Federal Register: June 28, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 124)
DOCID: FR Doc 06-5667
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
CFR Citation: 49 CFR Parts 229 and 238
Docket ID: [Docket No. FRA-2004-17645, Notice No. 3]
RIN ID: RIN 2130-AB23
NOTICE: Part II
DOCUMENT ACTION: Final rule.
SUBJECT CATEGORY:
Locomotive Crashworthiness
DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective August 28, 2006. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the rule is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 28, 2006.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY:
FRA is issuing comprehensive, minimum standards for locomotive crashworthiness. These crashworthiness standards are intended to help protect locomotive cab occupants in the event of a locomotive collision. Examples of locomotive collision scenarios considered in this rulemaking include collisions with another locomotive, the rear of another train, a piece of ontrack equipment, a shifted load on a freight car on an adjacent parallel track, and a highway vehicle at a railhighway grade crossing. Locomotive crashworthiness must be demonstrated by complying with either the final rule's new performance standards or an FRAapproved design standard.
SUMMARY:
Transportation Department, Federal Railroad Administration,
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
I. Statutory and Regulatory Background
A. FRA Regulatory Authority
FRA has broad statutory authority to regulate railroad safety. The Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) (formerly 45 U.S.C. 2234, now 49 U.S.C. 2070120703) was enacted in 1911. It prohibits the use of unsafe locomotives and authorizes FRA (by delegation from the Secretary of Transportation) to issue standards for locomotive maintenance and testing. In order to further FRA's ability to respond effectively to contemporary safety problems and hazards as they arise in the railroad industry, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (Safety Act) (formerly 45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq., now found primarily in chapter 201 of Title 49). The Safety Act grants the Secretary of Transportation rulemaking authority over all areas of railroad safety (49 U.S.C. 20103(a)) and authority to investigate and penalize violations of any rail safety law. This authority was subsequently delegated to the FRA Administrator (49 CFR 1.49). (Until July 5, 1994, the Federal railroad safety statutes existed as separate acts found primarily in Title 45 of the United States Code. On that date, all of the acts were repealed, and their provisions were recodified into Title 49.)
The term ``railroad'' is defined in the Safety Act to include all forms of nonhighway ground transportation that runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways, * * * other than rapid transit operations within an urban area that are not connected to the general railroad system of transportation.
This definition makes clear that FRA has jurisdiction over (1) rapid transit operations within an urban area that are connected to the general railroad system of transportation, and (2) all freight, intercity, passenger, and commuter rail passenger operations regardless of their connection to the general railroad system of transportation or their status as a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. FRA has issued a policy statement describing how it determines whether particular rail passenger operations are subject to FRA's jurisdiction (65 FR 42529 (July 2, 2000)); the policy statement can be found in Appendix A to parts 209 and 211 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (hereinafter, all references to CFR parts and sections will refer to parts and sections in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
Pursuant to its statutory authority, FRA promulgates and enforces a comprehensive regulatory program to address railroad track; signal systems; railroad communications; rolling stock; rearend marking devices; safety glazing; railroad accident/incident reporting; locational requirements for dispatching of U.S. rail operations; safety integration plans governing railroad consolidations; merger and acquisitions of control; operating practices; passenger train emergency preparedness; alcohol and drug testing; locomotive engineer certification; and workplace safety.
In part 229, FRA established minimum federal safety standards for locomotives. These regulations prescribe inspection and testing requirements for locomotive components and systems, minimum locomotive cab safety requirements, and even basic crashworthiness design requirements for electric multipleunit type locomotives. On May 12, 1999, FRA issued regulations addressing the safety of passenger rail equipment, including passengeroccupied locomotives (i.e., cab control cars, powered multipleunit passenger cars). These are found in part 238. However, FRA's existing locomotive safety standards do not address the crashworthiness of conventional locomotives, which comprise the majority of locomotives in use today.
B. Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act
In 1992, Congress passed The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act (RSERA). Pub. L. 102365, September 3, 1992. In response to concerns raised by railroad employee organizations, members of Congress, and recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concerning locomotive crew safety, Congress included mandates concerning locomotive crashworthiness and cab working conditions in the legislation. Section 10 of RSERA, entitled ``Locomotive Crashworthiness and Working Conditions,'' required FRA ``to complete a rulemaking proceeding to consider prescribing regulations to improve the safety and working conditions of locomotive cabs.'' In order to determine whether crashworthiness regulations would be necessary, Congress tasked FRA with assessing the adequacy of Locomotive Crashworthiness Requirements Standard S580, or any successor standard thereto, adopted by the Association of American Railroads in 1989, in improving the safety of locomotive cabs. Furthermore, Congress specifically mandated that the Secretary, in support of the rulemaking proceeding, consider the costs and benefits associated with equipping locomotives with each of a number of specified design features.
[[Page 36889]]
FRA agrees that locomotive crashworthiness protection is necessary
because train collisions and derailments can result in crew fatalities
and injuries. In the period from 1995 to 1997, 26 locomotive cab
occupants were killed and 289 were injured in freight and passenger
train accidents in the United States, a yearly average of 105 casualties.\1\
\1\ Regulatory Impact Analysis, p. iii of Appendix B of the
Analysis. These statistics were taken from the data set of injuries/
fatalities that, because of their circumstances, could have been
prevented by the crashworthiness standards contained in this rule.
Thus, this set does not include the total number of all locomotive
cab occupant fatalities/injuries that occurred during this time period.
