Browse: Departments Dates Agencies
Docket ID: [Docket No. PHMSA-07-29364 (HM-231A)]
RIN ID: RIN 2137-AE32
SUBJECT CATEGORY: Hazardous Materials; Combination Packages Containing Liquids Intended for Transport by Aircraft
DOCUMENT SUMMARY: PHMSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are considering changes to requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations applicable to nonbulk packagings used to transport hazardous materials in air transportation. To enhance aviation safety, the two agencies are seeking to identify costeffective solutions that can be implemented to reduce incident rates and potentially detrimental consequences without placing unnecessary burdens on the regulated community. We are soliciting comments on how to accomplish these goals, including measures to: (1) Enhance the effectiveness of performance testing for packagings used to transport hazardous materials on aircraft; (2) more clearly indicate the responsibilities of shippers that offer packages for air transport in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR); and (3) authorize alternatives for enhancing package integrity. We are also considering ways to simplify current requirements. Commenters are also invited to present additional ideas for improving the safe transportation of hazardous materials by aircraft.
SUMMARY: Combination Packages Containing Liquids Intended for Transport by Aircraft,
A. FAA Study
B. United Parcel Service (UPS) Study
C. Michigan State University (MSU) Study for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA/MSU Study)
D. MSU Study for PHMSA (PHMSA/MSU Study)
E. PHMSA Review of Incident Data
IV. Purpose of This ANPRM
A. Design Qualification and Periodic Retesting
(1) Pressure Differential Test
(2) Vibration Testing
(3) Combination (Simultaneous) Pressure Differential/Vibration Testing
(4) Elimination of Selective Testing Variations
B. Other Requirements
(1) Liners and Absorbent Material
(2) Secondary Means of Closure
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
B. Executive Order 13132
C. Executive Order 13175
D. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
E. Information Collection
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
B. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
The Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR parts 171180) authorize a variety of packaging types for the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce. Combination packagings are the most common type of packaging used for the transportation of hazardous materials by aircraft. A combination packaging consists of one or more inner packagings secured in a nonbulk outer packaging. (A nonbulk outer packaging is one that has a maximum capacity of 450 liters (119 gallons) as a receptacle for a liquid or a maximum net mass of 400 kg (882 pounds) or less and a maximum capacity of 450 liters (119 gallons) or less as a receptacle for a solid; see 49 CFR 171.8.) Combination packagings are used for the transportation of both solid and liquid hazardous materials, including materials such as sodium hydroxide, paint, and sulfuric acid and articles such as lithium batteries.
When used to transport liquid hazardous materials, a combination packaging must conform to one of the specifications (i.e., ``Specification Packaging'') in part 178 of the HMR or an authorized UN Standard; the packaging must be tested to ensure that it conforms to the applicable specification or standard. Inner packagings within a combination packaging must be closed in preparation for testing, and tests must be carried out on the completed package in the same manner as if prepared for transportation. See 49 CFR 178.602.
Under the HMR, certain classes and quantities of hazardous materials may be transported in nonspecification combination packagings. A nonspecification packaging is not required to meet specific performance requirements. Rather, a nonspecification packaging must meet general packaging requirements. For example, a non specification packaging must be designed, constructed, filled, and closed so that it will not release its contents under conditions normally incident to transportation. In addition, the effectiveness of the packaging must be maintained for temperature changes, changes in humidity and pressure, and shocks, loadings, and vibrations normally encountered during transportation. See 49 CFR 173.24. In addition, a nonspecification packaging authorized for transportation by aircraft must be designed and constructed to prevent leakage that may be caused by changes in altitude and temperature. See 49 CFR 173.27. Non specification packagings need not be tested to demonstrate that they conform to applicable HMR requirements.
Incident data and testing indicate that a number of combination packaging designs authorized for the transportation of liquid hazardous materials are not able to withstand conditions normally incident to air transportation. The packagings of most concern to PHMSA and FAA are nonspecification combination packagings that must be ``capable'' of meeting pressure differential requirements but are not required to be certified as meeting a specific performance test method to verify compliance with pressure differential performance standards.
