The applicant for any such change is responsible for notifying the Seattle Aircraft Evaluation Group that a new evaluation of the CRM is required.

All instructions for continued airworthiness, including service bulletins, must be submitted to the Seattle Aircraft Evaluation Group for approval before the FAA approves the modification.

Discussion of Proposed Special Conditions No. 9 and 12

The following clarifies the intent of proposed Special Condition No. 9 relative to the requirements of Sec. 25.1439(a):

Amendment 2538 modified the requirements of Sec. 25.1439(a) by adding,
``In addition, protective breathing equipment must be installed in each isolated separate compartment in the airplane, including upper and lower lobe galleys, in which crewmember occupancy is permitted during flight for the maximum number of crewmembers expected to be in the area during any operation.''

The CRM is an isolated, separate compartment, so Sec. 25.1439(a) is applicable. However, the requirements of Sec. 25.1439(a) for protective breathing equipment in isolated, separate compartments are not appropriate, because the CRM is novel and unusual in terms of the number of occupants.

In 1976 when Amendment 2538 was adopted, small galleys were the only isolated, separate compartments that had been certificated. Two crewmembers were the maximum expected to occupy those galleys.

These special conditions address a CRM which can accommodate up to six crewmembers. This number of occupants in an isolated, separate compartment was not envisioned at the time Amendment 2538 was adopted. It is not appropriate for all occupants to don protective breathing equipment in the event of a fire, because the first action should be for each occupant to leave the confined space, unless that occupant is fighting the fire. Taking the time to don protective breathing equipment would prolong the time for the emergency evacuation of the occupants and possibly interfere with efforts to extinguish the fire.

In regard to proposed Special Condition No. 12, the FAA considers that during the 1minute smoke detection time, penetration of a small quantity of smoke from the this forward lower lobe CRM into an occupied area of the airplane would be acceptable, given the limitations in these special conditions. The FAA considers that the special conditions place sufficient restrictions on the quantity and type of material allowed in crew carryon bags that the threat from a fire in the remote CRM would be equivalent to the threat from a fire in the main cabin. Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to Boeing Model 767300 series airplanes as modified by TIMCO to include a forward lower lobe CRM. If TIMCO applies at a later date for a change to the supplemental type certificate to include another model listed on the same type certificate data sheet which incorporates the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to that model.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on Boeing Model 767300 series airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability, and it affects only the applicant which applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.
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List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 767300 series airplanes, modified by TIMCO.

1. Occupancy of the forward lower lobe crew rest module (CRM) is limited to the total number of installed bunks and seats in each module. There must be an approved seat or berth able to withstand the maximum flight loads when occupied for each occupant permitted in the CRM. The maximum occupancy in the CRM is six.
(a) There must be appropriate placard(s) displayed in a conspicuous place at each entrance to the CRM to indicate the following: (1) The maximum number of occupants;
(2) Occupancy is restricted to crewmembers who are trained in evacuation procedures for the CRM;
(3) Occupancy is prohibited during taxi, takeoff and landing; (4) Smoking is prohibited in the CRM;
(5) Hazardous quantities of flammable fluids, explosives, or other dangerous cargo are prohibited in the CRM.
(6) Stowage in the CRM must be limited to emergency equipment, airplanesupplied equipment (e.g., bedding), and crew personal luggage. Cargo or passenger baggage is not allowed.
(b) There must be at least one ashtray located conspicuously on or near the entry side of any entrance to the CRM.
(c) There must be a means to prevent passengers from entering the CRM in the event of an emergency or when no flight attendant is present.
(d) There must be a means for any door installed between the CRM and the passenger cabin to be opened quickly from inside the module, even when crowding occurs at each side of the door.
(e) For all doors installed in the evacuation routes, there must be a means to prevent anyone from being trapped inside the module. If a locking mechanism is installed, it must be capable of being unlocked from the outside without the aid of special tools. The lock must not prevent opening from the inside of the module at any time.

