent, carbon
dioxide will accumulate and it may be necessary for it to be removed.\6\
\6\ Guidance on environmental control and life support systems
may be found in ``Designing For Human Presence in Space: An
Introduction to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems''
(NASA RP1324) and ``ManSystems Integration Standards'' (NASASTD 3000).
The FAA would require a licensee, permittee or flight crew to
monitor and control the pressure of the atmosphere to maintain safe
levels for flight crew respiration. An essential aspect of the body's
ability to absorb oxygen from the air is the atmospheric pressure,
specifically the partial pressure of oxygen (pO
An operator would have to monitor and control the temperature of the atmosphere to maintain safe levels for the flight crew. Although humans can survive in a relatively wide range of temperatures, it is essential to regulate the temperature within a cabin or suit. Requiring proper temperature control would ensure the flight crew maintained a degree of situational awareness sufficient for these individuals to perform their job. An operator would also have to monitor and control the ventilation and circulation of the cabin atmosphere to maintain safe levels for the flight crew. Requiring proper ventilation would ensure the flight crew maintained situational awareness by reducing stagnant air, which could contain a high concentration of carbon dioxide.
The FAA proposes to require an operator to monitor and control the humidity of the cabin atmosphere to maintain safe levels for the flight crew. If a flight crew depended on visual information through a window, humidity control would be necessary to avoid windows fogging and condensation that can hinder the pilot's vision. The FAA proposes to require an operator to control contamination and particulate concentrations for the flight crew to prevent interference with the crew's ability to operate the vehicle. The atmosphere should be free from harmful or hazardous concentrations of gases, vapors, and particulates that can be inhaled.
The FAA proposes to require an operator to provide an adequate redundant or secondary oxygen supply for the flight crew due to the extreme importance of having sufficient oxygen to enable the flight crew to function. In the event of a failure of the primary atmospheric control system, the redundant or secondary system would supply oxygen for the flight crew.
Lastly, the operator would have to provide a redundant means of preventing cabin depressurization or prevent incapacitation of the flight crew in the event of a loss of cabin pressure. If a loss of pressure were to occur, it could have serious physiological effects on the flight crew, including hypoxia, decompression sickness, hypothermia, and vaporization of tissue fluids. This performance standard could be satisfied by different means. For example, in addition to conducting ground tests and prelaunch cabin leak checks, Scaled Composites used dual pane windows, dual seals on cabin pass throughs, dual door seals, and dual pressurization systems for SpaceShipOne. Use of a pressure suit to prevent incapacitation of the flight crew if there were a loss of cabin pressure could be another means to satisfy this performance standard.
8. Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression
The FAA would require an operator or flight crew to have the ability to detect smoke and suppress a cabin fire to prevent incapacitation of the flight crew. Prior to a fire occurring, smoke can rapidly incapacitate a pilot or obscure the pilot's vision such that the vehicle cannot be flown safely. A crew should be able to respond to a vehicle fire so as not to risk the public.
9. Human Factors
The FAA would require an operator to account for human factors so that the flight crew could perform safetycritical roles. Human factors engineering is a discipline that applies knowledge of human capabilities and limitations to the design of systems, machines, work environment, and operations. Human factors considerations draw on multiple disciplines such as psychology, physiology, engineering, ergonomics, and medicine. The design and layout of displays and controls and the amount of crew workload can affect the ability of the crew to perform safetycritical roles. Therefore, the FAA would require an operator to account for human factors that can affect the flight crew's ability to perform safetycritical roles.
Mockups, simulators, and human factors analyses such as functional and task analyses are examples of human factorsrelated applications to assess humanmachine interfaces or humaninthe loop functions and performance. ``The Human Factors Design Standard'' (HFSTD001, FAA), ``DOD Design Criteria StandardHuman Engineering'' (MILSTD1472), ``Flying Qualities of Piloted Aircraft'' (MILHDBK1797), and ``Man Systems Integration Standards'' (NASASTD3000) may provide guidance on applying human factors engineering. Humanrelated factors account for the majority of fatal aircraft accidents. Conversely, aircraft system malfunctions are involved in a relatively small fraction of aircraft incidents and accidents. Some human factorsrelated lessons learned from aviation may apply to suborbital RLVs with a flight crew on board.