We are aware that there are a number of contributing factors that may cause packaging failures and releases in air transport, including noncompliance with existing requirements and lack of function specific training of hazmat employees. In this ANPRM, we are soliciting comments on costeffective measures that can be taken to reduce or eliminate the number of liquid hazardous materials releases from combination packagings in air transport. As discussed in more detail below, PHMSA and FAA developed this ANPRM, in part, utilizing data and information provided by stakeholders in a meeting on June 21, 2007. PHMSA's review of incident data is discussed in section III.E. of this notice. A summary of the meeting, including presentations by participants, is available for review in the public docket for this rulemaking.
In 1990, PHMSA's predecessor agency, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), published a final rule under Docket HM 181 (55 FR 52402; December 21, 1990), revisions and response to petitions for reconsideration (56 FR 66124; December 20, 1991) to align the HMR with international standards applicable to hazardous materials packagings. See 49 CFR part 178, subparts L and M, adopted at 55 FR 5271628. That final rule adopted nonbulk hazardous material packaging standards based on performance criteria rather than the detailed construction specifications that applied prior to 1990 and were phased out in 1996. See former 49 CFR 171.14(b)(1), adopted at 55 FR 5247374. Under these performanceoriented packaging requirements, packaging strength and integrity are demonstrated through a series of performance tests that a packaging must pass before it is authorized for the transportation of hazardous materials. The performance criteria provide packaging design flexibility that is not possible with detailed design specifications.
In the HM181 rulemaking, we adopted requirements that all nonbulk
packaging ``must be capable of withstanding * * * the vibration test
procedure'' set forth in 49 CFR 178.608 (55 FR at 52727) and that metal
and plastic and composite packagings ``intended to contain liquids''
must pass a hydrostatic pressure test. 49 CFR 178.605 (55 FR at 52726).
However, we did not adopt our proposal in the notice of proposed
rulemaking to require a hydrostatic pressure test to be performed on all inner packagings of combination packages containing
[[Page 38363]]
liquids intended for transportation by aircraft, which would have
addressed pressure differentials potentially encountered during air
transportation. (See 52 FR 16482, May 5, 1987). Instead, consistent
with the International Civil Aviation Organization Technical
Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO
Technical Instructions), we adopted a requirement that all packagings
intended to contain liquids ``must be capable of withstanding without
leakage'' a specified internal pressure depending on the hazard class/
division and packing group. 49 CFR 173.27(c)(2)(i), adopted at 55 FR 52612.
The ICAO Technical Instructions include guidance that indicates in more precise terms what is meant by ``being capable,'' but specific test methods have not been adopted. The ICAO Technical Instructions suggest that the capability of packaging to meet the pressure differential performance standard should be determined by testing, with the appropriate test method selected based on packaging type. See ``Note'' following 4.1.1.6.
The HMR, at 49 CFR 173.27(c), specify that inner packagings of combination packagings for which retention of liquid is a basic function must be capable of withstanding the greater of: (1) An internal pressure which produces a gauge pressure of not less than 75 kPa for liquids in Packing Group III of Class 3 or Division 6.1 or 95 kPa for other liquids; or (2) a pressure related to the vapor pressure of the liquid to be conveyed as determined by formulae in subsequent paragraphs.
When packages reach high altitudes during transport, they experience low pressure on the exterior of the package. This results in a pressure differential between the interior and exterior of the package since the pressure inside remains at the higher groundlevel pressure. Higher altitudes will create lower external pressures and, therefore, larger pressure differentials. This condition is especially problematic for packages containing liquids.
When a packaging, such as a glass bottle or receptacle, is initially filled and sealed, the cap must be tightened to a certain level to obtain sealing forces sufficient to contain the liquids in the packaging. This will require certain forces to be placed upon the bottle and cap threads as well as the sealing surface of the cap or cap liner to ensure the packaging remains sealed throughout transportation. Once at altitude, due to the internal pressure of the liquid acting upon the closure, combined with the reduced external air pressure, the forces acting on the threads and the forces acting on the sealing surfaces may not be the same as when the packaging was initially closed. Under normal conditions encountered in air transport (26 kPa @ 8000 ft), conditions are not overly severe. However, if the compartment is depressurized at altitude or if the compartment is not pressurized at all (e.g., feeder aircraft), the pressure differential (55 kPa90 kPa) may be severe enough to cause package failure and release of contents.
