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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Western Area Power Administration
CFR Citation: 14 CFR Parts 401, 406, 413, 415, and 417
Docket ID: [Docket No. FAA-2000-7953; Amendment Nos. 401-4, 406-3, 413-7, 415-4 , 417-0]
RIN ID: RIN 2120-AG37
NOTICE: Part II
DOCUMENT ACTION: Final rule.
SUBJECT CATEGORY: Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch
DATES: These amendments become effective September 25, 2006. Compliance is required by August 27, 2007.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY: This final rule amends commercial space transportation regulations governing the launch of expendable launch vehicles. This action is necessary to codify current launch practices at Federal launch ranges and codify rules for launches from a nonFederal launch site. These safety requirements currently apply to a launch operator through its FAA license. The intended effect of this action is to ensure that the public continues to be protected from the hazards of launch from either a Federal launch range or a nonFederal launch site.
SUMMARY: Transportation Department, Federal Aviation Administration,
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Availability of Rulemaking DocumentsYou can get an electronic copy using the Internet by: (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http:// http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html .
You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 2679680. Make sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this rulemaking.
Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 1947778) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a question regarding this document, you may contact a local FAA official, or the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out more about SBREFA on the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act .
Authority for This Rulemaking
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified and amended at 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IXCommercial Space Transportation, ch. 701, Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 7010170121 (the Act), authorizes the Department of Transportation and thus the FAA, through delegations (64 FR 19586, Apr. 21, 1999), to oversee, license, and regulate commercial launch and reentry activities and the operation of launch and reentry sites as carried out by U.S. citizens or within the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the FAA to exercise this responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70105. The FAA is also responsible for encouraging, facilitating and promoting commercial space launches by the private sector. 49 U.S.C. 70103. A 1996 National Space Policy recognizes the Department of Transportation as the lead Federal agency for regulatory guidance regarding commercial space transportation activities. The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding commercial space transportation safety is found under the general rulemaking authority, 49 U.S.C. 322(a), of the Secretary of Transportation to carry out Subtitle IX, Chapter 701, 49 U.S.C. 70101 70121 (Chapter 701).
Background
This final rule addressing licensing and safety requirements for launch was preceded by two proposals and a draft rule made available to the public through the docket. The FAA published a comprehensive notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on October 25, 2000. 65 FR 63921. The FAA received comments until April 23, 2001. The FAA addressed commenters' concerns in a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) published on July 30, 2002. 67 FR 49456 (``2002 SNPRM''). The FAA held a public meeting on the SNPRM on September 6, 2002 and received comments until October 28, 2002. Commenters were concerned with the anticipated cost of complying with the proposal. On February 28, 2005, the FAA placed a series of documents in the docket, including draft regulatory text, a draft analysis of comments (February 2005 Analysis of Comments), a summary of major changes since the SNPRM, and an independent economic assessment from SAIC. 70 FR 9885 (Mar. 1, 2005).
SAIC estimated that the rule would cost the industry a discounted $3.8 million \1\ over the years 2005 through 2009. This is less than the $7.3 million discounted cost to industry estimated by this Regulatory Evaluation. SAIC estimated recurring costs ranging from $110,000 to $165,000 per launch and fixed costs of either $0 or $100,000. However, in deriving the total industry cost of $3.8 million (discounted at 7%), SAIC estimated that there would be four to six launches per year. The current FAA launch forecast is about twelve per year. SAIC also estimated and discounted costs over the period 2005 through 2009, while the FAA estimated and discounted costs over the period 2006 through 2010. SAIC costs are in 2002 dollars while FAA estimates are in 2004 dollars.
\1\ Using a discount rate of 7%.
The FAA converted the SAIC cost estimates to 2004 dollars, used the
latest FAA ELV forecast and discounted costs over the fiveyear period
2006 through 2010. The result was an estimated cost of $10.5 million
(discounted to $8.6 million) over the period. This estimate is a
conservative one because it uses the higher per launch cost of $165,000.\2\ It is also very close to the estimate derived
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independently in FAA's own Regulatory Evaluation.
\2\ We did not estimate a lower range using the lower per launch estimate.
The FAA held a public meeting on March 2930, 2005 and received public comment on these documents until June 1, 2005. The draft analysis of comments in the docket is a detailed analysis of voluminous comments the FAA received during this rulemaking process. The FAA encourages the public to review this analysis of comments for specific concerns regarding this rule. The resolution of those comments is part of the record of this rulemaking.
This final rule codifies the successful safety measures that the Department of Defense and NASA have implemented at Federal launch ranges in the U.S. A launch operator must comply with both FAA commercial space transportation regulations and Federal range launch safety requirements, the latter through its launch license. In addition, some Federal range safety practices are incorporated into vehicle specific documents, also known as ``tailored documents,'' and these practices need to be codified to give all launch operators notice regarding other permissible alternatives. Until this rulemaking, the FAA has not adopted clear safety requirements for launches from a non Federal launch site. The FAA evaluates applications for launch from a nonFederal launch site on a casebycase basis, weighing the safety of launches from nonFederal launch sites against Federal launch range practices, procedures and requirements, including the safety requirements of the U.S. Air Force. See 14 CFR part 415, subpart F.
This final rule identifies and establishes the requirements for a launch operator launching from a Federal launch range or a nonFederal launch site. This rule allows a launch operator to interact with a Federal launch range in the same manner it does now. This rule also adopts the latest safety practices of Federal ranges, determined through the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG), a joint FAA and Air Force task force. By standardizing safety requirements between the Federal ranges and the FAA, the same level of safety is achieved throughout the United States. This standardization also improves efficiency in the launch industry, because launch operators have one set of clear rules. Codification improves transparency in the regulatory process for both established launch operators and new entrants.
Summary of the Final Rule
This final rule establishes requirements for obtaining a license to launch an expendable launch vehicle (ELV) from a nonFederal launch site. This rule also codifies safety responsibilities and requirements that apply to any licensed launch, regardless of where it takes place. The rule prescribes standardized application requirements and clarifies safety issues that an applicant must address. These application requirements, contained in 14 CFR part 415, subpart F, require an applicant to demonstrate how it would satisfy the safety requirements of the new part 417 in order to obtain a launch license.