The FAA proposes to require an operator to make provisions for
restraint or stowage of all individuals and objects in a cabin, so
moving objects would not interfere with the flight crew's operation of
the vehicle during flight. The FAA does not expect that this requirement would prevent an operator from
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allowing space flight participants to experience weightlessness during
a part of the mission. In order to allow this experience, the FAA would
look at whether the restraints on space flight participants would keep
those participants from interfering with flight crew activities. For
example, space flight participants separated by a bulkhead might be considered adequately restrained.
10. Verification Program
The FAA proposes to require an operator to implement a verification program sufficient to verify the integrated performance of a vehicle's hardware and any software in an operational flight environment. The FAA would require this verification program to include flight testing and the program would have to be successfully completed before allowing any space flight participant on board during a flight. An operator needs to establish a safety record to disclose to a space flight participant as required by the CSLAA. Furthermore, a space flight participant could not be present during flight testing in order to avoid distracting the flight crew from its public safety mission. The FAA intends early, experimental flight testing to take place with the flight crew's entire attention dedicated to the vehicle, not to anyone else on board.
XCOR through its comments on the FAA's February 11, 2005 draft
guidelines on space flight participants states that flight testing
plays an integral role in the provision of informed consent. Without a
flight test plan, and some number of flight tests, the RLV operator
cannot provide the space flight participant with a valid number \7\ for
demonstrated reliability. XCOR further noted that if an operator cannot
provide a valid number for demonstrated reliability, then the space
flight participant cannot give informed consent, and the operator cannot fly the space flight participant.
\7\ The FAA interprets XCOR's use of the term ``valid number'' to mean a reliability number based on experience.
In addition to avoiding distraction of the crew and establishing a safety record for disclosure to a space flight participant, flight testing provides other benefits. Flight testing provides data to validate analytical tools and models used to predict environments and responses. The initial flights and envelope expansion flights of a new vehicle typically pose the highest risk. Although flight testing does not eliminate risk, it does mitigate risk by potentially uncovering safetyrelated problems that may go undetected if relying only on analysis and ground testing. Verification of performance by flight testing can provide more information than ground testing and analysis and should be conducted to the maximum extent possible. Ground testing and analysis are often based on estimates and approximations, and may not fully simulate possible subsystem interactions in flight environments or may not accurately simulate actual flight conditions.
The FAA will initially determine the amount of verification and,
specifically, flight testing of launch or reentry vehicles on a case
bycase basis through the licensing or permitting process. The
appropriate level of testing depends on many factors, including the
vehicle's mission profile, operational restrictions, test and flight
history, component and subsystem heritage, and design and operating margins.
11. Crew and Space Flight Participant Waiver of Claims Against U.S. Government
The CSLAA requires crew and each space flight participant to execute a reciprocal waiver of claims with the FAA. 49 U.S.C. 70112(b)(2). This requirement would not apply to ground crew other than remote operators.
The CSLAA does not require crew and space flight participants to waive claims against each other or against a licensee or permittee. The CSLAA does not, however, prevent an operator from making a waiver of liability a condition of an agreement between it and a space flight participant or crew.
B. Launch and Reentry With a Space Flight Participant
This rulemaking would also establish informed consent and training
requirements for a space flight participant on board a launch or
reentry authorized by the FAA. Regardless of whether a space flight
participant pays for a ride, the space flight participant must provide informed consent and be trained.\8\
\8\ Although under the CSLAA a space flight participant may not
provide compensation for a space flight on a launch authorized by an
FAA permit, Congress did not foreclose the presence of a space
flight participant on a permitted launch. Under the CSLAA, the FAA
may issue a permit only for a reusable suborbital rocket that will
be launched or reentered solely for research and development to test
new design concepts, new equipment or new operating techniques;
showing compliance with requirements as part of the process for
obtaining a license under Chapter 701; or crew training prior to
obtaining a license for a launch or reentry using the design of the
rocket for which the permit would be issued. 49 U.S.C. 70105a(d)(1)
(3). Although a space flight participant could not pay to ride on a
rocket operated under a permit, a space flight participant could be
on board. Congress contemplated as much in section 70105(b)(5), when
it imposed conditions on holders of a license or permit launching or reentering a space flight participant.