When first closed, and if closed properly, the typical cap and bottle do not deform to the point where sealing integrity is immediately compromised, although studies have demonstrated that plastic bottles and caps do begin to exhibit stress relaxation and a reduction in sealing force immediately after the bottles are sealed. When the bottle is closed in a manner that accounts for the initial stress relaxation of the cap and threads, and there is no altitude induced pressure differential in the packaging, no pressure change inside the bottle and no change in the spacing between the top of the cap and the rim of the bottle, there will be no immediate change in the sealing force that affects the bottle's ability to maintain a seal. An increase in altitude will cause an increase in the thread contact force, but no immediate change in the sealing force. These conditions persist for as long as the pressure differential is maintained. Even though the sealing force remains unchanged, the increased thread forces could distort the cap and cause the cap threads to expand over the bottle threads.
Vibration further complicates the force on the bottle. The net effect of the vibration force intermittently compresses and decompresses the closure in rapid succession. This can temporarily reduce the sealing force to zero. A rapid removal of the compression force, which occurs naturally during vibration, may not allow the closure to recover quickly enough to maintain a seal. It may take several seconds, even minutes, for the closure to return to its original configuration, if it returns to the original configuration at all. Thus, while the bottle and cap are intermittently compressing and decompressing, there may be a gap, which could result in a leak of material from the package.
Finally, the effect of internal pressure and stress relaxation after initial closure of the inner receptacle, particularly with thermoplastic bottles and caps, can lead to a reduction of sealing force on the inner receptacle and may also cause failure of a packaging during air transport. Studies reviewed in section III of this notice demonstrate that when a thermoplastic bottle and cap are initially closed, stress relaxation can account for a reduction of nearly 50% in removal torque within minutes of application and an 80% reduction of removal torque over several days or weeks. Loss of sealing force due to the combination of creep and stress relaxation can also contribute to packages leaking in air transportation. As can be understood, the combination of stress relaxation, vibration, and low pressure at high altitudes may reduce the overall sealing force, thereby compromising the closure integrity of a packaging and resulting in leakage from the packaging. The air transportation of small parcels typically includes multiple flights to reach destination. Therefore, this stress cycle on the closure systems of inner packagings repeats itself multiple times from origination to destination.
The following studies simulated the stresses of low external pressure and vibration on combination package integrity and performance before, during, and while inflight. These same stresses induced by low external pressure and vibration are encountered inflight when cargo and feeder aircraft transport combination packages in nonpressurized or partiallypressurized cargo holds. These conditions result in substantial changes in pressure when compared to combination packages being transported at or near sea level and require a higher level of integrity as a result.
In 1999, the FAA began a detailed study of hazardous material
package failures in air transportation. FAA analyzed incident data from
the DOT Hazardous Materials Information System (HMIS) during 1998 and
1999 and focused on properly declared hazardous material shipments. The
study concluded that of 1,583 air incidents reported to PHMSA, a
failure of inner packagings in combination packaging designs
contributed to 333 spills or leaks. Further study of the spill or leak
incidents concluded that package closure/seal failure rates were as
high as 65% for plastic and metal inner packagings and 23% for glass
inner packagings. All failed inner packagings were packaged in outer UN
4G marked fiberboard boxes. Based on these study results, FAA concluded that either the inner packagings were not
[[Page 38364]]
closed properly as specified in the packaging manufacturer's closure
instructions or that the inner packagings were not capable of meeting
the pressure differential requirement or vibration standard of the HMR
or both. In addition, because the majority (85%) of the materials that
spilled or leaked during flight were toxic, corrosive or flammable,
they could have released potentially harmful fumes or vapors into the
cabin posing a threat to passengers and crew members. FAA determined
that further research on the actual effects of vibration and pressure differential in air transport was warranted.
As a result of the conclusions of FAA's study of combination packaging failures in 2000, FAA conducted extensive laboratory research and public outreach in multiple fora to analyze the problem and develop potential solutions. Conclusions reached as a result of the following laboratory studies indicate problems exist under the current regulatory standards for which solutions need to be developed and implemented. B. UPS Study
UPS presented a study in 2000 to the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) outlining the conditions that packages experience in the air transport environment. A copy of the UPS study is available for review in the public docket for this rulemaking. The study resulted in the following key observations related to air transport as described in ASTM D 665301:
1. Aircraft cargo compartments are typically pressurized to an altitude of 8,000 ft resulting in a pressure differential of approximately 26kPa on packages filled at or near sea level. Temperature is maintained at approximately 20[deg]23 [deg]C (68 [deg] 74 [deg]F).