A launch operator currently supplies a Federal launch range much of the information needed for the various safety analyses and verifications that a Federal launch range performs. However, the Federal launch range staffs and controls the launch. Launch operators will do more of their own safety work at a nonFederal launch site than they have at the Federal launch ranges because they will not be able to take advantage of the Federal range personnel and oversight as they do now. This does not mean that the requirements adopted today are new, only that a launch operator at a nonFederal launch site must work with the FAA to determine how to satisfy the safety requirements normally performed by a Federal launch range.
Definitions
The FAA adopts new definitions in this final rule. They include:
Equivalent level of safety. The FAA adopts a different definition than was proposed in the 2002 NPRM. An equivalent level of safety now means an approximately equal level of safety as determined by qualitative or quantitative means. The FAA does not adopt its proposed reference to risk in this definition, because demonstration by qualitative or quantitative means need not be risk based. The definition is now broad enough to adapt to new circumstances.
Launch site safety assessment. The FAA adopts a definition of a
Launch Site Safety Assessment (LSSA), formerly called a baseline
assessment. The FAA will assess each Federal launch range and determine
if the range meets FAA safety requirements. If there are any
differences between range practice and FAA requirements, the
differences will be documented in the LSSA. The FAA does not anticipate
many, if any, differences for Federal launch ranges because it derived
most of the requirements for part 417 from the safety requirements of
the Federal launch ranges themselves. A launch operator relying on a
LSSA to demonstrate compliance with FAA regulations should pay
particular attention to any differences because a launch operator will
still be responsible for satisfying FAA safety requirements but may
have to perform work or conduct analysis previously performed by a Federal launch range.
Requirements for Obtaining a Launch License for an Expendable Launch Vehicle
Part 415 contains requirements that an applicant must meet in order to obtain a license, and part 417 contains requirements that a licensee must comply with during the term of the license. The FAA moved all postlicensing requirements and responsibilities out of part 415 and placed them in part 417, subpart A to group them together. Part 415 references part 417 requirements where appropriate. The FAA did not change its part 415, subpart C application requirements for launching from a Federal launch range, except to clarify the role of a LSSA, and to consolidate and clarify the flight readiness requirements of section 415.37, as discussed in the docketed draft analysis of comments. Safety Review and Approval for Launch From a Federal Launch Range
Subpart C of part 415 describes how the FAA reviews the safety of licensed launches from Federal launch ranges. Subpart C contains safety requirements and recognizes that a launch operator may use a LSSA to demonstrate compliance of FAA safetyrelated launch services and property provisions.
Section 415.31 explains how the FAA conducts a safety review of an
applicant proposing to launch from a Federal launch range. The FAA
clarified section 415.31 and other sections in part 417 to make it
absolutely clear that an applicant may contract with a Federal range
for many Federal range safetyrelated launch services and property.
These provisions should clarify that a launch operator will maintain the same relationship it has with a Federal launch range.
Safety Review and Approval for Launch From a NonFederal Launch Site
Subpart F of part 415 contains requirements that an applicant must
meet to obtain a safety approval for a launch from a nonFederal launch
site. Subpart F requires an applicant to demonstrate how it would
satisfy the safety requirements of part 417 in order to obtain a launch license.
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Launch Safety Generally
Part 417 contains the standards by which the FAA assesses the adequacy of both a licensee and a Federal launch range. The FAA assesses a launch operator through the licensing process and a Federal launch range through a LSSA. The FAA developed the standards in part 417 after extensive negotiation in the CSWG. These standards include not only current Federal launch range standards but also current practice at the Federal ranges. This rulemaking incorporates any lessons learned through tailoring of launch operator requirements. Therefore, the FAA anticipates that the LSSA for each Federal launch range will disclose few, if any, range differences with part 417 requirements. Nonetheless, it is possible some FAA requirements may differ from range requirements. In such a case, any differences will be documented in a LSSA.
General and License Terms and Conditions
The FAA moved existing part 415 subpart E, PostLicensing
RequirementsLaunch License Terms and Conditions into subpart A of
part 417. This change enables a launch operator to reference one
source, instead of two or more for the postlicensing responsibilities
and requirements. The requirements of part 417, subpart A apply to
launch operators launching from both Federal and nonFederal launch
sites, except where noted. As a result, part 415 includes all the
responsibilities and requirements that an applicant needs to fulfill in order to obtain a license, and part 417 includes all the
responsibilities and requirements that a launch operator needs to fulfill in order to keep a license.
Requests for Relief and Tailoring
The Federal ranges permit tailoring of requirements. With tailoring, range and launch operator personnel produce a document that details all areas where the Air Force grants some form of relief without a degradation of safety. The FAA will accept prior agreements between the Air Force and a launch operator, as long as the FAA and the Air Force determine there is no change in circumstance that would degrade safety.
The FAA will utilize equivalent level of safety determinations, similar to the Air Force tailoring process, and FAA waivers to grant relief to launch operators. The FAA will also accept written evidence of Air Force ``meets intent'' certifications (MIC) and previously granted Air Force waivers. The FAA will also accept Air Force grandfathering of prior practices.
Definition of Public
This final rule does not change the existing FAA definition of the ``public.'' As discussed in greater detail in the draft final rule in the docket, it is impossible for industry to determine the implications of a change in definition at this time because there has not been opportunity to discuss concerns in depth. Commenters pointed out that a change may impose burdens, place logistical, schedule, and programmatic activities at risk, and adversely impact the cost or availability of insurance. The current FAA definition of public is different from the definition of public that the ranges use. However, recent Federal range safety analysis determined that commercially licensed launches from the Eastern and Western ranges complied with the risk criterion of less than 30 x 106 when using the FAA definition of the public. In addition, the Western Range has not assessed the impact of the current FAA definition of public for launches of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle scheduled to launch from that range in the near future. The Western Range will conduct a similar safety analysis once the EELV operators provide the appropriate data.
Launch Services and Liability
As discussed in the public meeting, the FAA seeks to clarify that a launch operator is responsible for its launches, including launches from a Federal range or from a nonFederal launch site. Even if a launch operator contracts with a Federal range to perform many services, the launch operator must still conduct a launch that complies with part 417. In addition, although a launch operator may contract certain duties and responsibilities required by part 417, the launch operator cannot delegate its accountability for safe operations under part 417.