2. There must be at least two emergency evacuation routes, each of which can be used by each occupant of the CRM to rapidly evacuate to the main cabin. The exit door/hatch for each route must be able to be closed from the main cabin after evacuation of the CRM. In addition (a) The routes must be located with one at each end of the module or with two having sufficient separation within the module and between the routes to minimize the possibility of an event (either inside or outside the CRM) rendering both routes inoperative.
(b) The routes must minimize the possibility of blockage which might result from fire, mechanical or structural failure or from persons standing on top of or against the escape route. If an evacuation route uses an area where normal movement of passengers occurs, it must be demonstrated that passengers would not impede egress to the main deck. If a hatch is installed in an evacuation route, the point at which the evacuation route terminates in the passenger cabin should not be located where normal movement by passengers or crew occurs. Examples include the main aisle, cross aisle, passageway, or galley complex. If it is not possible to avoid such a location there must be a means of ensuring that the hatch or door can be opened when a person, the weight of a ninetyfifth percentile male, is standing on the hatch or door. The use of evacuation routes must not depend on any powered device. If there is low headroom at or near an evacuation route, there must be provisions to prevent or to protect occupants of the CRM from head injury.
(c) There must be emergency evacuation procedures, including procedures for the emergency evacuation of an incapacitated occupant from the crew rest module. All of these procedures must be transmitted to all operators for incorporation into their training programs and appropriate operational manuals.
(d) There must be a limitation in the Airplane Flight Manual or other suitable means of requiring training in the use of evacuation routes for the crewmembers.

3. There must be a means for the evacuation of an incapacitated person representative of a 95th percentile male from the CRM to the passenger cabin floor. The evacuation must be demonstrated for all evacuation routes. A flight attendant or other crewmember (a total of one assistant within the CRM) may provide assistance in the evacuation. Up to three persons in the main passenger compartment may provide additional assistance. For evacuation routes having stairways, the additional assistants may descend to one half the elevation change from the main deck to the lower deck compartment or to the first landing, whichever is higher.

4. The following signs and placards must be provided in the CRM: (a) At least one exit sign located near each exit which meets the requirements of Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i) at Amendment 2558. However, the exit sign may have a reduced background area of no less than 5.3 square inches (excluding the letters), provided that it is installed so that the material surrounding the exit sign is light in color (e.g., white, cream or light beige). If the material surrounding the exit sign is not light in color, an exit sign with a minimum of a oneinch wide background border around the letters would also be acceptable. (b) An appropriate placard located near each exit, defining the location and the operating instructions for each evacuation route; (c) Placards must be readable from a distance of 30 inches under emergency lighting conditions; and
(d) The exit handles and placards for each evacuation route (see 4.(b) above) must be illuminated to at least 160 micro lamberts under emergency lighting conditions.

5. In the event of failure of the airplane's main power system or of the normal lighting system for the CRM, there must be a means to automatically provide emergency illumination to the CRM.
(a) This emergency illumination must be independent of the main lighting system.
(b) The sources of general cabin illumination may be common to both the emergency and the main lighting systems, if the power supply to the emergency lighting system is independent of the power supply to the main lighting system.
(c) The illumination level must be sufficient for the occupants of the CRM to locate and transfer to the main passenger cabin floor by means of each evacuation route.
(d) If the privacy curtains are in the closed position, the illumination level must be sufficient for each occupant of the CRM to locate a deployed oxygen mask.

6. There must be means for twoway voice communications between crewmembers on the flightdeck and occupants of the CRM. There must also be public address system microphones at each flight attendant seat which is required to be near a floor level exit in the passenger cabin per Sec. 25.785(h) at Amendment 2551. The public address system must allow twoway voice
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communications between flight attendants and the occupants of the CRM. However, one microphone may serve more than one exit, if the proximity of the exits allows unassisted verbal communication between seated flight attendants.

7. There must be a means for manual activation of an aural emergency alarm system, audible during normal and emergency conditions, to enable crewmembers on the flightdeck and at each pair of required floor level emergency exits to alert occupants of the CRM of an emergency situation. Use of a public address or crew interphone system will be acceptable, provided it has an adequate means of
differentiating between normal and emergency communications. The system must be powered in flight for at least ten minutes after the shutdown or failure of all engines and auxiliary power units or the disconnection or failure of all power sources which depend on the continued operation of the engines and auxiliary power units.

8. There must be a means, readily detectable by seated or standing occupants of the CRM, of indicating when the occupants must fasten their seat belts. In the event there are no seats, there must be at least one means to address anticipated turbulence (e.g., sufficient handholds). Seat belt type restraints must be provided for berths and must be compatible for the sleeping attitude during cruise conditions. There must be a placard on each berth requiring that seat belts be fastened when the berth is occupied. If compliance with any of the other requirements of these special conditions is predicated on specific head location, there must be a placard identifying the head position.

9. In lieu of the requirements specified in Sec. 25.1439(a) at Amendment 2538 that pertain to isolated compartments and to provide a level of safety equivalent to that which is provided occupants of a small, isolated galley, the following equipment must be provided in the

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT Jayson Claar, FAA, Airframe/Cabin Safety Branch, ANM115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington, 980573356; telephone (425) 2272194; facsimile (425) 2271320.