Adopted in 1989, Association of American Railroads (AAR) Specification S580 (``S580'') has served as the industry standard for crashworthiness design specifications of new road freight locomotives. At the time of its development, S580 provided basic enhancements to the crashworthiness of road locomotives. Many of the units built to this specification are of widenose cab design, often referred to as the North American cab design. It is generally held throughout the industry that S580 represented a significant step on the part of the railroad industry to improve the crashworthiness of locomotives. II. FRA's Response to Section 10 of RSERA
In response to the mandate of Section 10 of RSERA, FRA conducted the necessary research and analysis. FRA undertook steps to determine the health and safety effects of locomotive cab working conditions and evaluated the effectiveness of S580, along with the benefits and costs of RSERA's specified locomotive crashworthiness features (i.e., braced collision posts, rollover protection devices, deflection plates, shatterproof windows, readily accessible crash refuges, uniform sill heights, anticlimbers, or other equipment designed to prevent overrides resulting from headon locomotive collisions, equipment to deter post collision entry of flammable liquids into locomotive cabs, any other device intended to provide crash protection for occupants of locomotive cabs). In an effort to fully address the broad range of issues presented in the RSERA, FRA (1) conducted an industrywide public meeting to gather information regarding the areas of concern identified in the RSERA, (2) established a locomotive collision database based on detailed accident information gathered from actual collisions, (3) established a research contract to develop and verify a computer model capable of predicting how each of the crashworthiness features in S580 and in the RSERA affect the collision dynamics and probability of crew injury, and (4) conducted a detailed survey of locomotive crews' cab working conditions and environment. FRA detailed the results of these actions in ``Locomotive Crashworthiness and Cab Working Conditions Report to Congress,'' dated September 18, 1996. A copy of this report has been placed in the docket of this rulemaking as Document No. FRA 2004176459. Actions taken to gather information for that report are described below.
First, meetings with all segments of the railroad industry formed an essential part of FRA's plan to meet the requirements of the RSERA. FRA held an industrywide public meeting on June 23, 1993, to gather information from the industry on each of the areas of concern identified in Section 10 of the RSERA and to inform the industry of FRA's approach. This meeting was well attended by all segments of the rail industry, including rail labor, freight railroads, locomotive builders, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and commuter railroads.
At this initial meeting, some of the railroads urged that improvements in crash avoidance technology should be pursued in lieu of improved crashworthiness features. FRA is currently pursuing crash avoidance technology and on March 7, 2005, published a separate rule (part 236, subpart H) on performance standards for the use and development of processorbased signal and train control systems. See 70 FR 11052. The issue of collision avoidance is more fully discussed below in section IV of the preamble.
Several participants in the public meeting expressed an opinion
that a series of smaller, informal meetings with the separate segments
of the rail industry would provide more detailed information regarding
locomotive crashworthiness. As a result, FRA held a number of such meetings which included the following organizations:
American Public Transportation Association (APTA);
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA); Amtrak;
AAR;
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (now Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
Burlington Northern (now Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway) (BNSF); DuPont (glazing);
General Electric Transportation Systems (GE);
General MotorsElectroMotive Division (GM/EMD);
Morrison Knudsen (MK); NTSB; Sierracin (glazing); and
United Transportation Union (UTU).
These meetings generated considerable discussion about the adequacy of the AAR's Locomotive Crashworthiness Standard S580 (1989), the requirement to conduct research and analysis, including computer modeling and fullscale crash testing of the safety of locomotives, and the costs and benefits associated with RSERA's specified locomotive crashworthiness features. During the meetings, FRA requested specific cost or test data to support the positions taken by the various organizations. Some supply industry organizations were forthcoming with this data, while other organizations were apparently unable or unwilling to respond.
Second, FRA proceeded based on the understanding that earlier locomotive collision accident reports did not contain the data necessary to support crash modeling. Thus, in 1992, FRA instructed field inspectors to investigate all accidents involving either a collision of two trains or a collision of one train with an object weighing ten tons or more, regardless of monetary damage thresholds and locomotive design. This accident data provided information which FRA used to determine the possible benefits of a crashworthiness regulation.
Third, with the support of the Volpe National Transportation
Systems Center (``Volpe Center''), FRA contracted with Arthur D.
Little, Inc. (ADL) to predict the benefit, if any, of each of the
locomotive crashworthiness features listed in Section 10 of the RSERA.
Using the collision data collected by FRA, ADL performed a series of
analyses using computer models to evaluate the effectiveness of specific crashworthiness design features.\2\
\2\ Mayville, R. A., Stringfellow, R. G., Rancatore, R. J.,
Hosmer, T. P., 1995, ``Locomotive Crashworthiness Research, Volumes
1 through 5,'' DOT/FRA/ORD95/8.18.5. A copy of each cited report
has been placed in the docket of this rulemaking as Document No. FRA 20041764513.
Lastly, FRA's approach to the research and analysis tasks focused
on the cost and benefits of design changes to conventional locomotives
operating at speeds of less than 80 mph. The work done to meet the
requirements of the RSERA was not intended to address safety concerns
unique to high speed rail transportation. FRA has addressed high speed rail safety concerns,
[[Page 36890]]
including crashworthiness design, in part 238.
FRA's Report to Congress contained an implementation strategy to
address each of the issues raised by the RSERA.\3\ FRA determined that
S580, which provided for improvements in collision posts, anti
climbing arrangements, and the short hood structure, represented a
significant step on the part of the railroad industry to improve
locomotive crashworthiness. The research and analysis conducted in
response to the RSERA showed that S580 could be further improved to
reduce casualties without significantly impacting locomotive design.
FRA also found that (1) modified frontend structural designs
incorporating stronger collision posts, (2) fullheight corner posts
with increased strength, and (3) utilization of roof longitudinal
strength to support structural members from crushing may provide
opportunities for additional protection for locomotive cab occupants.
FRA even evaluated the potential to create a designated crash refuge
within the space that these measures would help to protect.
Furthermore, based on accident/incident experience and recent advances
in fuel tank design being undertaken by the industry, FRA concluded
that fuel tank design could be significantly improved to minimize the
risk and severity of future fuel spills. Finally, FRA identified
locomotive cab emergency lighting and more reliable means of rapid
egress during derailments and collisions as additional subject areas which appeared to warrant further exploration.
\3\ ``Locomotive Crashworthiness and Cab Working Conditions
Report to Congress'', Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration, 1996.
While the study findings clearly indicate that several crashworthiness features warranted further exploration, the findings also indicated that several features, including rollover protection, uniform sill heights, and deflection plates did not warrant further action. Rollover protection costs would be substantial, and no material need for such protection was demonstrated by the accident data. Design limitations of multiuse freight locomotives all but preclude practical design possibilities for deflection plates, and FRA found that a successful deflection device would cause collateral safety problems. Uniform sill heights were found not to significantly reduce life threatening collision damage, would have a high cost, and any benefit would accrue only after an extended period over which older standard locomotives would be phased out of service. The perceived benefits of uniform sill height might be more reliably achieved by improved anti climbing arrangements, and the report proposed that development and evaluation of a design concept be explored.