Launch Reporting Requirements
A launch operator is required to provide launch specific information at various times to the FAA after receiving a launch license. All information updates not covered by section 417.17 should be filed under the license modification requirements of section 417.11. The FAA will work with launch operators concerning the availability of information at various points in the launch schedule and the FAA is willing to consider waiver requests for certain reporting requirements. Post Launch Report
This rule requires a launch operator to identify discrepancies or anomalies that occur during the launch countdown or flight, including any deviations from the terms of the launch license or to the operating environments. This rule requires post launch reporting for every launch.
Launch Safety Responsibilities
Subpart B of part 417 is a road map describing the responsibilities of a launch operator when conducting a licensed launch of an ELV. Subpart B covers all of the safety issues that a launch operator's safety program needs to address. A launch operator should pay particular attention to section 417.107, because its requirements rely on many of the analyses covered in other subparts. Subpart B contains the requirement to implement the results of analysis, other subparts contain the performance requirements governing those analyses and the appendices include the methodologies to satisfy the performance requirements.
The FAA has clarified in this rule that a launch operator launching from a Federal launch range and contracting with a range for certain safetyrelated launch services and property may use a LSSA to demonstrate compliance with part 417 requirements. In essence, use of a LSSA preserves the current relationship a launch operator has with a range. If a LSSA finds differences between part 417 requirements and range requirements, the FAA will document any differences in the LSSA, and the FAA and the Air Force will work with a launch operator to resolve these differences.
It is also important to reinforce the change from the FAA's original proposal concerning public risk criteria in paragraph 417.107(b). As discussed in the SNPRM, the FAA originally proposed to aggregate the risks attributable to all mission hazards and set a cap on the total mission risk of all hazards at an expected average casualty of 30 x 106. The FAA now limits the acceptable risk attributable to each hazard, rather than to an aggregate of the risk for all hazards.
Flight Safety Analysis
A flight safety analysis is one of the cornerstones of a safe
launch. A flight safety analysis determines where a launch vehicle may
safely fly, where it may not, and monitors and controls risk to the
public from normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle flight. A launch
operator is required to conduct a flight safety analysis by section [[Page 50511]]
417.107(f). Subpart C of part 417 contains the performance requirements
for conducting such an analysis. Appendices A, B, C, and I contain the
methodologies for meeting the performance requirements of Subpart C.
This final rule does not change current practice between a launch operator and a Federal launch range. A launch operator launching from a Federal launch range may still contract with that range to provide flight safety analyses. Any launch operator contracting with a Federal launch range for flight safety analysis may rely on a LSSA to determine whether the range can ensure compliance with this subpart. That launch operator must ensure that it satisfies any requirement that a range does not meet. The FAA and the Air Force will work with the launch operator to ensure compliance. A launch operator may also file an alternate flight safety analysis for FAA approval.
Under a flight safety analysis the FAA requires a launch operator to use a flight safety system, a windweighting safety system for any unguided suborbital launch vehicle, or an alternative flight safety system approved by the FAA during the licensing process. The chart below describes the flight safety analysis requirements for each type of system.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR25AU06.000
The performance requirements for a flight safety system and a wind weighting system are both located in subpart C. However, the methodologies for meeting the performance requirements are different for each system. Appendices A, B, and I contain the methodologies for a flight safety system and Appendices B, C, and I contain the methodologies for a windweighting system. All of the following performance requirements adopt current range practices, as identified through FAA consultation with range safety personnel. Below is a description of each of the analyses that together constitute a flight safety analysis. The results of a flight safety analysis using a flight safety system or a windweighting safety system are then used to establish rules governing when it is safe to launch, which are referred to as flight commit criteria. A flight safety analysis using a flight safety system also establishes rules governing the termination of flight.
A trajectory analysis establishes, for any time after liftoff, the limits of a launch vehicle's normal flight, as defined by the nominal trajectory and potential threesigma trajectory dispersions about the nominal trajectory. The trajectory analysis must also establish a fuel exhaustion trajectory and a straight up trajectory. A fuel exhaustion trajectory produces instantaneous impact points with the greatest range for any given timeafterliftoff for any stage that has the potential to impact the Earth and does not burn to propellant depletion before a programmed thrust termination. For example, a stage that fails to terminate at its programmed thrust termination point will continue flight until burnout if the stage contains residual fuel. A straightup trajectory projects the results that would occur if a launch vehicle malfunctioned and flew in a vertical or near vertical direction above the launch point.
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A malfunction turn analysis describes a launch vehicle's turning capability in the event of a malfunction during flight. This analysis accounts for where a vehicle would go in the event of a malfunction by plotting a series of malfunction turns that must account for numerous factors. This analysis determines, for any point in flight, how far off course a vehicle can travel before either the flight safety system takes action or the vehicle breaks apart due to aerodynamic forces.
A debris analysis accounts for the debris produced by both normal events, such as the planned jettison of stages in an ocean, and abnormal events, such as destruction of the launch vehicle. This analysis must identify the inert, explosive and other hazardous launch vehicle debris that results from normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle flight. A debris analysis also requires a debris list, which is commonly referred to as a ``debris model,'' and must account for each cause of launch vehicle breakup. The debris lists describe and account for all debris fragments and their physical characteristics. A debris model categorizes, or groups, debris fragments into classes where the characteristics of the mean fragment in each class represent every fragment in the class. These debris lists are used as input to other flight safety analyses, such as those performed to establish flight safety limits and hazard areas and to determine whether a launch satisfies the public risk criteria of section 417.107.
A flight safety limits analysis identifies when flight must terminate to limit the hazardous effects of debris impacts on any populated or other protected area, establishes designated impact limits to bound the area where debris with a ballistic coefficient of three or more is allowed to impact without a flight safety system failure, and ensures that a launch satisfies the public risk criteria.