2. Nonpressurized ``feeder aircraft'' typically fly at approximately 13,00016,000 feet. The highest recorded altitude in a nonpressurized feeder aircraft was 19,740 ft. Temperatures ranged from approximately 4[deg] to 24 [deg]C (25 [deg]75 [deg]F). Based on these findings, it is evident that packaged products transported by the feeder aircraft network used by air cargo carriers may experience potential altitudes as high as 20,000 feet, resulting in a pressure differential of approximately 55 kPa. An inadequate packaging design containing liquids at this pressure differential can fail in transportation.
In 2002, the FAA initiated a study with Michigan State University
(MSU) to replicate actual air and pre and posttruck transportation
conditions to determine which conditions contribute to package
failures. FAA examined the effects of vibration alone, altitude alone,
and a combination of vibration and altitude on the performance of UN
standard hazardous material combination packages containing liquids. In
the study, the combination packages were placed in various
orientations, not all of which are authorized in the HMR. The study did
not include temperature effects because the temperatures in cargo holds
are not unusual or extreme. Each test condition in Table 1 represents a
different combination of low pressure and vibration that packages may be exposed to while in, or pre or postair transport:
Table 1.Ranking of Conditions
Percentage of
failure of
Conditions packages
tested
No vibration, 14,000 ft, 30 min......................... 0
Truck and air vibration, 0 ft, 30 min................... 14
Truck only vibration, 8,000 ft, 180 min................. 21
Truck and air vibration, 8,000 ft, 180 min.............. 29
Truck and air vibration (typical sequence for air 50 transportation), 14,000 ft, 30 min.....................
MSU procured 32 design samples of UN standard liquid hazardous material
combination packagings from three leading hazmat packaging suppliers.
See United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods
Model Regulations, Volume II, Part 6. The test combination packagings
were certified to meet current UN, ICAO, and applicable HMR
requirements. The testing was designed to replicate actual
transportation conditions. A copy of this report is available for
review in the public docket. Several key conclusions can be drawn from the analysis:
In 2003, PHMSA also initiated a study with MSU to compare the HMR
requirements and the testing used in the FAA/MSU Study discussed
previously. To provide for a more thorough evaluation of the
performance of liquid hazardous materials combination packagings, this
phase of testing was conducted on a smaller number of packaging
designs; however, a much greater number of packagings of each design
were tested in this study. In the 2002 FAA/MSU study, two packagings of
each design were tested; for this study, PHMSA tested thirty packagings
from each of eleven designs. With the exception of three packaging
designs, all of the packagings tested during this phase had been tested
for the 2002 FAA/MSU study. See Table 2 below. A copy of this report is available for review in the public docket.
Table 2.Ranking of Conditions
Percentage of
failures of
Conditions packages
tested
Random vibration and vacuum, vertical orientation 12 (conforming to HMR), 14,000 ft, one hour...............
Random vibration and vacuum, horizontal orientation, 18 14,000 ft, one hour....................................
Vacuum only, 95 kPa for 30 min, inverted orientation.... 13
Random vibration, one hour.............................. 11
Average failure rate................................ 13
The conclusions from this testing supported MSU's previous testing conducted for FAA:
During the first half of 2007, PHMSA conducted a comprehensive assessment of hazardous materials transportation incidents occurring in air transportation from 1997 through 2006. This study and its corresponding data may be accessed in the public docket for this rulemaking. The study concluded that there has been no appreciable reduction in package failures over the past 10 years. It is estimated that 191,429 tons of liquid hazardous materials are transported by aircraft annually contained in 7,657,152 combination packaging shipments. Of that total, our analysis concluded that out of approximately 483 failures (.00006%) in air transportation involving combination packagings containing liquids each year, 20 are reported as ``serious.'' An incident is considered serious if it involves one or more of the following: (1) A fatality or major injury caused by the release of a hazardous material; (2) the evacuation of 25 or more persons as a result of release of a hazardous material or exposure to fire; (3) a release or exposure to fire which results in the closure of a major transportation artery; (4) the alteration of an aircraft flight plan or operation; (5) the release of radioactive materials from Type B packaging; (6) the release of over 45 liters (11.9 gallons) or 40 kilograms (88.2 pounds) of a severe marine pollutant; and (7) the release of a bulk quantity (over 450 liters (119 gallons) or 400 kilograms (882 pounds)) of a hazardous material. We want to emphasize that any incident, such as a package failure, involving hazardous materials in air transportation is unacceptable. In air transportation, any incident could quickly escalate and result in irreversible, possibly catastrophic, consequences.