Many of the proposed measures were practical for application only to newly constructed locomotives. Further, additional information and research were required to determine the costeffective basis of these concepts, and to assure the acceptance of these measures by locomotive crews. In order for protective features to be effective, crew members must have confidence that they will function as intended. Crew members who lack confidence in the safety measures employed may be inclined to jump from a locomotive prior to a collision, resulting in a high probability of serious injury or death.
FRA determined that it would use its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee to further develop these safety issues thereby tapping the knowledge and energies of a wide range of interested parties. III. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Recommendations
In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for
consensual rulemaking and program development. The Committee includes
representation from all of the agency's major customer groups,
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers,
and other interested parties. A list of member groups follows: AAR;
American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AARPCO);
American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials (AASHTO);
American Train Dispatchers Department/BLE (ATDD/BLE) (now American Train Dispatcher Association);
Amtrak;
APTA;
ASLRRA;
Association of Railway Museums (ARM);
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
BLET;
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes (now Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED);
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) (associate member);
High Speed Ground Transportation Association;
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union;
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and Blacksmiths;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA) (associate member);
League of Railway Industry Women (associate member);
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
National Association of Railway Business Women (associate member); National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association; NTSB (associate member);
Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
Safe Travel America;
Secretaria de Communicaciones y Transporte (associate member); Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMW);
Tourist Railway Association Inc.;
Transport Canada (associate member);
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC); Transport Workers Union of America (TWUA); and
UTU.
When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop recommendations to FRA for action on the task. The working group develops the recommendations by consensus. The working group may establish one or more task forces to develop the facts and options on a particular aspect of a given task. The task force reports to the working group. If a working group comes to unanimous consensus on recommendations for action, the working group presents the package to the RSAC for a vote. If a simple majority of the RSAC accepts the proposal, the RSAC formally recommends the proposal to FRA.
FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation.
Because FRA staff has played an active role at the working group level
in discussing the issues and options and in drafting the language of
the consensus proposal, and because the RSAC recommendation constitutes
the consensus of some of the industry's leading experts on a given subject, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the
[[Page 36891]]
agency exercises its independent judgement on whether the recommended
rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly supported, and
is in accordance with policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies
in some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual
regulatory proposal. If the working group or RSAC is unable to reach
consensus on recommendations for action, FRA moves ahead to resolve the issue through traditional rulemaking proceedings.
On June 24, 1997, FRA tasked RSAC with the responsibility of making recommendations concerning standards for locomotive crashworthiness. Specifically, RSAC was charged with the investigation and development, if necessary, of crashworthiness standards to ensure the integrity of locomotive cabs in collisions, thereby minimizing fatalities and injuries to train crews. This task was to be performed in three phases. RSAC would first review relevant accident data and existing industry standards to determine which, if any, appropriate modifications to the cab structure are required to provide additional protection above that provided by S580. In particular, RSAC was to specifically consider the following features: fullheight corner posts; improved glazing design and support structure; equipment to prevent the postcollision entry of flammable liquids; and improved fuel tank design. Second, RSAC would examine to what extent improved anticlimber designs and/or incorporation of shelf couplers, used to complement the existing S580 standards, serve to mitigate the effects of the abovelisted collision scenarios. Third, RSAC would examine past and present methods of cab egress, along with the benefits of emergency lighting in the event of a collision. Based on a review of relevant accident data, available technology, implementation costs, and other applicable factors, RSAC would then develop appropriate recommendations.
To accomplish the above goals, RSAC created the Locomotive
Crashworthiness Working Group (``Working Group''). Created on June 24,
1997, this group of about 40 members consisted of FRA personnel and
representatives from railroad labor and management, States, and two
major manufacturers of locomotives. The following organizations provided representatives to serve on the Working Group:
AAR;
AASHTO;
APTA;
ASLRRA;
BLET;
BMWED;
FRA;
IBEW;
RSI;
SMW;
UTU; and
NTSB.
The Working Group broke the task into three distinct phases. The
first phase included review of accident data to formulate the most
prevalent accident scenarios involving injuries and deaths. Second, the
Volpe Center, along with contractor ADL, performed detailed analyses of
how design improvements/additions to S580 would affect the probable
resulting injuries/deaths in each of five accident scenarios described
later in this preamble.\4\ Third, the Working Group analyzed and
deliberated the proposed costs and benefits to determine the
effectiveness of each of the proposed changes to S580. The Working
Group then presented its findings to the full RSAC Committee.
\4\ Tyrell, D., Severson, K., Marquis, B., Martinez, E.,
Mayville, R., Rancatore, R., Stringfellow, R., Hammond, R., Perlman,
A.B., 1999, ``Locomotive Crashworthiness Design Modifications Study,'' Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE/ASME Joint Railroad
Conference, April 1315, 1999, IEEE Catalog Number 99CH36340, ASME
RTD Volume 16; Tyrell, D.C., Martinez, E.E., Wierzbicki, T.,
``Crashworthiness Studies of Locomotive Wide Nose Short Hood
Designs,'' Proceedings of the 8th ASME Symposium on Crashworthiness,
Occupant Protection and Biomechanics in Transportation November 14
19, 1999; Nashville, Tennessee; Tyrell, D., Severson, K., Marquis,
B., Perlman, A.B., ``Simulation of an Oblique Collision of a
Locomotive and an Intermodal Container,'' Proceedings of the 8th
ASME Symposium on Crashworthiness, Occupant Protection and
Biomechanics in Transportation November 1419, 1999; Nashville, Tennessee.
The Working Group conducted its meetings on the following dates at the following locations:
(1) September 89, 1997, Washington, DC;
(2) February 23, 1998, Jacksonville, FL;
(3) April 910, 1998, Fort Pierce, FL;
(4) July 1415, 1998, Las Vegas, NV;
(5) October 2829, 1998, Kansas City, MO;
(6) February 2526, 1999, Washington, DC;
(7) June 1516, 1999, Las Vegas, NV;
(8) October 1920, 1999, Sterling, VA;
(9) December 1314, 1999, Jacksonville, FL;
(10) October 910, 2001, Washington, DC;
(11) January 1718, 2002, Jacksonville, FL; and
(12) June 2829, 2005, San Francisco, CA.