A straightup time analysis accounts for how long a vehicle may fly straight up before it poses a hazard to the public if it fails to turn downrange. This analysis also identifies the point in flight where termination is no longer required. This analysis establishes the latest time after liftoff, assuming a launch vehicle malfunctioned and flew in a vertical or near vertical direction above the launch point, that activation of the launch vehicle's flight termination system or breakup of the launch vehicle would not cause hazardous debris or critical overpressure to affect any populated or other protected area.
Data loss flight time and no longer terminate time analyses establish time periods during the nominal flight of a launch vehicle when flight termination is not necessary even if tracking data is not available. Generally, termination is not required because either the data loss is so brief a vehicle could not reach a populated or protected area or the vehicle has reached a point where the remaining thrusting potential, in a worst case scenario, does not let the vehicle reach a populated or protected area.
A time delay analysis establishes the mean elapsed time between the violation of a flight termination rule and the time it takes a flight safety system to terminate flight. This analysis is used in establishing a vehicle's flight safety limits.
A flight hazard area analysis determines what areas of land, air, and sea must be controlled, by evacuation or notices to mariners and airmen, because of the risk to the public from debris impact hazards. The FAA does not adopt a specific impact probability or casualty expectation protection criterion for ship and aircraft hazard areas because the different federal ranges use different criterion. The FAA simply requires a launch operator to provide the same level of protection as that of a federal range when performing the analysis. The FAA does require a launch operator to conduct a hazard analysis and inform the public as to the location of any resulting hazardous areas. In addition, the FAA provides a methodology in appendix B for quantitatively constructing these hazard areas as part of the hazard analysis using the same construction methods that a federal ranges uses.
A probability of failure analysis requires a launch operator to establish a launch vehicle failure probability, regardless of hazard or phase of flight, in a consistent manner, using accurate data, scientific principles, and a statistically valid method. For a launch vehicle with fewer than two flights, the failure probability estimate must account for the outcome of all previous launches of vehicles developed and launched in similar circumstances. For a launch vehicle with two or more flights, launch vehicle failure probability estimates must account for the outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle in a statistically valid manner.
A debris risk analysis determines the expected number of casualties
(E
A toxic release hazard analysis determines any potential public hazards from any toxic release during the proposed flight of a launch vehicle or that would occur in the event of a flight mishap. A launch operator performs a toxic release hazard analysis using the methodologies of appendix I of part 417. The FAA requires a toxic release analysis to establish flight commit criteria to protect the public from any toxic release, and to demonstrate compliance with the public risk criterion of section 417.107(b).
A launch operator's flight safety analysis must also establish flight commit criteria that will protect the public from any hazard associated with far field blast overpressure effects due to potential explosions during flight, and to demonstrate compliance with the public risk criterion of section 417.107(b). This analysis applies to any far field overpressure blast effects analysis such as the potential for overpressure effects based upon meteorological conditions and terrain characteristics, potential for broken windows, launch vehicle explosive capability, population shelter types, window characteristics, and hazard characteristics of glass shards.
A collision avoidance analysis requires a launch operator to establish a period in a planned launch window during which a launch operator could not initiate flight, so as to maintain a 200kilometer separation from any habitable orbiting object. This analysis must account for all variances associated with launch vehicle performance and timing and ensure that any calculated launch hold incorporates all additional time periods associated with such variances. This standard is in keeping with current practice because a Federal range launch wait already accounts for such variances. A launch vehicle performing nominally within its threesigma performance envelope could have a different separation distance or intercept time with a resident space object as compared to the same launch vehicle performing on its nominal trajectory. A launch wait, as part of a collision avoidance analysis, accounts for these variances.
An overflight gate analysis determines whether a vehicle can
overfly populated areas. This analysis requires a launch operator to
file information to explain why it is safe to allow flight through a
flight safety limit, the limit that protects populated or protected
areas, without terminating a flight. This analysis accounts for the
fact that it is potentially more dangerous to populated or protected areas to destroy a malfunctioning vehicle during certain
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portions of a launch than not to destroy it. In some circumstances, a
destroyed vehicle may disperse debris over a wider area affecting more people than if the vehicle were to impact intact.
A hold and resume gate analysis may, in the event a launch operator has lost tracking data information, still allow a normally performing launch vehicle to overfly or nearly overfly a populated or otherwise protected area to avoid dispersing debris over a populated area when a launch vehicle might still be performing normally. This analysis would expand the range of acceptable trajectories for coastal launch sites whose flight corridors could contain isolated populated or protected islands. It would also increase the availability of inland launch locations by allowing a normally performing vehicle to overfly populated or otherwise protected areas from a site that is wholly contained within a populated or otherwise protected area.
The launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle (USLV) flown with a wind weighting safety system also requires analysis to establish wind constraints and other corrections for wind effects on a launch. The flight safety analysis of such a flight must also demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria and operational requirements for the launch of a USLV contained in section 417.125. A launch operator must also ensure the flight safety analysis for a USLV is conducted in accordance with the methodologies in Appendices B, C, and I. Flight Safety System
The FAA also adopts standards for a flight safety system. As discussed earlier, subpart B of part 417 describes when a launch operator must use a flight safety system. Subpart D of part 417 contains the performance requirements of any flight safety system that a launch operator must use. Appendix D has methodologies for meeting the performance requirements of a flight termination system. Appendix E has the test requirements for a flight termination system.
A flight safety system is a system that provides a means of control during flight for preventing a hazard from a launch vehicle, including any payload hazard, from reaching any populated or other protected area in the event of a launch vehicle failure. A flight safety system includes all hardware and software used to protect the public in the event of a launch vehicle failure, and the functions of any flight safety crew. A typical flight safety system is composed of a flight termination system (FTS) and a command control system. The FAA adopts requirements for the flight termination system components onboard a launch vehicle as well as command control components that are typically ground based. This final rule also defines a process for determining the reliability of a flight safety system. The reliability process consists of specific flight termination system design standards and criteria, a reliability analysis of the FTS design, and comprehensive testing to qualify the FTS design and certify and accept FTS components.
A launch operator may employ an alternate flight safety system if approved by the FAA. An alternate flight safety system must undergo analysis and testing that is comparable to that required by Subpart D of part 417 to demonstrate its reliability to perform its intended functions. In addition, the FAA built flexibility into this area by permitting entities, other than a launch operator to conduct required tests or analysis. The FAA recognizes that a vendor, contractor, or Federal range may perform the required tests and analysis of this subpart. However, the FAA notes that a launch operator is ultimately responsible for employing a flight termination system that satisfies all FAA requirements of subpart D and appendices D and E of part 417.