Accounting for approximately 80 percent of all packages transported
by air, combination packagings containing liquids are involved in 44
percent (483) of all package failures annually. Inner packaging closure
failures within a combination outer packaging are the primary cause of
incidents involving combination packagings in air transportation. Such
failures could be the result of pressure differential (packages closed
at sea level subjected to lower pressure on planes), ``backing off'' of the closure (closures that appear tight but loosen during
transportation), improper closures, or some other cause. Our analysis
also suggests that most incidents involve combination packagings that
contain flammable liquids (e.g., paint and paint related material) of
varying degrees of hazard. Some additional statistical data from the 2007 incident review include:
PHMSA presented the results of this review at a June 21, 2007 meeting with stakeholders to discuss air packaging issues. The 44 participants included cargo and passenger air carriers, packaging manufacturers and testing laboratories, FAA and PHMSA personnel, and representatives of industry trade associations. The shippers, air carriers, and enforcement personnel present generally agreed that the current capability requirements for air packagings are difficult to comply with and suggested that specific test methods designed to demonstrate that packagings will withstand the air transportation environment should be specified in the HMR.
Stakeholders at the meeting also suggested that increased outreach through industry partnership and targeted enforcement for habitual offenders would significantly enhance achievement of PHMSA and FAA safety goals without additional regulation.
As previously noted, to enhance aviation safety, PHMSA and FAA are seeking to identify costeffective solutions that can be implemented to reduce incident rates and potentially detrimental consequences without placing unnecessary burdens on the regulated community. We are soliciting comments on how to accomplish these goals, including measures to: (1) Enhance the effectiveness of performance testing for packagings used to transport hazardous materials on aircraft; (2) more clearly indicate the responsibilities of shippers that offer packages for air transport in the HMR; and (3) authorize alternatives for enhancing package integrity. Based on PHMSA and FAA analyses, it appears that some combination packaging designs used to transport hazardous materials by aircraft may not meet the pressure differential and vibration capability standards mandated under the HMR. Indeed, the testing suggests that the capability standards themselves may not be sufficiently rigorous to ensure that packagings maintain their integrity under conditions normally incident to air transportation. Because aircraft accidents caused by leaking or breached hazardous materials packages can have significant consequences, the air transport of hazardous materials requires exceptional care and attention to detail. Therefore, we are considering measures to reduce the incidence of package failures and to minimize the consequences of failures should they occur.
The fact that specific test methods are not specified in the HMR or
the ICAO Technical Instructions leads to inconsistencies in package
integrity and results in varying levels of compliance among shippers.
For example, we understand that, because the pressure differential and
vibration capability standards for combination packagings are not required to be verified by a test
[[Page 38366]]
protocol, some shippers (selfcertifiers) or manufacturers have used
historical shipping data, computer modeling, analogies to tested
packagings, engineering studies, or similar methods to determine that
their packagings meet pressure differential and vibration capability
standards. Further, some less experienced shippers or manufacturers may
not understand that their packagings must withstand pressure
differential and vibration requirements. In addition, some shippers or
manufacturers may not realize that both UN Standard packaging and
packagings that are not required to be certified as meeting a
specification or standard are subject to the pressure differential
capability requirement. This would include packagings for products,
such as limited quantities and consumer commodities, where non
specification packagings are authorized. A significant percentage of
aircraft incidents involving hazardous materials appear to result from failures of nonspecification packagings.
As indicated above, a nonspecification packaging is not required to meet specific performance requirements. Rather, a nonspecification packaging must meet general packaging requirements and, for air transportation, must be capable of withstanding pressures encountered at altitude. We invite comments on how to enforce this ``capability'' standard for nonspecification packagings and ask whether a test of some sort should be required to verify packaging integrity.
A complicating factor that appears to be contributing to packaging failures and noncompliance is that assembly of packages in some cases is not consistent with the design type that was originally tested. In some cases, manufacturers change components without informing the shipper; in other cases, shippers specify or change components without appropriate verification and testing to determine compliance with the applicable performance standard. The numerous variables that exist in the interaction of closures, liners, and container neck finishes preclude the use and validity of general assumptions about equivalent pressure performance capabilities of similar containers.