1. Risk to Space Flight Participants
The CSLAA characterizes what is commonly referred to as a passenger as a ``space flight participant.'' The statute defines this person to mean ``an individual, who is not crew, carried within a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle.'' 49 U.S.C. 70102(17). This characterization signifies that someone on board a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle is not a typical passenger with typical expectations of transport, but someone going on an adventure ride.
Space flight remains inherently risky. Testimony concerning a predecessor to the CSLAA highlights the situation. Michael S. Kelly, of NorthropGrumman/Xon Tech, testified that ``space flight is years from being routine, or even a mode of transportation per se. Transportation refers to reaching a desired destination. Space flight, for the foreseeable future, will be an end in itself.'' Commercial Space Act of 2003, H.R. 3245, 108th Cong., (Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Michael Kelly). Mr. Kelly characterized the experience as an adventure ride. Others have compared it to mountain climbing, skydiving, not wearing a helmet while riding a motorcycle, and other risky endeavors.
New technologies carry new risks. Nonetheless, Congress recognizes that ``private industry has begun to develop commercial launch vehicles capable of carrying human beings into space, and greater private investment in these efforts will stimulate the Nation's commercial space transportation industry as a whole.'' 49 U.S.C. 70101(11). To that end, the CSLAA finds that ``the public interest is served by creating a clear legal, regulatory, and safety regime for commercial human space flight.'' 49 U.S.C. 70101(14). With an infant industry, Congress notes, ``regulatory standards must evolve as the industry matures, so that regulations neither stifle technology development nor expose crew or space flight participants to avoidable risks as the public comes to expect greater safety for crew and space flight participants from the industry.'' 49 U.S.C. 70101(15). The CSLAA is structured to allow the same kind of risk that mountain climbers and other adventurers seek in the context of space flight.
The CSLAA provides the FAA authority to issue rules to protect
space flight participants. 49 U.S.C. 70103. That authority, however, is limited. The FAA is only able to impose ``additional
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license requirements for a launch vehicle carrying a human being for
compensation or hire, necessary to protect the health and safety of
flight crew or space flight participants,'' if such requirements are
imposed pursuant to final regulations. 49 U.S.C. 70105(b)(2)(D). This
provision appears to limit the FAA's current approach of imposing
requirements on a casebycase basis through license terms and
conditions. For purposes of protecting the public on the ground, when
an applicant proposes an operation not covered by existing rules, the
FAA has the ability to impose license restrictions to address new
proposals. For purposes of protecting space flight participants and
crew, however, Congress has limited the FAA's ability to impose safety
requirements until the FAA passes regulations. Space flight
participants should therefore have no expectations that the FAA is
imposing individualized or tailored requirements designed to achieve their protection.
Those regulations, in turn, may only be promulgated under certain circumstances. 49 U.S.C. 70105(c). For eight years, the CSLAA only permits the FAA to issue regulations restricting or prohibiting design features or operating practices that result in a serious injury, fatality or a close call to those on board during an FAA authorized flight. This means that the FAA has to wait for harm to occur or almost occur before it can impose restrictions, even against foreseeable harm. Instead, Congress requires that space flight participants be informed of the risks. To that end, the FAA proposes notification requirements in subpart B of proposed part 460.
2. Informed Consent
Congress requires that a licensed or permitted operator inform a space flight participant in writing about the risks of the launch and reentry, including the safety record of the launch or reentry vehicle type. 49 U.S.C. 70105(b)(5)(A). The FAA's Sec. 460.45 would implement this statutory provision. Additionally, the proposed regulations would require an operator to describe these hazards and risks in a manner that is understandable to the space flight participant. As with crew, the CSLAA requires an operator to inform each space flight participant that the United States Government has not certified the launch vehicle as safe for carrying crew or space flight participants. The FAA would also require a space flight participant to provide his or her consent in writing before boarding a vehicle.