For launch from a nonFederal launch site, compliance with the flight safety system requirements is demonstrated through the licensing process. For a launch from a Federal launch range, the FAA will accept the flight safety system used or approved on a Federal launch range, if a launch operator has contracted with a Federal launch range for the provision of flight safety system services and property, and the FAA has assessed the range through a LSSA and found that the range's property and services satisfy the requirements of this subpart. In this case, the FAA will treat the Federal launch range's flight safety system's property and services as that of a launch operator. This is consistent with the FAA's current practice for launches from Federal ranges. Under this provision, the FAA expects that launch operators at Federal ranges will continue to rely on the Federal range to approve flight termination systems and provide command control and support systems that comply with the requirements of this part.
A flight safety system must have a command control system to transmit a command signal that has the radio frequency characteristics and power needed for receipt of the signal by the flight termination system onboard the launch vehicle. The command control system must include equipment to ensure that an onboard vehicle termination system will receive a transmitted command signal and must meet subpart D's performance requirements, including those addressing reliability prediction, fault tolerance, configuration control, electromagnetic interference, command transmitter failover, the ability to switch between transmitter systems, radio carrier, command control system monitoring, command transmitter system, and command control antennas. Each command control system, subsystem, component, and part that can affect the reliability of a component must have written performance specifications that demonstrate, and contain the details of, how each satisfies the performance requirements of subpart D.
Testing requirements apply to a new or modified command control system. This testing includes preflight testing. Each test must follow a written plan that specifies procedures and test parameters, and must include instructions on how to handle procedural deviations and react to test failures. A launch operator must also prepare written test reports for each test. In accordance with a launch site safety assessment, for a launch from a Federal launch range, a launch operator may continue to rely on the range's verification that the system satisfies all the test requirements. Appendix D of part 417 contains methodologies that a launch operator can use to conduct the tests. Appendix D provides one means of satisfying the requirements of this rule. A launch operator may also file an alternative means for FAA review and approval.
A flight safety system must also have design, test, and functional
requirements for systems that support the functions of a flight safety
crew, including any determination to terminate a flight. The vehicle
tracking system is one of these support systems. It must include two
independent tracking sources and provide the launch vehicle position
and status to the flight safety crew from liftoff until the vehicle
reaches its planned safe flight state. Other support systems include
telemetry, a communications network, data processing, display and
recording, displays and controls, support equipment calibration,
destruct initiator simulator, and timing. The data processing, display
and recording system must display and record raw input and processed
data at no less than 0.1 second intervals. Again, appendices D and E of part 417 provide the methodologies that a launch operator
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must use, absent an equivalent alternative, to conduct the above tests.
This rule also requires a launch operator to demonstrate the predicted reliability of a flight safety system, including a flight termination system, command and control system, and each of its components. This reliability analysis must use a reliability model that is statistically valid and that accurately represents the actual system. These analyses must identify all possible failure points and undesired events, the probability that they would occur, and their effects on system performance. The analyses must demonstrate the reliability of a radio frequency link, any software or firmware, any battery, and the survivability of a flight termination system, when exposed to various hostile environments.
A flight safety system must be operated by a qualified flight safety crew. The flight safety crew's capabilities are verified through a training program and approved during the licensing process. The FAA's training and qualification approach is an adaptation of Federal launch range practices.
Ground Safety
The FAA also adopts ground safety standards governing the preparation of a launch vehicle for flight. The FAA recognizes that other Federal agencies regulate various aspects of ground safety. This final rule addresses ground safety issues not otherwise addressed by other Federal regulations, that are unique to space launch processing and that could affect the general public. A launch operator licensee is responsible for developing and implementing a ground safety program in compliance with the specified standards. This final rule does not supersede the ground safety requirements of other regulatory agencies.
In order for a launch operator to meet the ground safety requirements of subpart E of part 417 and the methodologies of appendices I and J, a launch operator must conduct a ground safety analysis. In addition to the Subpart E requirements, a launch operator is also required to conduct a toxic release hazard analysis as part of subpart C, flight safety analysis. For a launch from a range, a launch operator may rely on a launch site safety assessment to demonstrate compliance with both the ground safety analysis and the toxic release analysis. In addition, a launch operator may also demonstrate the acceptability of an alternative method of compliance.
A ground safety analysis consists of identifying each potential hazard, each associated cause, and each hazard control that a launch operator must establish and maintain to keep each identified hazard from affecting the public. A launch operator not relying on a LSSA must conduct this analysis for launch vehicle hardware, ground hardware (including launch site and ground support equipment), launch processing, and postlaunch operations. A launch operator not relying on a LSSA must record all of this analysis in a ground safety report, the format for which is located in appendix J.
A launch operator must classify each hazard in the analysis described above as a public hazard, a launch location hazard, an employee hazard, or a noncredible hazard. For some hazards capable of creating catastrophic consequences, a launch operator must implement a dual fault system, so that no single act could cause the catastrophic event. Once a hazard is identified, classified, and a corresponding control is in place, a launch operator must also conduct periodic inspections to ensure safety devices and hazard controls remain in working order. A launch operator must also establish a safety clear zone and prohibit public access during hazardous operations. Discussion of Comments
At the conclusion of the public comment period on June 1, 2005 the FAA received written comments from The Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin Corp., NASA, Orbital Sciences Corp., Sea Launch Company, Space Exploration Technologies, XCOR Aerospace, and three comments from private citizens. The following discussion responds to substantive comments that explain the reasons for the comment and that were not already submitted and responded to in the past.
General Comments
A number of comments repeat suggested changes for several sections.
We address these comments here, instead of in every section. First, for
several sections commenters suggested repeating the FAA's willingness
to accept alternative approaches that provide an equivalent level of
safety.\3\ However, it is better to state this only once at the
beginning of each subpart, so that a finding of an equivalent level of
safety may be made for any requirement in a subpart, rather than just in a few select sections.