Minutes from the abovereferenced meetings have been placed in the docket of this proceeding.
The Working Group had its inaugural meeting on September 89, 1997, in Washington, DC. After reviewing its formal Task Statement to gain an understanding of the scope of its mission, the Working Group recognized that a smaller, more manageable group could more effectively consider the technical requirements and debate the advantages and disadvantages of the technical options available. Thus, the S580/Engineering Review Task Force (``Engineering Task Force'') was created for this sole purpose. The Engineering Task Force was made up of Working Group members who either volunteered or named a fellow member as a representative. The Engineering Task Force met four times and conducted meetings by telephone conference on three occasions. These task force meetings served to progress the technical aspects of the issues and were open to all members of the Working Group. These meetings were somewhat less formal and were conducive to free exchange of technical information and ideas. A summary report on the Engineering Task Force's deliberations was made at each subsequent Working Group meeting.
The Working Group acknowledged the three distinct elements to the task. First, the group would need to identify, using recent accident data, the most prevalent locomotive collision scenarios which involve injuries and deaths. To this end, the Working Group requested that FRA review pertinent accidents for presentation at the February 23, 1998 Working Group meeting. The second element involved detailed engineering analysis of the effectiveness of specific crashworthiness features. To this end, FRA pledged the technical assistance of the Volpe Center, along with required support from outside contractors as needed. Third, the Working Group expressed interest in understanding the projected economic impact of any new requirements.
FRA commenced a review of locomotive accident data from 1995 to
1996 as a representative sampling of accidents. FRA then narrowed the
pool of accidents to 23 and presented summaries of them to the
Engineering Task Force at its first meeting. Collective discussion of
these accidents with railroad and labor members of the Engineering Task
Force helped to flesh out all the details of the locomotive types and
designs. The Engineering Task Force then classified all 23 collisions
into five major categories and developed a sequence of events, or scenario, for each accident. These five scenarios are:
[[Page 36892]]
(1) Coupled locomotive override resulting from a headon trainto train collision;
(2) Colliding locomotive override resulting from a headon train totrain collision;
(3)\5\ Rear end/overtaking collision between a locomotive and a freight car;
\5\ The report from the Accident/Data Analysis and Benefits
Assessment Task Force describes 6 scenarios. It contains 2 scenarios
in which the window structure is impacted. In one, an overriding freight car impacts the window structure during a rearend
collision; in the other, logs impact the window structure in a grade
crossing collision with a truck carrying logs. The Working Group
initially considered the former, but the latter was used for the
basis for crashworthiness evaluation of the window structure. See Table 1.
(4) Oblique/raking collision between a locomotive and a freight car
or part thereof, at a switch or upon passing a train on the adjacent track; and
(5) Offset collision between locomotive and freight car.
Once these scenarios were identified, a representative accident for
each scenario was chosen to be studied in detail. The Engineering Task
Force next gathered as many details as possible concerning the
accidents and determined the crashworthiness features which were
involved or could have had an effect in each scenario. Table 1 shows
the scenarios, collision mode, relevant crashworthiness features, and representative accidents.
Table 1.Collision Scenario, Collision Mode, and Accident Representative of Scenario.
Accident location and
Collision scenario Collision mode Modified component date
1. Headon collision between two Coupled locomotive Anticlimber Shelf Smithfield, WV, August
freight trains. override. coupler. 20, 1996.
2. Headon collision between two Colliding locomotive Collision post West Eola, IL, January
freight trains. override. 20, 1993.
3a. Overtaking collision, locomotive Loading of window frame Window frame structure. Phoenixville, PA,
to flat car. structure. August 23, 1996.
3b. Grade crossing collision with Loading of window frame Window frame structure. Phoenixville, PA,
highway truck carrying logs. structure. August 23, 1996.
4. Object, such as a trailer, fouling Corner loading of Short hood............. Selma, NC, May 16,
rightofway of locomotive. locomotive short hood. 1994.
5. Offset collision between a Corner loading of Front plate............ Madrone, NM, October
locomotive and a freight car. locomotive underframe. 13, 1995.
Figure 1 shows schematic illustrations for the inline collision
scenariosScenarios 1, 2, and 3b. In Scenario 1, the principal concern
is a trailing locomotive overriding the leading locomotive,
consequently eliminating the operator's cab (survival space) during the
collision. In scenario 2 the principal concern is the relatively strong
underframe of one colliding locomotive overriding the underframe of the
other locomotive. In this scenario, the overriding locomotive crushes
the operator's cab of the overriden locomotive. In scenario 3, the
principal concern is the destruction of the upper portion (window area) of the operator's cab.
[[Page 36893]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR28JN06.002
Figure 2 shows schematic illustrations of the oblique collision scenariosScenarios 4 and 5. The illustration for Scenario 4 shows an intermodal trailer fouling the right of way of an oncoming locomotive. The principal concern is with the trailer striking the short hood outboard of the collision post and consequently causing sufficient damage to intrude into the operator's cab. The illustration of Scenario 5 shows a locomotive obliquely colliding with a freight car at a switch. The principal concern is that the freight car can intrude into the operator's volume by raking down the side of the locomotive. [[Page 36894]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR28JN06.003
Each collision scenario presents a significant risk of injury or death to locomotive cab occupants, and the Working Group recognized that effective reduction of this risk is the primary goal when considering locomotive crashworthiness standards.
The Working Group next examined a list of crash survival concepts that FRA had previously assembled. The Engineering Task Force discussed each concept in light of the accidents reviewed. There was general agreement among Task Force members about the continued need for braced collision posts, corner posts, and the utilization of crash energy management principles to minimize secondary collisions within the locomotive cab. The Task Force also discussed the variance of underframe sill heights, the frequency of locomotive rollover occurrences, and the concept of crash refuges, but ultimately agreed with FRA's Report to Congress that these features held little promise as effective locomotive crashworthiness features and that further use of resources in pursuit of these concepts was not warranted. The Task Force then discussed collision post strength, widenose locomotive cabs and cab corner strength as well as locomotive front end strength up to the window level. The Task Force felt that these concepts required further development in order to further mitigate the consequences from the reviewed accidents, which included side/oblique collisions, coupled locomotive override, and shifted load collisions.