More specifically, under Sec. 460.45, an operator would have to provide the safety record of all launch or reentry vehicles that have carried one or more persons on board, including both U.S. Government and private sector vehicles. The development of commercial launch vehicles to carry space flight participants is in the early stages. Consequently, newly developed launch vehicles will not have the extensive flighttest history or operational experience that exists for commercial airplanes. Because of the lack of flighttest and operational experience, the risks of the operator's particular launch vehicle and of vehicles like it should be disclosed. The House Committee on Science report, H. Rep. 108429, clarifies that Congress intended all government and private sector vehicles to be included in this disclosure. Because most human space flight to date has taken place under government auspices, the government safety record currently provides the most data. The operator should provide a record of all vehicles that have carried a person because they are the most relevant to what the operators propose. Regardless of whether humans traveled to space on board a vehicle destined for a suborbital or orbital mission, those persons traveled on new and unproven vehicles based on technology as new then, as what may be developed now. The vehicle and technology were therefore as risky. Likewise, because those vehicles were intended for a human on board, greater care was likely to have been taken in its design and construction. The same should be expected for commercial human space flight. Accordingly, the historical record of human space flight provides an appropriate and reasonable basis for comparison of risks to current human space flight.
Additionally, this section would also require an operator to describe the safety record of its own vehicle to each space flight participant. The operator's safety record would have to include the number of vehicle flights, the number of safetyrelated anomalies or failures, including on the ground or in flight, and whether any corrective actions were taken to resolve these anomalies or failures. If a space flight participant requested more detail, the operator would have to provide a description of the safetyrelated anomalies or failures and what the corrective actions were. For the general public, this technical information will not likely be useful, and the FAA does not want the more dire possibilities obscured by a deluge of technical data. Nonetheless, there will be space flight participants who will be able to obtain useful information from this data and make better informed choices as to whether they want to ride that particular vehicle. Accordingly, the FAA proposes to require an operator to inform each space flight participant that the safetyrelated data is available and provide the data upon request.
In its February 11, 2005, guidelines, the FAA recommended that an operator provide space flight participants an opportunity to ask questions orally to acquire a better understanding of the hazards and risks of the mission. An opportunity to ask questions allows a space flight participant a chance to get clarification on any information that may be confusing or unclear. Although the FAA does not now propose to require this recommendation, the FAA continues to consider this good practice, and believes such opportunities should be provided.
The CSLAA requires that before receiving compensation from a space
flight participant or making an agreement to fly a space flight
participant, an operator inform the space flight participant in writing
that the U.S. Government has not certified the launch vehicle as safe for carrying crew or space flight participants. 49 U.S.C.
70105(b)(5)(B). Accordingly, the FAA proposes to implement this statutory requirement in proposed 460.45(b).
3. Physical Examination
In its February 11, 2005 guidelines, the FAA recommended that a
space flight participant provide his or her medical history to a
physician experienced or trained in the concepts of aerospace medicine.
The physician would determine whether the space flight participant
should undergo an appropriate physical examination before boarding a
vehicle destined for space flight. 49 U.S.C. 70105(b)(6)(A). Guidance
for the medical assessment of space flight participants is provided in
a memorandum, ``Guidance for Medical Screening of Commercial Aerospace
Space Flight Participants,'' (Mar. 31, 2003). The Federal Air Surgeon
of the FAA's Office of Aerospace Medicine and the Director of the FAA's
Civil Aerospace Medical Institute provided this guidance to the
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation. Medical
conditions that may indicate that an individual should not participate
in a mission should be identified so that participation may be avoided
where a space flight participant's involvement in a mission could
aggravate or exacerbate a preexisting medical condition that could put
the flight crew or other space flight participants at risk. The FAA does not intend to propose that this
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recommendation become a requirement, unless a clear public safety need
is identified. It is, of course, in a space flight participant's own
interest to obtain such medical advice for both suborbital and orbital
missions, and the FAA will rely on that selfinterest until a
demonstrable need arises to mandate this through regulation. The FAA
highly recommends that a space flight participant seek such medical
advice if he or she plans to be on an orbital mission. Orbital missions
are longer in d
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
For technical information, contact Kenneth Wong, Deputy Manager, Licensing and Safety Division, Commercial Space Transportation, AST200, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267 8465; facsimile (202) 2673686, email ken.wong@faa.gov. For legal information, contact Laura Montgomery, Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 2673150; facsimile (202) 2677971, email laura.montgomery@faa.gov.