\3\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.1(c), D417.1(a) E417.1(a).
Second, if a comment submitted in 2005 repeats a comment submitted in response to earlier notices, but raises no new issues or adds no new information, the FAA will continue to rely on its own earlier response, including those placed in the docket on February 28, 2005. For example, XCOR Aerospace, in addition to providing new comments, also submitted a copy of the same comments given in response to the 2001 NPRM.\4\
Third, the FAA is unable to respond to comments that do not provide
an explanation or a reason for a suggested change for a comment.\5\
Likewise, a number of comments request a change to the proposal based
on cost concerns, but do not provide cost data to substantiate that
concern.\6\ In addition, we do not specifically address requests for
clarifying or editorial changes, even though we may accept some of those changes.\7\
\4\ See also, Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.1(g),
417.105(a) and (b), 417.111(d)(4), 417.231(a), 417.303(c), 417.303(d), 417.307(b)(8), 417.307(h)(4), 417.309(b)(2),
417.309(c)(4), 417.309(j), 417.407(a), 417.407(b), 417.417(b),
D417.5(c)(3), D417.13(c), D417.17(b)(6), D417.29(b)(2)(ii),
D417.33(d), D417.33(g)(6), D417.31(h), D417.31 (i), E417.1(d)(3), Lockheed proposed E417.1(j), E417.3(f)(3), E417.11(g)(1),
E417.19(e)(2)(ii), E417.19(e)(2)(vi), E417.25(f)(2), E417.29(b)(6);
Boeing's comments concerning sections D417.41(c), D417.45(m), D417.47(b), E417.1(d)(3).
\5\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.3, 417.107(f),
417.111(e)(2), 417.207(b), 417.303(l)(6), D417.3(b), D417.21(a),
E417.9(l), E417.19(d), E417.25(c)(2), E417.25(i), E417.25(j)(4);
Boeing comments concerning D417.7(l), E417.15(b), E417.21(b)(iii), E417.25(c)(2), E417.25(i), E417.35(b).
\6\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.1(f), E417.35(c).
\7\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.11(c)(2)(ii),
417.301(c)(1), 417.307(b)(4), 417.307(e)(2), 417.3079(e)(7), 417.307(f)(8), 417.309(b), 417.309(c), 417.309(f)(3)(i),
417.311(b)(2), 417.402(e), 417.403(c), 417.405(e), 417.405(f), 417.405(g)(3), 417.405(j)(5), D417.5(i), D417.9(b) & (d),
D417.21(e), D417.25(b), D417.29(a)(1), D417.29(b)(1)(i),
D417.33(h)(2), E417.1(g), E417.5(g)(3), E417.7(d), E417.9(a), (b),
and (e), E417.11(f)(2), E417.11(h)(1), E417.19(d)(1), E417.19(d)(5), E417.9(e)(1); Boeing comment concerning B417.13.
Fourth, some commenters continue to suggest that they do not
satisfy the part 417 requirements or they are currently operating to a
different standard. This is because a range found an equivalent level
of safety through tailoring or a meets intent certification. The FAA's
grandfathering policies should address these concerns. Also, as noted
in the Analysis of Comments the FAA placed in the docket on February
28, 2005, the FAA did consult with the ranges regarding a number of
these concerns when they were raised earlier in the rulemaking, and operators are
[[Page 50515]]
apparently in compliance, but unaware that they are.\8\
\8\ See, e.g., Boeing comments concerning sections
417.209(a)(6), A417.7(2)(g)(1), D417.5(c), D417.7(c)(1),
D417.7(c)(4), D417.7(g)(1)(i), D417.13(c), D417.15(b)(1),
D417.35(d), D417.45(b) and (o), D417.47(i), E417.33(c),
E417.41(e)(1); Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.301(d)(2),
D417.7(g)(1)(i), D417.19(g)(2), D417.27(h), D417.29(b)(9), D417.53
(d), E417.9(j), E417.11 (b)(3), E417.11(c)(2), E417.11(c)(3),
E417.11(c)(6), E417.11(e)(2), E417.11(e)(4), E417.11 (h)(1)(ii), E417.11 (h)(4)(ii), E417.11(i)(2)(ii), E417.13(d)(2)(v),
E417.13(e)(1)(i), E417.13(e)(2)(ii), Table E417.172, Table E417.19
1, E417.19(e)(2)(i), E417.19(e)(2)(v)(A), E417.19 (e)(2)(xiii),
E417.19(f)(2), E417.19(f)(10), E417.19(f)(11), all Lockheed comments
concerning section E417.19(j), E417.21(b)(iv), E417.21 (g)(2),
E417.21(j)(4)(i), (j)(4)(ii) E417.21(p)(1), E417.21(p)(3)(ii),
E417.21(q)(6), E417.21(r)(5), E417.22(a), E417.25(g)(4), E417.25(h),
E417.31(b)(4), E417.33(c), E417.37(b)(2), E417.41(h)(1)(ii), E417.41(h)(2)(i)(1)(i), E417.41(h)(2)(i)(1)(iii),
E417.41(h)(2)(i)(5)(i), E417.41(h)(2)(i)(6).
Fifth, the FAA received several comments concerning requirements for a launch operator to file information during a particular time period, e.g., thirty days before a launch. The FAA did not change the suggested timing requirement because the FAA already provides a process for granting waivers under part 404. As noted at the 2005 public meeting, the FAA routinely grants waivers to administrative timing requirements. Additionally, the FAA plans to permit the coordination of timing issues at Federal launch ranges to be taken care of by the Federal launch ranges.\9\
Sixth, the FAA received some comments claiming that a proposed
requirement was not current practice. The FAA reviewed current practice
with the Federal launch ranges, and received confirmation that the
commenters suggestion is current practice at the ranges. The FAA
therefore adopts the commenters suggestions.\10\ In addition, some
comments simply claimed that a proposed requirement is not current
practice, without further explaining what the commenter considers
current practice.\11\ The FAA was able to confirm with the Federal
ranges that the FAA requirement is current practice. In this regard,
commenters who questioned whether a requirement was current practice in
this latest round of comments may be assured that the FAA checked again
with U.S. Air Force range safety personnel on each comment discussed in detail below.