Standard S580 includes the use of collision posts, widenose cab configurations of greater strength, and anticlimbing means to prevent override. The Working Group found that the accident survey showed the effects of S580 on the survivability of locomotive crews to be substantial. However, they also recognized that higher levels of protection could be achieved by enhancing the strength requirements for future locomotive designs and by fortifying the current design of locomotives where possible and economically practicable. Thus, for comparison purposes, the group decided to model each of the collision scenarios to gauge the performance of each of the crashworthiness features under consideration. Data from the accidents was used for comparison with the analytic models and, where possible, for information on the crashworthiness performance of the baseline S580 locomotive design. For Scenarios 3a and 3b, the model was compared with the accident that occurred in Phoenixville, PA, on August 23, 1996, but the grade crossing collision, also occurring on August 23, 1996 in Phoenixville, with logs impacting the window structure was used to evaluate the influences of changes in the window structure.
The Volpe Center, locomotive manufacturers and remanufacturers, and manufacturers of locomotive components made presentations to the Working Group on the current strength of the crashrelated components and discussed the possibility of further strengthening of these components to improve overall crashworthiness. In addition, all members of the Working Group engaged in extensive discussion of these issues. Thus, only enhancements which were currently feasible were modeled. [[Page 36895]]
In all, the Working Group considered the following locomotive crashworthiness features:
Shelf couplers: A representative of the Mechanical Committee of
Standard Coupler Manufacturers (MCSCM) reviewed the ``shelf coupler''
concept with the Working Group and traced its development from concept
to the current status. Every freight car has a bottomshelf E head
coupler. Double shelf (top and bottomshelf) couplers are mandated by
FRA on tank cars used to haul hazardous materials. These shelves limit
vertical motion between two coupled couplers to approximately < plus
minus>7\1/4\ inches (184 mm). Passenger cars are typically equipped
with tightlock couplers which keep the coupler faces at the same
height. These couplers have demonstrated their effectiveness in
preventing override for their respective equipment. During the
discussion it was pointed out that a top shelf might assist in
preventing override in a rearend collision although it would require
that a coupling actually occur for the shelf to be effective. However,
typeF couplers commonly applied to locomotives already incorporate a
top shelf feature. After deliberations, the Working Group decided not
to pursue the concept of double shelf couplers as effective
crashworthiness improvements. It was further noted that the coupling of
MU cables and the air hoses between locomotives would be made more
difficult if shelf couplers were required on locomotives. The potential
for such coupler designs in preventing locomotivetolocomotive override in a headon collision was nonetheless evaluated.
Interlocking anticlimber: The anticlimber design employed by the
Canadian National Railway Company (CN) was evaluated. This design
incorporates thicker webs and flanges than typical North American
designs, and also includes exposed flanges running the width of the anticlimber.
Stronger collision posts: Preliminary designs of collision posts with
strengths up to the strength of the main underframe structure of the
locomotive were developed and evaluated. Principal modifications
considered were the addition of flanges and tapering the collision post.
Stronger window area structure: Increased cab strength above the
short hood was evaluated. Modifications considered included the use of thicker sheet metal for the window frame members.
Stronger short hood: The influence of short hood strength on
locomotive crashworthiness in an oblique collision was evaluated.
Modifications evaluated included thickness of the short hood and the material used to make the short hood.
Front plate: Increased front plate strength was considered as a
potential modification for increased locomotive crashworthiness in an
oblique collision with a freight car. The modification considered consisted of increased front plate thickness.
The results of the study indicate that strengthened collision posts and short hoods resulted in increased crashworthiness for particular collision scenarios. Shelf couplers were found not to be effective in preventing coupled locomotive override. Due to the fracture that occurs as the CN anticlimber design longitudinally crushes, this design was found to be ineffective in supporting the vertical forces that occur during locomotivetolocomotive override, consequently allowing such overrides to occur. For an oblique collision of a locomotive with an empty hopper car, in which the locomotive is principally engaged below the underframe, modifications to the locomotive are not likely to influence the outcome of the collision.
ADL and Volpe Center representatives, presented results from their detailed analyses of how design improvements/additions in S580 would affect the probable resulting injuries/deaths in each of the five scenarios (a copy of the results has been placed in the docket of this proceeding). Then, the Working Group analyzed and considered the proposed costs and benefits to determine the effectiveness of each of the proposed changes to S580. The group also considered a performance standard for locomotive crashworthiness design.
From this point forward, the Working Group, assisted by the Task Force, debated the format for specifying the crashworthiness requirements, many issues relating to feasibility of alternative structures, and the economic impact of the proposed new requirements. Throughout, the group remained convinced that significant safety benefits could be achieved. The AAR members volunteered to adopt a specification (which would become AAR S5802005) meeting the performance criteria under discussion. This would act as a model design standard which satisfies the crashworthiness performance requirements. The group then focused its attention on the details of AAR S5802005 in order to refine and optimize them.
On November 2, 2004, FRA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) addressing locomotive crashworthiness. In issuing the NPRM, FRA adopted the recommendations of the Working Group and the full RSAC. See 69 FR 63890. The NPRM provided for a 60day comment period and provided interested parties the opportunity to request a public hearing. Based upon a request from an interested party, FRA issued a notice on January 12, 2005 extending the comment period from January 3, 2005 until February 3, 2005. See 70 FR 2105. FRA received comments from six interested parties.
On June 28 and 29, 2005, the Working Group conducted a meeting to review and discuss the comments received in response to the NPRM. Minutes from this meeting have been placed in the docket of this proceeding. The Working Group discussed all of the issues raised in the comments and considered various methods by which to address the comments. Based on information and discussions held at this meeting, the Working Group developed a recommendation for a final rule.
In July 2005, the Working Group presented its recommendations for resolution of the public comments to the full RSAC. On August 5, 2005, the RSAC voted to recommend issuance of the final rule while addressing the comments as proposed by the Working Group. FRA, having fully participated in the RSAC review, and finding that the final rule will improve rail safety, has accepted the recommendations of the RSAC in completing this final rule. FRA has also made various editorial corrections necessary to present in a clear, concise, and technically correct manner the intended final rule.
