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Docket ID: [Docket No. FAA-2008-0181; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-180-AD]
RIN ID: RIN 2120-AA64
SUBJECT CATEGORY: Airworthiness Directives; Lockheed Model L-1011 Series Airplanes
DOCUMENT SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Lockheed Model L1011 series airplanes. This proposed AD would require revising the FAAapproved maintenance program by incorporating new airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. This proposed AD would also require the accomplishment of certain fuel system modifications, the initial inspections of certain repetitive fuel system limitations to phase in those inspections, and repair if necessary. This proposed AD results from a design review of the fuel tank systems. We are proposing this AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
SUMMARY: Lockheed Model L 1011 Series Airplanes,
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA20080181; Directorate Identifier 2007NM180AD'' at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov , including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' Amendment 2178, and subsequent Amendments 2182 and 2183).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbinepowered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and inservice failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.
We have determined that the actions identified in this proposed AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328098, Revision 1, dated January 22, 2008. The service bulletin describes procedures for incorporating new airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems into the operator's FAAapproved maintenance program. The airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems include fuel system limitations (FSLs) and critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCLs). FSLs are modifications, design features, and periodic inspections of certain features for latent failures that could contribute to an ignition source. CDCCLs are limitation requirements to preserve a critical ignition source prevention feature of the fuel tank system design that is necessary to prevent the occurrence of an unsafe condition. The purpose of a CDCCL is to provide instruction to retain the critical ignition source prevention feature during configuration change that may be caused by alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions. A CDCCL is not a periodic inspection.
Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328098 refers to the following service information for doing certain CDCCLs:
Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.
During the SFAR 88 safety assessment, Lockheed concluded that no operator had installed auxiliary fuel tank No. 4, in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328089, on Model L10113853 series airplanes. Thus, safety assessments for the auxiliary fuel tank, including the electrical equipment involved with the modification, did not need to be analyzed to show compliance with SFAR 88. Since Lockheed has not provided the service information required under SFAR 88 that could lead the FAA to make a finding of compliance, and there is a possibility that there may be unreported installations of the modification, we must mandate the removal of auxiliary fuel tank.
If an operator does not wish to remove the auxiliary fuel tank, we
will consider requests for alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs).
The most likely requests would be to allow continued use of the tank by showing compliance
[[Page 9237]]
with SFAR 88. This would involve obtaining STCs and developing design
and maintenance procedures to address all identified safety issues. FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD
We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing this AD, which would require revising the FAAapproved maintenance program to incorporate the FSLs and CDCCLs specified in Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328098. This proposed AD would also require the accomplishment of certain fuel system modifications, the initial inspections of certain repetitive FSLs to phase in those inspections, and repair if necessary. Differences Between the Proposed AD and Service Bulletin
Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328098 specifies to revise the operator's maintenance program to incorporate Revision 7 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328062 and Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328093. However, this proposed AD would not require those actions, since Lockheed Service Bulletins 09328062 and 09328093 are mandated by other ADs. AD 992412, amendment 3911436 (64 FR 66756, November 30, 1999), mandated Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328093. AD 802504, amendment 393983 (45 FR 79011, November 28, 1980), mandated Revision 1 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328062, but this proposed AD would not require accomplishing Revision 7 of the service bulletin since both Revisions 1 and 7 adequately address the unsafe condition.
Where Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328098 specifies to inspect, this proposed AD would require a general visual inspection. We have included Note 2 in this proposed AD to define this type of inspection.
Although Lockheed Service Bulletins 09328094, 09328095, 09328 096, and 09328097 describe procedures for notifying Lockheed of any discrepancies found during inspection or any evidence of damage or wire replacement, this proposed AD would not require those actions. Explanation of Compliance Time
In most ADs, we adopt a compliance time allowing a specified amount of time after the AD's effective date. In this case, however, the FAA has already issued regulations that require operators to revise their maintenance/inspection programs to address fuel tank safety issues. The compliance date for these regulations is December 16, 2008. To provide for efficient and coordinated implementation of these regulations and this proposed AD, we are using that same compliance date in this proposed AD.
