Federal Register: Part V [49 CFR Part 172]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CFR Citation: 49 CFR Part 172

Docket ID: [Docket No. PHMSA-06-25885 (HM-232F)]

RIN ID: RIN 2137-AE22

NOTICE: Part V

DOCUMENT ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUBJECT CATEGORY: Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security Plan Requirements

DATES: Submit comments by November 10, 2008.

DOCUMENT SUMMARY: PHMSA, in consultation with the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is proposing to modify its current security plan requirements governing the commercial transportation of hazardous materials by air, rail, vessel, and highway. Based on an evaluation of the security threats associated with specific types and quantities of hazardous materials, the proposed rule would narrow the list of materials subject to security plan requirements and reduce associated regulatory costs and paperwork burden. The proposed rule also would clarify certain requirements related to security planning, training, and documentation and incorporate and build on recent international standards governing hazardous materials security.

SUMMARY: Transportation Department, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Comment Submission

Instructions: Identify the agency and docket number (PHMSA06 25885) at the beginning of your submission. Except for comments that receive confidential treatment, all comments received will be posted without change to the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS), including any personal information provided. Detailed instructions for requesting confidential treatment are provided below, under the Privacy Act heading.

Docket: For access to the dockets to read background documents or comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov or DOT's Docket Operations Office (see ADDRESSES).

Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of any written communications and comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the document (or signing the document, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 1947778), which may also be found at http://www.regulations.gov.

You may request confidential treatment of comments or portions of comments under the procedures set forth in 49 CFR part 105. While all comments should be sent to the FDMS, PHMSA will consider separately and not place in the public docket those comments or portions of comments PHMSA determines to include trade secrets, other confidential commercial information, or sensitive security information (SSI). In accordance with 49 CFR 105.30, you may ask PHMSA to keep information confidential using the following procedures: (1) Mark ``confidential'' on each page of the original document you would like to keep confidential; (2) send FDMS both the original document and a second copy of the original document with the confidential information redacted; and (3) explain why the information is confidential (as a trade secret, other confidential commercial information, or SSI). In your explanation, you should provide enough information to enable PHMSA to determine whether the information provided is protected by law and must be handled separately.

In addition, for comments or portions of comments that you believe contain SSI as defined in 49 CFR 15.7, you should comply with Federal regulations governing the handling of SSI. See 49 CFR 1520.9 and 49 CFR 15.9, Restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive security information. Those regulations restrict the disclosure of SSI to those with a need to know and set forth specific requirements for marking, packaging, and disposing of documents containing SSI. Note when mailing in or using a special delivery service to send comments containing SSI, comments should be wrapped in a manner to prevent the information from being read. PHMSA may perform concurrent reviews on requests for designations as SSI.

After reviewing your request for confidentiality and the information provided, PHMSA will determine whether the information should be treated as confidential under applicable laws and regulations. PHMSA will notify you of the decision to grant or deny confidential treatment. If PHMSA denies your request, you will be provided an opportunity to request reconsideration before the information is publicly disclosed. PHMSA will reconsider its decision to deny confidentiality based on your response.

To further guard against disclosure of SSI, PHMSA will review all submissions, whether or not they are identified as confidential, prior to their posting on the public docket. PHMSA will notify you if we determine that information in your submission should not be disclosed to the public. If you have any questions concerning the procedures for determining confidentiality or security sensitivity, you may call one of the individuals listed below.
I. Background

A. Current DOT Security Requirements

The Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171180) require persons who offer for transportation or transport certain hazardous materials in commerce to develop and implement security plans. The security plan requirements in subpart I of part 172 of the HMR apply to persons who offer for transportation or transport: (1) A highwayroute controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) material;
(2) More than 25 kg (55 lbs.) of a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 (explosive) material;
(3) More than 1 L (1.06 qt.) per package of a material poisonous by inhalation in Hazard Zone A;
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(4) A shipment in a bulk packaging with a capacity equal to or greater than13,248 L (3,500 gallons) for liquids or gases or greater than 13.24 cubic meters (468 cubic feet) for solids;
(5) A shipment in other than a bulk packaging of 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) gross weight or more of one class of hazardous materials for which placarding is required;
(6) A select agent or toxin regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under 42 CFR part 73 or a select agent or toxin regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under 9 CFR part 121; or
(7) A shipment that requires placarding under subpart F of part 172 of the HMR.

A security plan must include an assessment of possible transportation security risks and appropriate measures to address the assessed risks. Specific measures implemented as part of the plan may vary with the level of threat at a particular time. At a minimum, the security plan must address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security. For personnel security, the plan must include measures to confirm information provided by job applicants for positions involving access to and handling of the hazardous materials covered by the plan. For unauthorized access, the plan must include measures to address the risk of unauthorized persons gaining access to materials or transport conveyances being prepared for transportation. For en route security, the plan must include measures to address security risks during transportation, including the security of shipments stored temporarily en route to their destinations.

As indicated above, the HMR set forth general requirements for a security plan's components rather than a prescriptive list of specific items that must be included. The HMR set a performance standard providing offerors and carriers with the flexibility necessary to develop security plans addressing their individual circumstances and operational environments. Accordingly, each security plan will differ because it will be based on an offeror's or a carrier's individualized assessment of the security risks associated with the specific hazardous materials it ships or transports and its unique circumstances and operational environment.