FRA has worked closely with the RSAC in the development of its
recommendations and believes that the RSAC effectively addressed
locomotive crashworthiness standards. FRA has greatly benefitted from
the open, informed exchange of information that has taken place during
meetings. There is general consensus among labor, management, and
manufacturers concerning the primary principles FRA sets forth in this
final rule. FRA believes that the expertise possessed by the RSAC
representatives enhances the value of the recommendations, and FRA has made every effort to incorporate them in this final rule.
IV. Major Issues
A. Promulgation of Performance Standards Where Possible
FRA has endeavored to promulgate performance requirements in this final
[[Page 36896]]
rule rather than the more prescriptive design standards. FRA
understands that this approach allows for greater flexibility in the
design of locomotives and believes this approach has a better chance of
encouraging innovation in locomotive design than less flexible design standards.
The following discussion includes a description of performance and design standards, the advantages and disadvantages of each, and the relationship between the design and performance standards.
Performance standards describe the behavior, or performance, of systems under prescribed circumstances. The principal advantage of such standards is that how the performance is achieved is not specified; any design approach can be used. The principal drawback to such standards for crashworthiness is that either destructive tests or detailed analyses (i.e., computer simulation) are required in order to assure that the system can achieve the desired level of performance.
Design standards prescribe conditions which do not explicitly relate to the performance of the system. The principal advantage of such standards is that compliance can be verified with either non destructive tests or closedform analyses (i.e., hand calculations). The principal disadvantages are that the desired level of performance is not guaranteed, assumptions about performance must be made when fashioning a particular design approach, and innovative approaches to achieving the regulatory objective may be precluded.
The Working Group considered specifying crashworthiness through design standards and performance standards. The Working Group recommended that design standards be employed for industry standards, and that a combination of design and performance standards for the federal regulations. The Working Group endeavored to have the recommended industry standards and the recommended federal regulations provide equivalent levels of crashworthiness.
This final rule includes both performance requirements and design requirements. The Working Group recognized that in certain cases, design standards are identified as presumptively responsive to performance requirements. This approach permits builders to use accepted designs without conducting costly analyses.
While the Working Group endeavored in its recommendations to make both sets of requirements as equivalent as possible, because of the differences in their nature, it is impossible to make them completely equivalent. The equivalence of the design and performance standards is discussed in detail in: Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., ``Alternative Analyses of Locomotive Structural Designs for Crashworthiness,'' presented at the 2000 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition, November 6, 2000, Orlando, FL, and included in the docket of this proceeding as Document No. FRA 20041764510. There are no guarantees that a locomotive built to the design specification will have the performance required by the performance specification. If some aspect of the design approach assumed in developing the design requirements is changed, it may be possible to meet the design requirements but not meet the level of desired performance. Nevertheless, FRA believes that this final rule will accomplish the intended risk reduction.
Since performance standards are not appropriate for every regulation, it must first be determined whether certain factors preclude their use. For example, performance standards are not effective for regulation in areas where it is difficult to determine compliance (i.e., a regulation requiring safer piloting of aircraft) or where determination of a proper minimum level of performance cannot be made easily or costeffectively (see ``PerformanceBased Regulations Guide,'' Federal Aviation Administration, October 31, 1997, a copy of which has been placed in the docket of this proceeding).
The Working Group sought to recommend locomotive crashworthiness performance standards where possible and identified the locomotive front end structure design as the best candidate for regulation through performance requirements. There was some concern among the Working Group members that if FRA issued performance requirements in this area, computer models would be required to show compliance with performance requirements for each new locomotive design. Thus, the Working Group decided to recommend that S580 be incorporated by reference in its entirety. This concept became further refined by maintaining the performance requirements, yet providing a model design standard which, if met, would likely satisfy the performance requirements.
The Working Group's approach encourages introduction of more innovative designs. As previously noted, AAR agreed to provide the model design standard in the form of an enhanced S580. Thus, the Working Group focused its efforts on developing a model design standard for locomotives of conventional design, herein called AAR S5802005.
Rather than requiring every design to show satisfaction of the performance standards here, FRA has offered AAR S5802005 as a conventional model design standard. FRA, in consultation with the RSAC Working Group, has performed the necessary analysis to show that AAR S 5802005 meets the performance standards in most instances.
All of the subject areas covered by this final rule, other than locomotive front end, are presented in terms of design standards rather than performance requirements. This formulation required indepth analysis of accident history, creation and validation of computer models, and comparison of various design improvements versus their baseline design. This was necessary to ensure that the minimum requirements being developed were in fact feasible and necessary. Also, S580 provided a convenient and appropriate benchmark for testing of further improvements in this field, whereas FRA is not aware of any standards for subject areas such as locomotive cab interior configuration or locomotive cab emergency egress.
FRA will regulate designs for anticlimbing devices and underframe strength through design standards, in accordance with AAR S5802005. Under this standard, underframe strength is maintained at the level utilized in prior construction, providing basic compatibility among old and new locomotives. During preparation of the proposed rule, the AAR revised its anticlimbing standard to make it more rigorous by specifying that the required load (100,000 pounds) be met as applied to a 12 inch width anywhere along the anticlimber perimeter, in contrast to 200,000 pounds applied across the full width of the anticlimber. The Working Group recognized that even this improved structure would be of limited use in a headon collision with another locomotive, because of horizontal crushing that would typically occur before the device could engage vertically. However, the group did find evidence that anticlimbing devices do provide protection to cab occupants in the event of a collision with a highway vehicle. FRA plans additional research in this area in the future.
FRA understands that these standards will not create absolutely crashworthy locomotives, but rather will tend to optimize
crashworthiness design features in order to increase cab occupant safety under some of the most
[[Page 36897]]
common collision conditions. Since its inception in the early 1990's,
S580 has had a positive effect on locomotive crashworthiness design.
This final rule is intended to capture the benefits of the industry's
initiative and improve upon it where possible. FRA believes the RSAC
resources were the best forum for recognizing and generating such improvements.
Other efforts are being undertaken by the industry and by FRA to
reduce the risk of locomotive collisions. For instance, on March 7,
2005, FRA issued a rule on performance standards for the use and
development of processorbased signal and train control systems (part
236, subpart H). See 70 FR 11052. The implementation of positive train
control \6\ (PTC) technology could reduce the number of traintotrain
collisions. Current federal and state programs encourage the safety
improvement of highwayrail atgrade crossings (including initiatives
targeted at drivers of heavy trucks) and help reduce the risk of
locomotive collisions. The risks associated with locomotive collisions
with offset intermodal containers on freight cars on parallel tracks
are being addressed by joint industry/FRA programs to promote better securement of trailers and containers.
