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Docket ID: [Docket No. FAA-2008-0269; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-320-AD]
RIN ID: RIN 2120-AA64
SUBJECT CATEGORY: Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, - 800, and -900 Series Airplanes
DOCUMENT SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737600, 700, 700C, 800, and 900 series airplanes. This proposed AD would require replacement of the power control relays in the P91 and P92 power distribution panels for the fuel boost and override pumps with new improved relays. This proposed AD would also require a revision to the Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate AWL No. 28AWL20. This proposed AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are proposing this AD to prevent pump housing burnthrough due to electrical arcing, which could create a potential ignition source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
SUMMARY: Boeing Model 737 600, 700, 700C, 800, and 900 Series Airplanes,
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA20080269; Directorate Identifier 2007NM320AD'' at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' Amendment 2178, and subsequent Amendments 2182 and 2183).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbinepowered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and inservice failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.
We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
The power control relays for the fuel boost and override pumps must be replaced with new relays that include a ground fault interrupter (GFI) feature. The GFI is designed to detect electrical faults and open the circuit prior to pump housing burnthrough. Burnthrough due to electrical arcing could create a potential ignition source inside the center fuel tank. This condition in combination with flammable fuel vapors, if not corrected, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 73728A1201, dated February 19, 2007. The service bulletin describes procedures for replacing the power control relays in the P91 and P92 power distribution panels for the fuel boost and override pumps with new, improved relays having a GFI feature.
The Boeing service bulletin refers to Honeywell Service Bulletin 11519322461, dated November 10, 2006, as an additional source of service information for replacing the power control relays in the P91 power distribution panel. The Boeing service bulletin also refers to Honeywell Service Bulletin 11519342462, dated November 10, 2006, as an additional source of service information for replacing the power control relays in the P92 power distribution panels.
We have also reviewed Section 9 of the Boeing 737600/700/800/900 Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) Document, D626A001CMR, Revision March 2007 R2 (hereafter referred to as ``Revision March 2007 of the MPD''). Subsection F, ``AIRWORTHINESS LIMITATIONSFUEL SYSTEMS AWLs,'' of Revision March 2007 of the MPD describes new airworthiness limitations (AWLs) for fuel tank systems. Subsection F of Revision March 2007 of the MPD adds new fuel system AWL No. 28AWL20, which is a repetitive operational check of the GFI for all alternating current fuel tank boost pumps to ensure continued functionality of the GFI circuit. FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD
We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the(se) same type design(s). This proposed AD would require the following actions:
This proposed AD would also allow accomplishing the revision to the AWLs section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness in accordance with later revisions of the MPD as an acceptable method of compliance if they are approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA.
We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 754 aircraft of U.S.
registry. The following table provides the estimated costs, at an
average labor rate of $80 per hour, for U.S. operators to comply with this proposed AD.
Estimated Costs
Cost per
Action Work hours Parts product Fleet cost
Installation of GFI relays............. 8 $11,010................... $11,650 $8,784,100
Maintenance program revision........... 1 None...................... $80 $60,320 [[Page 12912]]
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in ``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866,
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety. The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
Boeing: Docket No. FAA20080269; Directorate Identifier 2007NM 320AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by April 25, 2008.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 737600, 700, 700C, 800,
and 900 series airplanes, certificated in any category; as
identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 73728A1201, dated February 19, 2007.
Note 1: This AD requires revisions to certain operator
maintenance documents to include new inspections. Compliance with
these inspections is required by 14 CFR 91.403(c). For airplanes
that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the
areas addressed by these inspections, the operator may not be able
to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this
situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must
request approval for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC)
according to paragraph (i) of this AD. The request should include a
description of changes to the required inspections that will ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent pump housing burn
through due to electrical arcing, which could create a potential
ignition source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination
with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
Compliance
(e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.
Replacement
(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD, replace the power control relays in the P91 and P92 power
distribution panels for the fuel boost and override pumps with new
improved relays having a ground fault interrupter (GFI) feature, in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin.
Note 2: The Boeing service bulletin refers to Honeywell Service
Bulletin 11519322461 and Honeywell Service Bulletin 11519342462,
both dated November 10, 2006, as additional sources of service
information for replacement of the power control relays in the P91 and P92 power distribution panels.
Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) Revision
(g) Concurrently with accomplishing the actions specified in paragraph (f) of this AD, revise the AWLs section of the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness by incorporating AWL No. 28AWL20 of Subsection F of the Boeing 737600/700/800/900
Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) Document, D626A001CMR, Section 9,
Revision March 2007 R2 (hereafter referred to as ``the MPD''). No Alternative Inspections or Inspection Intervals
(h) After accomplishing the action specified in paragraph (g) of
this AD, no alternative inspections or inspection intervals may be
used unless the inspections or intervals are part of a later
revision of the MPD that is approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO; or
unless the inspections or intervals are approved as an AMOC in
accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(i)(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA, ATTN: Jen Pei, Aerospace
Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM130S, 1601 Lind Avenue,
SW., Renton, Washington 980573356; telephone (425) 9176409; fax
(425) 9176590; has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 3, 2008.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E84773 Filed 31008; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 491013P
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT Jen Pei, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 980573356; telephone (425) 9176409; fax (425) 9176590.
14 CFR Part 39 40 CFR Part 52 14 CFR Part 71 33 CFR Part 165 26 CFR Part 1 50 CFR Part 679 40 CFR Part 180 47 CFR Part 73 33 CFR Part 117 50 CFR Part 17 44 CFR Part 67 50 CFR Part 648 14 CFR Part 97 33 CFR Part 100 40 CFR Part 63 26 CFR Part 301 50 CFR Part 622 39 CFR Part 111 40 CFR Part 300 50 CFR Part 660 44 CFR Part 65 40 CFR Parts 52 and 81 40 CFR Part 271 47 CFR Part 64 14 CFR Part 23 14 CFR Part 25 21 CFR Part 522 50 CFR Part 665 47 CFR Part 76 27 CFR Part 9