There are about 108 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet. The following table provides the estimated costs, at
an average labor rate of $80 per hour, for U.S. operators to comply with this proposed AD.
Estimated Costs
Number of
Work Cost per U.S.
Action hours Parts airplane registered Fleet cost
airplanes
Maintenance program revision to 4 None................. $320 63 $20,160 incorporate FSLs and CDCCLs.
Removal of auxiliary fuel tank No. 4, 40 None................. 3,200 8 25,600 if applicable.
Modification and inspection of the 19 $974................. 2,494 63 157,122 wiring harnesses of the fuel level
control switch.
Inspection of the airplane fuel tanks, 370 $18,491.............. 48,091 63 3,029,733 vent boxes, and bonding jumpers, and
the addition of bonding jumpers to the
fuel/vent tube fittings.
Inspection of the wiring harnesses of 2 $41,785.............. 41,945 63 2,642,535 the No. 1 and No. 3 engine tank valves.
Identification and inspection of the 4 $336................. 656 63 41,328 FQIS wiring harnesses.
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety. The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: [[Page 9238]]
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
Lockheed: Docket No. FAA20080181; Directorate Identifier 2007NM 180AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by March 21, 2008.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to all Lockheed Model L1011 series airplanes, certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD requires revisions to certain operator
maintenance documents to include new inspections. Compliance with
these inspections is required by 14 CFR 91.403(c). For airplanes
that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the
areas addressed by these inspections, the operator may not be able
to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this
situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must
request approval for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in
accordance with paragraph (k) of this AD. The request should include
a description of changes to the required inspections that will ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from a design review of the fuel tank
systems. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential for
ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures,
alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination
with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.
Service Bulletin Reference
(f) The term ``service bulletin,'' as used in this AD, means the
Accomplishment Instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328098, Revision 1, dated January 22, 2008.
Maintenance Program Revision
(g) Before December 16, 2008, revise the FAAapproved
maintenance program to incorporate the fuel system limitations
(FSLs) specified in paragraph 2.B. of the service bulletin and the
critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCLs) specified
in paragraph 2.C. of the service bulletin; except as provided by paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD.
(1) Where the FSLs specify to inspect, this AD would require doing a general visual inspection.
Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection
is: ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior area,
installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or
irregularity. This level of inspection is made from within touching
distance unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to
ensure visual access to all surfaces in the inspection area. This
level of inspection is made under normally available lighting
conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or
droplight and may require removal or opening of access panels or
doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be required to gain proximity to the area being checked.''
(2) For the CDCCLs specified in paragraphs 2.C.(2)(c),
2.C.(2)(d), and 2.C.(15)(a) of the service bulletin, do the
applicable actions using a method approved in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (k) of this AD. The applicable
service information listed in Table 1 of this AD is one approved method.
Table 1.Approved Methods for Certain CDCCLs For the CDCCL identified in the service
bulletin in paragraph One approved method is For
2.C.(2)(c)................................... Hamilton Sundstrand Overhaul Overhauling and repairing the
Manual 282403, Revision 14, electricallyoperated fuel
dated May 15, 2000. boost pumps.
2.C.(2)(d)................................... Lockheed L1011 Service Keeping the electrical conduit
Information Letter 2812, dated for the electricallyoperated
March 17, 1998. fuel boost pumps open and
unplugged at the wing rear
spar.
2.C.(15)(a).................................. Lockheed Drawing 1527514, Installing the fuel tank
Revision D, dated November 11, valves, auxiliary power unit
1981. pump, sight gages, fuel
quantity indicating system
tank units, over wing filler
cap adapter ring, boost pump
mounting plate, and access
doors for the boost pump, vent
box, vent valve, and fuel
level control switch. Initial Accomplishment of FSLs and Repair if Necessary
(h) Before December 16, 2008, do the applicable FSLs specified
in paragraphs 2.B.(1)(b), 2.B.(1)(d), 2.B.(1)(e), 2.B.(1)(f), and
2.B.(1)(g) of the service bulletin and repair any discrepancy, in
accordance with the service bulletin. Any repair must be done before further flight.