\9\ See Boeing comments concerning sections 417.117(b)(2),
E417.41(e)(1); Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.17(c)(4),
417.17(c)(7), E417.41(d)(2), E417.41(e)(1), E417.41(h)(2),
E417.41(h)(2)(i), E417.41(h)(2)(i)(1)(v), E417.41(h)(2)(i)(2)(i),
E417.41(h)(2)(i)(3), and Sea Launch comments concerning sections 415.115 and 415.121.
\10\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.9(c), E417.3(e)(1), E417.11(b)(4)(iii).
\11\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.303(b),
417.307(a)(2), 417.309(c)(6), D417.5(e), D417.7(c)(6), D417.19(e), E417.5(g), E417.7 (f)(5), E417.25(f)(4).
Finally, XCOR submitted general comments concerning the latest draft documents placed in the docket on February 28, 2005. These comments included the general statement that the FAA should abandon this rulemaking, start over, and engage industry in real dialogue because this rulemaking will destroy industry, is too burdensome, and actually decreases public safety. The FAA notes that this rulemaking adopts current practice, so there is no degradation to public safety. In addition, the industry's relationship with the Federal launch ranges will not change. To the extent that XCOR is concerned that current practice is too burdensome, the FAA is not proposing any changes. Launch Site Safety Assessments
In accordance with comments from industry, if the FAA has assessed a Federal launch range, through its launch site safety assessment, and found that an applicable range safetyrelated launch service or property satisfies FAA requirements, then the FAA will treat the Federal launch range's launch service or property as that of a launch operator's, and there will be no need for further demonstration of compliance to the FAA. The FAA agrees with most commenters that existing Federal launch range safety requirements and processes have worked well in protecting the safety of the public and property. The March 2005 Draft Regulatory Language and Analysis of Comments, at 106, stated that the FAA had assessed the Federal launch ranges through the FAA's launch site safety assessment, and found that applicable range safetyrelated launch analyses, services or property satisfied the requirements. Therefore, the FAA proposal intended to treat a Federal launch range's launch service or property as that of a launch operator's. The FAA remains committed to this position. Participants at the 2005 public meeting referred to this practice as an ``offramp.''
The FAA discussed the sufficiency of the launch site assessment process at a public meeting held on March 2930, 2005 (``2005 public meeting''). At that public meeting, FAA officials thoroughly briefed, discussed, and entertained multiple questions from industry representatives in an attempt to assure the launch operators of the FAA's plan to allow launch operators to continue using the ranges as their primary interface. The FAA encouraged the launch operators to work with the FAA in determining appropriate language if the proposed language did not satisfy industry concerns. Industry was encouraged to act immediately and not wait until the end of the comment period. Industry responded at the close of the comment period.
Orbital \12\ described the FAA's previously established approach to accepting a Federal launch range's range safetyrelated launch service or property as an ``offramp'' for launch operators operating on a Federal launch range. Orbital requested that the FAA expressly provide that no further demonstration of compliance to the FAA be required of a launch operator, and the FAA adopts this clarification. Lockheed suggested similar language for section 417.1(g). The FAA provides this assurance at the beginning of every substantive subpart of this rule. \12\ See also, Boeing, at 1, and Lockheed, subpart A at 12, 7 9, subpart B at 12, 46, 813, subpart C at 12, subpart D at 13, subpart E at 14, 79, Appendix A at 1, Appendix B at 1, Appendix D at 23, Appendix E at 12, Appendix G at 1, Appendix I at 1, Appendix J at 1, also commented on the offramp process.
Boeing suggested removing any suggestion that a Federal launch range's analyses might not satisfy an FAA requirement, and that the provision should not entertain that possibility. The FAA does not accept this suggestion. Federal launch range practices change over time. Ideally, the FAA's launch site safety assessment reflects those changes. However, a Federal launch range could change a requirement without the agreement of the FAA. This is highly unlikely due to the CSWG goal of maintaining common standards. A Federal launch range could, however, decide that it no longer will perform a flight safety analysis or some other service for launch operators due to a decreasing budget or other reasons. Therefore, the FAA's acceptance of Federal launch range work must recognize that theoretical possibility. Application Requirements
Section 415.111 requires that an applicant's safety review document
identify all persons with whom the applicant has contracted to provide
goods or services for the launch of the launch vehicle. Sea Launch
commented that this is an overly detailed requirement and it would be
nearly impossible to meet because it includes all persons with whom the
applicant has contracted. Sea Launch recommends that the requirement be
limited to only persons who provide safetyrelated services. The FAA agrees
[[Page 50516]]
and adopts the requirement as suggested.
Section 415.123 contains requirements for computing systems and
software. Sea Launch commented that these requirements are not current
practice. AFSPCMAN 91710, Volume 1, Attachment 2 , ``System Safety
Program Requirements,'' requires analysis of software and computing
systems hazards and risks as part of a comprehensive analysis of system
safety, and verification and validation. Therefore, the FAA did not change this section in response to this comment.
Launch Safety
Requests for Relief
Paragraphs (c) and (d) of section 417.1 require written evidence of a meets intent certification or waiver for a launch operator to be eligible for relief. Lockheed and Boeing commented at the 2005 public meeting that such evidence may not exist in the way of a meets intent certification. The FAA clarifies that other forms of written evidence are acceptable and now provides examples
Section 417.1(c) provides a launch operator with an alternative means to satisfy an FAA requirement through an equivalent level of safety if written evidence demonstrates that a Federal launch range has, by the effective date of this part, granted a ``meets intent certification.'' Section 417.1(d) states that a requirement of this part does not apply to a launch if written evidence demonstrates that a Federal launch range has, by the effective date of this part, granted a waiver that allows noncompliance with the requirement. Lockheed requested the FAA strike the term, ``by the effective date of this part.'' Lockheed stated that suspension of the ``meets intent'' certification process and waiver process as of the effective date of the final rule promulgated by the FAA would result in a significant impact to the Atlas program, although Lockheed did not state in its written comments how or why this impact might occur.