As an alternative to regulation, the FAA implemented an aggressive public outreach program over the past seven years targeted at specific stakeholder audiences, including thousands of shippers, packaging laboratories, industry research and training institutes, airline operators, and chemical manufacturers. In addition, several voluntary industry standards (test protocols) were either created or revised as a result of the public (independent) and private funding of the studies detailed in the previous sections above. A copy of the report listing the specific public outreach efforts conducted by FAA on this issue can be found in the docket for this rulemaking.
Some regulatory solutions under consideration in this rulemaking
process are explained in more detail in the following sections. A. Design Qualification and Periodic Retesting
(1) Pressure differential test. Currently in the HMR, all
packagings containing liquids and intended for transport by air must be
capable of withstanding, without leakage, an internal gauge pressure of
at least 75 kPa for liquids in Packing Group III of Class 3 or 6.1 or
95 kPa for all other liquids, or a pressure related to the vapor
pressure of the liquid to be conveyed, whichever is greater (see 49 CFR
173.27(c)). This requirement is also applicable to liquids excepted
from specification or UN Standard packaging, such as those authorized
for limited quantities and consumer commodities. This would include
eligible liquids of Classes 3 (flammable) and 8 (corrosive), and
Divisions 5.1 (oxidizer), 5.2 (organic peroxide), and 6.1 (poisonous).
Liquids contained in inner receptacles that do not meet the minimum
pressure requirements in the current Sec. 173.27(c) may be overpacked into receptacles that do meet the pressure requirements.
In this ANPRM, we are soliciting comments on whether we should
require mandatory pressure differential testing for all specification
or UN Standard combination packaging designs containing liquids
transported or intended for transportation aboard aircraft. In
addition, because many incidents are attributed to nonspecification
package failures, we are soliciting comments on potential solutions to
this problem that may or may not include the mandatory pressure
differential testing of inner receptacles intended to contain liquids.
One approach would be to incorporate by reference a number of
acceptable test methods and to simplify the regulations by removing the
requirement for calculating the test pressure in Sec. 173.27(c).
Shippers (offerors) would be responsible for using inner receptacles
that have been certified as passing one of the following test methods:
Test Equipment Time under pressure Pressure differential
(a) 49 CFR 178.605................... Pressure fitting, pump. 5 minutes for metal and 60 kPa differential.
composite (including
glass, porcelain, or
stoneware); 30 minutes
for plastic.
(b) ASTM D665301.................... Vacuum chamber and 60 minutes............. 14,000 ft (41.8 kPa
associated gages and differential) \1\ or
pumps. 16,000 ft (46.4 kPa
differential).\2\
(c) ASTM D499194.................... Transparent vessel 30 minutes for plastic, 60 kPa pressure
capable of 10 minutes for differential.
withstanding 1\1/2\ everything else. atmospheres, inlet
tube and vacuum pump, moisture trap,
solution of ethylene glycol in water.
(d) ASTM F1140 or Part 178 Appendix D Inlet tube............. 30 minutes............. 60 kPa pressure
for flexible packaging. differential.
\1\ If it is not possible to use the atmospheric and temperature preconditioning specified.
\2\ For test specimens where the atmospheric and temperature preconditioning is followed.
(a) 49 CFR 178.605Low Pressure Hydrostatic Pressure Test Method
Suitable for Air Inner Packages. This test is currently required for
all single and composite packagings intended to contain liquid, but it
is not currently required for inner packagings of combination
packaging. This test, which uses the hydrostatic test method, pumps
highpressure water into a packaging to create a pressure differential. Failure is determined if there is leakage of liquid
[[Page 38367]]
from the package during the test. This could be observed as a stream of liquid exiting the package or rupture of the package.
(b) ASTM D665301Standard Test Methods for Determining the
Effects of High Altitude on Packaging Systems by Vacuum Method. This
method uses a vacuum chamber to determine the effects of pressure
differential on packages. Upon completion of the test, the package is
removed and checked for damage in the form of package failure, closure
failure, material failure, internal packaging failure, product failure,
or combinations thereof. If these are all free of damage, then the
packaging should be reassembled for testing in accordance with an
industry accepted packaged product performance test, such as Practice D
4169. This will help determine if the pressure differential
conditioning had an effect on the performance of the packaging system.