Note 3: The service bulletin refers to the service information
listed in Table 2 of this AD as additional sources of service information for doing the FSLs and repair.
Table 2.Additional Sources of Service Information for Certain FSLs
The FSL identified in the service bulletin in Refers to Lockheed Service
paragraph Bulletin For
2.B.(1)(b)................................... 09328089, Revision 3, dated Removing auxiliary fuel tank
October 4, 2006 (or later). No. 4, if applicable.
2.B.(1)(d)................................... 09328094, Revision 1, dated Modifying the wiring harnesses
June 23, 2006 (or later). of the fuel level control
switch; repetitively
inspecting the fuel level
control switch, wiring
harness, and harness conduit
for any visible damage, wear
or chafing, broken or missing
Orings, or indications of
electrical arcing; and
replacing the fuel level
control switch assembly with a
new assembly if any damage or
evidence of chafing to the
wiring is found. [[Page 9239]]
2.B.(1)(e)................................... 09328095, dated September 13, Repetitively inspecting the
2006 (or later). airplane fuel tanks and vent
boxes for cleanliness and
evidence of deteriorated or
damaged fuel/vent tubes and
components; repetitively
inspecting bonding jumpers for
proper installation,
corrosion, frayed or broken
strands, and the condition of
the environmental sealing or
bonding clamps and hardware;
correcting any discrepant
conditions; adding bonding
jumpers to the fuel/vent tube
fittings; and repetitively
inspecting the bonding jumpers
on the fuel/vent tube
fittings.
2.B.(1)(f)................................... 09328096, Revision 2, dated Repetitively inspecting the
June 23, 2006 (or later). wiring harnesses of the No. 1
and No. 3 engine tank valves
for evidence of damage and
fuel contamination; replacing
any damaged wire with new
wire; and repairing or
replacing any contaminated
wires as applicable.
2.B.(1)(g)................................... 09328097, dated August 3, 2006 Identifying the wiring
(or later). harnesses for the fuel
quantity indicator system
(FQIS); repetitively
inspecting the FQIS wiring
harnesses for any visible
damage, wear, chafing, or
indications of electrical
arcing; and replacing or
repairing any damaged wires as
applicable. No Reporting Requirement
(i) Although Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328094, Revision 1,
dated June 23, 2006; Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328095, dated
September 13, 2006; Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328096, Revision
2, dated June 23, 2006; and Lockheed Service Bulletin 09328097, dated August 3, 2006; specify to notify Lockheed of any
discrepancies found during inspection or any evidence of damage or wire replacement, this AD does not require that action.
No Alternative Inspections, Inspection Intervals, or CDCCLs
(j) After accomplishing the actions specified in paragraphs (g)
and (h) of this AD, no alternative inspections, inspection
intervals, or CDCCLs may be used unless the inspections, intervals,
or CDCCLs are part of a later revision of the service bulletin that
is approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), FAA; or unless the inspections, intervals, or CDCCLs are
approved as an AMOC in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (k) of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(k)(1) The Manager, Atlanta ACO, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 11, 2008. Stephen P. Boyd,
Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E82996 Filed 21908; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 491013P
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT Robert A. Bosak, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion and Services Branch, ACE118A, FAA, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, One Crown Center, 1895 Phoenix Boulevard, Suite 450, Atlanta, Georgia 30349; telephone (770) 7036094; fax (770) 703 6097.
14 CFR Part 39 40 CFR Part 52 14 CFR Part 71 33 CFR Part 165 50 CFR Part 679 26 CFR Part 1 40 CFR Part 180 47 CFR Part 73 50 CFR Part 17 33 CFR Part 117 44 CFR Part 67 50 CFR Part 648 14 CFR Part 97 33 CFR Part 100 40 CFR Part 63 50 CFR Part 622 26 CFR Part 301 39 CFR Part 111 40 CFR Part 300 50 CFR Part 660 44 CFR Part 65 40 CFR Parts 52 and 81 40 CFR Part 271 47 CFR Part 64 50 CFR Part 665 47 CFR Part 76 50 CFR Part 229 14 CFR Part 23 14 CFR Part 25 21 CFR Part 522