As discussed in the 2005 public meeting, the FAA cannot eliminate the reference to the effective date. This effective date is retained because any relief granted before the effective date requires proof that the Federal launch range granted such relief. After the effective date, the FAA will coordinate with the Federal launch range to determine whether relief should be granted. Also, as discussed in the SNPRM, agencies cannot waive each other's requirements. This rulemaking remedies that problem. The effective date requirement must remain because the requirement applies to all previously grandfathered requirements. The effective date does not terminate the relief process, as suggested by Lockheed and Boeing.
Lockheed Martin also suggested that the FAA add a new section adopting the practice of ``tailoring'' at the Federal ranges. The FAA does not need to add the section because although the FAA in practice will continue the tailoring process, it will do so through the use of an equivalent level of safety determination.
License Terms and Conditions
Section 417.7 states that a launch operator is responsible for
ensuring public safety and the safety of property at all times during
the conduct of a licensed launch. Lockheed requested the FAA add that
for licensed launches from a Federal launch range, compliance with
section 417.13, which says a launch operator must enter into an
agreement with and comply with range requirements, satisfies the launch
operator's public safety requirements. Lockheed reasoned that the
Federal launch ranges play a key role in conducting launch activities
and the range has its own authorities and responsibility with regard to
ensuring public safety. A launch operator cannot subsume these
responsibilities. Although Lockheed is correct about the important role
of the Federal launch ranges, the role of the range does not detract
from a launch operator's responsibilities for safety under its license. A Federal launch range cannot subsume a launch operator's
responsibilities either. The FAA's description of the launch operator's
responsibility has been part of the regulations for years. See 14 CFR
415.71. That a range has responsibilities does not mean that a launch
operator does not have these same responsibilities. As explained in
previous rulemakings, a launch operator must comply with the
requirements of both the ranges and the FAA. See, Commercial Space
Transportation Licensing Regulations, NPRM, 62 FR 13234 (Mar. 19, 1997).
Scheduling
Proposed section 417.17(b)(1) would have required that for each launch, a launch operator must file a launch schedule that identified each point of contact by name and position for each scheduled activity. The FAA proposed that the points of contact be filed no later than six months before flight. Sea Launch commented at the 2005 public meeting and both Boeing and Sea Launch commented in written comments, that a single schedule point of contact is current practice and that requiring the information six months before flight was excessive. The FAA agrees and instead requires a single point of contact for the schedule and that the launch schedule must be filed and updated in time to allow FAA personnel to participate in the reviews, rehearsals, and safety critical launch processing.
Proposed paragraph (b) of section 417.25 would have required that for a launch operator launching from a nonFederal launch site, a launch operator must file a post launch report with the FAA 90 days after the launch. Sea Launch commented that current practice requires a 30 and 60 day report and that the 90 day report is not current practice. The reports filed by Sea Launch under current practice meet the requirement of section 417.25(b). To clarify, the FAA now requires the report be filed no later than 90 days after launch. The clarification is also made to section 417.25(a).
Launch Safety Responsibilities
Section 417.103(b)(2) requires that a safety official have direct access to a launch operator's launch director. The FAA had proposed that a safety official report directly to the launch director, but Lockheed pointed out that these employees may be stationed in different parts of the country. The FAA clarifies that direct access means a safety official can communicate safety concerns to the launch director. This provision does not mandate the organizational structure of a launch operator.
Flight Safety
Section 417.107(b) requires a launch operator to demonstrate that
any risk to the public satisfies public risk criteria of E
106 as a level defining acceptable launch risk without high
management review. As it has in the past, Boeing suggested that the
E
Section 417.107(e) requires a launch operator to ensure that a
launch vehicle, any jettisoned components, and its payload do not pass any closer than 200
[[Page 50517]]
kilometer to a habitable orbital object and to obtain a collision
avoidance analysis for each launch. Lockheed \13\ requested that the
FAA change ``habitable'' to ``known inhabitable'' on the grounds that
if there is uncertainty about whether an object is habitable the
required collision avoidance distance may be less. The FAA will not
adopt the suggested change because it would not change the separation
distance or reflect current practice in classification of these types
of orbital objects. Even if an object is not known to be habitable with
absolute certainty, safety errs on the side of being conservative and
claims of habitability are taken at face value. If an object is
designed to be habitable the separation distances must be maintained.
\13\ See also, Lockheed comments regarding Sec. Sec. 417.3,
417.107(e)(1), 417.107(e)(1)(ii)(B), 417.231(b), (c), and (d),
A417.31(a)(3), A417.31(c)(7)(iv), A417.31(c)(8), A417.31(c)(8)(i).
Instead, the FAA requires a 200 km separation distance for ``manned or mannable'' objects to match the current terminology of the Federal launch ranges in AFSCMAN 91710 and the United States Strategic Command. Mannable objects include all orbital objects that are designed for manned spaceflight. Habitable, or mannable, objects are known and the FAA requirement only applies to those known objects and not to all resident space objects. Current manned or mannable objects include the Space Transportation System (STS), International Space Station (ISS), and Chinese Shenzou spacecraft. The FAA can adjust the miss distance through an equivalent level of safety on a casebycase basis similar to Federal launch range current practice.
Section 417.111(e)(2) and (g)(4) require a launch operator to identify personnel, by position, who have authority to approve design changes, maintain documentation of the most current approved design and conduct piece parts tests. Lockheed Martin objected to these requirements on the grounds that a launch operator is responsible for design changes, the requirement might conflict with other hiring, certification and qualification requirements (although Lockheed does not describe the conflicts), and with a launch operator's ability to make personnel decisions. Because the FAA only requires that a launch operator identify such positions, the FAA does not believe that these concerns are well founded. To the contrary, for purposes of configuration management and control, a launch operator should know which position is responsible for design changes, document control and conducting piece parts tests as a matter of prudent business practice.
Section 417.111(h)(2) requires that an accident investigation plan (AIP) contain procedures that ensure the containment and minimization of the consequences of a launch accident, launch incident or other mishap. Boeing comments that this type of procedure is usually in an accident response plan not an accid
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT Ren[eacute] Rey, Licensing and Safety
Division, AST200, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 2677538; email
Rene.Rey@faa.gov. For questions regarding legal interpretation, contact
Laura Montgomery, AGC200, (202) 2673150; email
laura.montgomery@faa.gov.
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