\6\ PTC is a type of train control system containing modern
processorbased technology that is defined by the protective
functions that it provides. As a minimum, the core functions of a
PTC system are: (1) Prevent traintotrain collisions (positive
train separation), (2) enforce speed restrictions, including civil
engineering restrictions (curves, bridges, etc.) and temporary slow
orders, and (3) provide protection for roadway workers and their
equipment operating under specific authorities. A PTC system can be
classified into one of four levels of a system hierarchy depending
on safety features or additional functions that it contains beyond the basic core functions.
However, all of these collision avoidance strategies require time and resources to work, and there is significant uncertainty regarding their full implementation. Further, as rail operations and highway traffic grow, significant effort may be required to ensure that collisionrelated casualties do not grow as well. Accordingly, taking action to mitigate the effects of collisions remains a prudent element of public policy, and is likely to remain so for some years to come. B. Application to New Locomotives (See Also SectionbySection Analysis for Sec. 229.203)
It should be emphasized that FRA is not imposing these locomotive crashworthiness requirements on the current locomotive fleet. At this time, FRA believes safety benefits resulting from crashworthiness improvements would be best realized through future locomotive designs, rather than by retrofitting the current fleet. However, what ought to be considered a ``new locomotive'' for purposes of this final rule merits discussion.
FRA uses the locomotive build date of on or after January 1, 2009, for determining whether the locomotive is subject to the requirements of this final rule. This should give railroads and locomotive manufacturers adequate time to take necessary steps to ensure that these new locomotives will be in compliance with these requirements, and it corresponds with the date selected by the AAR for the revised S 580 standard to be implemented by manufacturers.
In the NPRM, FRA was particularly interested in whether a locomotive rebuilt with new components atop a previouslyused underframe, or ``decked'' locomotive, should qualify as a new locomotive. These ``remanufactured'' locomotives may have a future life span nearly equivalent to a locomotive constructed on a new underframe. FRA previously defined ``new locomotive'' to include those locomotives rebuilt with a previouslyused underframe and containing no more than 25% previouslyused parts (weighted by cost). FRA invited comment on this issue and whether any other distinct class of locomotive should be considered a ``new locomotive'' for the purposes of this rule. FRA received comments from three parties seeking clarification of FRA's definition of ``remanufactured'' locomotive. These comments are addressed and discussed in the sectionbysection analysis of ``Section 229.5 Definitions.''
FRA encourages, as discussed by the Working Group, the use of sound
consist \7\ management principles to place improved, more crashworthy
locomotives as lead locomotives in consists. As these new locomotives
are phased in, they will only comprise a portion of the fleet, and
railroads will be faced with making decisions regarding their placement
in a consist. FRA believes the benefits of this rule are maximized when
these newer locomotives are used in the lead position to provide
additional protection to the operating crews, and not in trailing
positions behind older, less crashworthy locomotives, but FRA has not
mandated the placement of the newer locomotives. The Working Group did
not believe a requirement to mandate placement of these newer
locomotives in the lead position would be beneficial, and further
believed that the issue is relevant only during the phasein period. In
any event, in the future the entire locomotive fleet will be built to
these or future crashworthiness standards. In the NPRM, commenters were invited to address this issue.
\7\ As used in this context, ``consist'' means the composition of a train.
FRA received one comment on this issue. The commenter believed that since all future locomotives will be built to these new crashworthiness standards, a placement requirement would soon be unnecessary. In addition, the commenter believed that the requirement to place newer locomotives in the lead position would prove to be an ``operational nightmare'' for railroads to implement. The RSAC, through the Working Group, discussed this issue and agreed with the commenter that a placement requirement should not be implemented. As FRA has found that there is no current need to mandate the placement of newer locomotives in the lead position, FRA has adopted the RSAC's recommendation. V. SectionbySection Analysis
Amendments to Part 229
In contrast to requirements for passengeroccupied cab control cars and multiple unit (MU) locomotives, there are no current federal regulations governing conventional locomotive crashworthiness design. These new regulations revise subpart D of part 229 to address locomotive crashworthiness design for conventional locomotives. Subpart AGeneral
Section 229.5 Definitions
This section contains an extensive set of definitions. FRA intends for these definitions to clarify the meaning of terms as they are used in the text of the final rule. The final rule retains all of the definitions proposed in the NPRM, with the exception of the definition of ``MU locomotive'', which will keep its existing definition as amended by FRA's Locomotive Event Recorder Rule, which was published subsequent to the NPRM. See 70 FR 37920 (June 30, 2005). FRA received one comment asking FRA to reconcile the potential conflict between the definition of ``MU locomotive'' proposed in the NPRM and the existing definition of ``MU locomotive'' contained in part 238. As the crashworthiness standards of this final rule do not apply to ``MU locomotives,'' FRA finds no need to further modify the existing ``MU locomotive'' definition. FRA will address the general issue of definitions related to MU locomotives in a forthcoming proposal originated by the Passenger Safety Working Group of the RSAC. [[Page 36898]]
The following terms have the same meaning as provided in part 238: ``corner post,'' ``lateral,'' ``locomotive cab,'' ``longitudinal,'' ``permanent deformation,'' ``power car,'' ``roof rail,'' ``semi permanently coupled,'' ``Tier II,'' and ``ultimate strength.''
The term ``anticlimber'' is intended to have the same meaning as ``anticlimbing mechanism'' as it is used in part 238. The term ``anti climber'' is used in place of ``anticlimbing mechanism'' to more accurately represent the name used in the rail industry.
The term ``collision post'' has essentially the same meaning as it is used in part 238; however, the definition is modified slightly in this final rule to narrow its application only to locomotives.