(c) ASTM D499194 (Reapproved 1999) Standard Test Method for
Leakage Testing of Empty Rigid Containers by Vacuum Method. This test
is applied to empty packagings to check for resistance to leakage under
differential pressure conditions, such as those that can occur during
air transport. Instead of pumping highpressure air into the packaging,
the air pressure on the exterior of the packaging is reduced using a
vacuum. The package is considered to fail if it leaks a continuous
stream or recurring succession of bubbles or if fluid is found within the test specimen after the test.
(d) ASTM F 1140Standard Test Methods for Internal Pressurization
Failure Resistance of Unrestrained Packages for Medical Applications. This test applies to flexible packaging (e.g., bags).
(2) Vibration testing. When packages travel through the
transportation and distribution environment, they are subject to
vibration by automated sorting systems and during transit aboard
aircraft, railcars, or trucks. As packages move on conveyor systems
during automated sorting, they experience a low level of vibration at a
constant frequency. Aircraftinduced vibration typically is very high
frequency and low amplitude for 30 minutes to 12 hours on domestic
shipments, depending on origin, destination, and the carrier's network.
Vibration on trucks occurs at lower frequencies, but at much higher
amplitudes than on aircraft. This duration can last anywhere from 5
minutes to several days depending upon the route and the distance from
origin to destination. Vibrations from these various sources can result
in damage, including scuffing, abrasion, loosening of fasteners and
closures, and package fatigue. There are two main types of vibration
testing used for packages: Fixed frequency vibration and random
vibration. Random vibration provides the most realistic representation
of actual transport conditions, but requires equipment that is more expensive.
The HMR require nonbulk packagings to be capable of withstanding, without rupture or leakage, the vibration test in 49 CFR 178.608. In this ANPRM, we are soliciting comments concerning whether the HMR should be revised to require all specification or UN Standard combination packaging design types containing liquids transported or intended to be transported aboard aircraft to be vibration tested and whether alternative vibration test methods should be authorized for nonbulk packagings. We invite comments on whether the random vibration encountered during the ``sorting'' process and multiple flight segments of today's expedited shipping environment contributes to package failure and whether more representative vibration test methods should be specified in the HMR.
Alternative test methods for determining package vibration capability are described in the following table:
Test Title Equipment Frequency Time
Vertical Linear Test at Fixed Frequency
ASTM D99901 Method A1.......... Repetitive Shock Vibration test Start vibration at Predetermined
Test (Vertical machine with 2 Hz and steadily time, as stated
Motion). horizontal increase until in applicable
surface and the test specimen specification, or
mechanism for repeatedly leaves until
vertical the test surface. predetermined
sinusoidal input; amount of damage
fences, is detected.
barricades or
other restraints.
ASTM D99901 Method A2.......... Repetitive Shock Vibration test Start vibration at Predetermined
Test (Rotary machine with 2 Hz and steadily time, as stated
Motion). horizontal increase until in applicable
surface and the test specimen specification, or
mechanism for repeatedly leaves until
rotational input the test surface. predetermined
with a vertical amount of damage
component is detected.
approximately
sinusoidal;
fences,
barricades or
other restraints.
ASTM 416904a Paragraph 13.1 Loose Load Use Test Method Use Test Method Assurance Level I:
(Schedule F). Vibration ASTM D999, Method ASTM D999, Method 60 min dwell
(Repetitive A1 or A2. A1 or A2. time; Assurance
Shocks). Level II: 40 min
dwell time;
Assurance Level
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT Michael G. Stevens, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 205900001, telephone (202) 3668553.
14 CFR Part 39 40 CFR Part 52 14 CFR Part 71 33 CFR Part 165 47 CFR Part 73 26 CFR Part 1 50 CFR Part 679 40 CFR Part 180 50 CFR Part 17 33 CFR Part 117 44 CFR Part 67 50 CFR Part 648 14 CFR Part 97 40 CFR Part 63 6 CFR Part 5 33 CFR Part 100 50 CFR Part 622 50 CFR Part 660 26 CFR Part 301 44 CFR Part 65 39 CFR Part 111 40 CFR Part 271 40 CFR Part 300 47 CFR Part 64 40 CFR Parts 52 and 81 50 CFR Part 665 39 CFR Part 3020 50 CFR Part 229 44 CFR Part 64 49 CFR Part 571