The term ``build date'' means the date on which the completed locomotive is actually shipped by the manufacturer or remanufacturer to the customer, or if the railroad manufactures or remanufactures the locomotive itself, the date on which the locomotive is released from the manufacture or remanufacture facility. In the NPRM, FRA asked for comment as to whether this definition accurately represents the industry's definition of ``build date.'' FRA received two comments addressing this issue. One commenter suggested that the Working Group revise the definition to reflect the date on which the locomotive is ready for delivery to a customer, regardless of when the customer actually takes delivery. However, another commenter suggested that the definition of ``build date'' remain unchanged. The Working Group discussed this issue and agreed with one of the commenters that the definition should remain unchanged. FRA agrees with the Working Group's recommendation based on the fact that the existing definition of ``build date'' will be simpler to apply uniformly to all affected parties. Subsequent to the RSAC providing recommendations on this final rule, FRA also added language to the definition to reflect what a build date for a locomotive would be if a railroad manufactured or remanufactured a locomotive itself. This addition captures the intent of the ``build date'' definition proposed in the NPRM and discussed by the Working Group, however, it contemplates the possibility that a railroad may manufacture or remanufacture its own locomotives.
The term ``designated service'' has the same meaning as provided in part 223.
The term ``design standard'' means a specification for the crashworthiness design of locomotives. This will usually contain a set of design requirements which do not specify ultimate performance, yet are not so specific in nature that they leave little flexibility to the designer. The overall design of the locomotive is allowed to vary, so long as the specified crashworthiness design requirements are met.
The term ``fuel tank, external'' differs slightly from the current part 238 definition and revises that definition by replacing the word ``volume'' with the word ``vessel.'' FRA believes that this is a more accurate and grammatically correct definition. In this rulemaking, FRA is also revising the current part 238 definition to mirror the definition in part 229.
The term ``fuel tank, internal'' differs slightly from the current part 238 definition and revises that definition by replacing the word ``volume'' with the word ``vessel.'' FRA believes that this is a more accurate and grammatically correct definition. In this rulemaking, FRA is also revising the current part 238 definition to mirror the definition in part 229.
FRA received one comment concerning the definitions of ``fuel tank, external'' and ``fuel tank, internal.'' This commenter agreed that the new definitions are ``more accurate and grammatically correct''; however, this commenter sought clarification as to what structural protection would be required for a fuel tank to be considered ``internal'' or within the ``car body structure.'' In response to this comment, FRA provides further clarification as to what is considered an ``internal'' fuel tank. A ``fuel tank, internal,'' as defined in this rule, is a fuel tank which ``does not extend outside the car body structure of the locomotive.'' In order to be considered ``internal,'' a fuel tank must be surrounded by more than just a minimally protective ``skin.'' The fuel tank must be surrounded by a more substantial structure and located within the support structure of the locomotive.
The term ``manufacture'' means the practice of producing a locomotive from new materials.
The term ``monocoque design locomotive'' means a locomotive in which the external skin or shell of the locomotive combines with the support frame to jointly provide structural support and stress resistance.
The term ``narrownose locomotive'' means a locomotive with a short hood which spans substantially less than the full width of the locomotive.
The term ``occupied service'' means any instance in which a locomotive is operated with a person present in the cab.
The term ``remanufacture'' means the practice of producing a ``remaufactured locomotive''.
As proposed, the term ``remanufactured locomotive'' means a locomotive rebuilt or refurbished from a previously used or refurbished underframe (``deck''), containing fewer than 25% previously used components (weighted by dollar value of the components). It is intended to capture the practice of decking a locomotive, or rebuilding it on a previouslyused underframe. The proposed definition was intended to give better guidance to rebuilders of locomotives and railroads considering rebuilding a locomotive, and also to prevent avoidance of the proposed requirements by simply rebuilding a locomotive on a previouslyused underframe containing less than 25% previously used components without making safety improvements.
FRA has already codified the term ``remanufactured locomotive'' in Sec. 229.5, by including it as part of FRA's Locomotive Event Recorders Final Rule. 70 FR 37919. However, in response to the NPRM, three commenters requested additional clarification as to what constitutes a new locomotive for the purpose of determining applicability of the locomotive crashworthiness rulemaking. In general, commenters requested that FRA's locomotive crashworthiness rule provide more clarity and specificity to the methodology that should be used to calculate the 25%. One commenter noted that the definition of 25%, based on dollar value, does not specify the basis for comparison. Thus, FRA has provided further comparison requirements in the final rule's definition. The new definition adopted by this rule reads: ``[r]emanufactured locomotive means a locomotive rebuilt or refurbished from a previously used or refurbished underframe (deck), containing fewer than 25% previously used components (measured by dollar value of the components). For calculation purposes, the percentage of previously used components is determined with the equivalent value of new parts and is calculated using dollar values from the same year as the new parts used to remanufacture the locomotive.''
Another commenter noted that for all intents and purposes FRA's
definition of a ``remanufactured locomotive'' is essentially equivalent
to a new locomotive. This commenter also noted that this created a need
for defining remanufactured (or rebuilt) locomotives where the
percentage of previously used parts exceeds 25%. FRA agrees that there is a category or group of
[[Page 36899]]
locomotives that could be rebuilt or remanufactured that would not come
under the requirements of this regulation. However, the regulation's
design and/or structure does not demand that such a definition be added.
The term ``semimonocoque design locomotive'' means a locomotive in which the external skin or shell of the locomotive partially combines with the support frame to provide structural support and stress resistance.
The term ``short hood'' means the part of the locomotive above the underframe located between the cab and the nearest end of the locomotive. Short hoods may vary in length and are usually, but not always, located toward the frontfacing portion of the locomotive.
The term ``standards body'' means an industry and/or professional organization or association which conducts research and develops and/or issues policies, criteria, principles, and standards related to the rail industry.
The term ``widenose locomotive'' means a locomotive used in
revenue service which is not of narrownose or monocoque or semi monocoque design.
Subpart DLocomotive Crashworthiness Design Requirements
Section 229.201 Purpose and Scope
Paragraph (a) provides that the purpose of the final rule is to help protect locomotive cab occupants in the event of a collision with another locomotive, ontrack equipment, or with any of several types of objects which may foul railroad trackage. Paragraph (b) provides that this subpart sets forth standards for the design of crashworthy locomotives. It is important
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
John Punwani, Office of Research and Development, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Mail Stop 20, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 2024936369); Charles L. Bielitz, Mechanical Engineer, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 2024936314); or Melissa Porter, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 2024936034).