B. International Transportation Security Standards

The United Nations Model Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN Recommendations) identify high consequence dangerous goods for which enhanced security measures are recommended. The recommended security measures include security plans and are similar to the requirements in subpart I of part 172 of the HMR. The UN
Recommendations define high consequence dangerous goods as materials with the ``potential for misuse in a terrorist incident and which may, as a result, produce serious consequences such as mass casualties or mass destruction.'' The UN Recommendations list the following materials as high consequence dangerous goods:
(1) Division 1.1 explosives;
(2) Division 1.2 explosives;
(3) Division 1.3 compatibility group C explosives;
(4) Division 1.5 explosives;
(5) Bulk shipments of Division 2.1 flammable gases;
(6) Division 2.3 toxic gases (excluding aerosols);
(7) Bulk shipments of Class 3 flammable liquids in PG I or II; (8) Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitized explosives;
(9) Bulk shipments of Division 4.2 PG I materials;
(10) Bulk shipments of Division 4.3 PG I materials;
(11) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1 PG I oxidizing liquids; (12) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1 perchlorates, ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate fertilizers;
(13) Division 6.1 PG I toxic materials;
(14) Division 6.2 infectious substances of Category A (UN2814 and 2900);
(15) Class 7 radioactive materials in quantities greater than 3000 A1 (special form) or 3000 A2, as applicable, in Type B(U) or Type B(M) or Type (C) packages; and
(16) Bulk shipments of Class 8 PG I materials.
For purposes of the security provisions, the UN defines ``in bulk'' to mean quantities greater than 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) or 3,000 liters (793 gallons) in portable tanks or bulk containers.

C. Petitions for Rulemaking

PHMSA has received two petitions for rulemaking requesting a review and reevaluation of the current HMR security plan requirements. The Council on Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles (COSTHA) petitioned PHMSA (P1447) to reevaluate the security requirements in subpart I of part 172 of the HMR to ``enhance international harmonization and to better utilize available resources in enhancing hazardous materials transportation security.'' COSTHA notes that the list of hazardous materials subject to the security plan requirements differs from the list of high consequence dangerous goods in the UN Recommendations. COSTHA requests that PHMSA adopt the same criteria as the UN Recommendations for materials that are subject to the security plan requirements or, as an alternative, eliminate the security plan requirement for quantities of hazardous materials currently subject to placarding under subpart F of part 172. COSTHA cites several examples of hazardous materials (e.g., automobile batteries, inks, paint, flavoring extracts) that, based on hazard class and quantity are placarded and subject the security plan requirements under the HMR, but not covered by the list of high consequence dangerous goods in the UN Recommendations. COSTHA acknowledges that these materials pose certain risks in transportation, but contends it is highly unlikely a terrorist would use these materials to perpetrate a terrorist attack.

Similarly, the American Trucking Associations (ATA) petitioned PHMSA (P1466) to designate a subset of ``security sensitive hazardous materials'' that would trigger security plan requirements. The ATA urges PHMSA to use the list of materials and quantities subject to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Hazardous Materials Safety Permit requirements as the starting point for determining security sensitive hazardous materials. In 49 CFR part 385, FMCSA requires a safety permit for motor carriers transporting specified quantities of Class 7 (radioactive) materials; Class 1 materials (explosives); materials that are poisonous or toxic by inhalation (PIH or TIH materials); and compressed or refrigerated liquefied methane or liquefied natural gas. In addition to those materials, ATA suggests that PHMSA add the following materials from the UN high consequence dangerous goods list: (1) Bulk shipments of Division 2.1; (2) bulk shipments of Class 3, PG I and II; (3) Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitized explosives (quantity to be determined); (4) bulk shipments of Division 4.2, PG I; (5) bulk shipments of Division 4.3, PG I; (6) bulk shipments of Division 5.1, PG I; (7) bulk shipments of Division 5.1 perchlorates, ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate fertilizers; (8) Division 6.2 infectious substances of Category A (quantity to be determined); (9) any quantity of select agents; and (10) bulk shipments of Class 8, PG I. The ATA uses quantities greater than 3,500 gallons or 5,000 pounds to define ``bulk'' for purposes of security planning. [[Page 52560]]

We agree with COSTHA and ATA that the list of materials for which a security plan is required should be reevaluated. Our existing security plan rules were developed as baseline requirements. We considered the company preparing the security plan to be in the best position to assess security risks based on its operational circumstances. If security risks were determined to be insignificant, this would be reflected in a simple security plan with minimal content. Increased coverage would be required when security risks are more substantial. The security plan requirements went into effect more than four years ago, on September 25, 2003. Since then, both the industry and the government have gained experience evaluating security risks associated with specific hazardous materials and transportation environments and identifying appropriate measures to address those risks. Accordingly, we initiated this rulemaking, in coordination with other DOT modal administrations (the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and FMCSA), and TSA to consider modifications to the list of hazardous materials for which security plans are required.

II. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

On September 21, 2006, PHMSA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking public comment on the current security plan requirements. Commenters were asked to address the list of materials posing a security threat sufficient to justify preparation and implementation of a security plan, including factors that should be considered in assessing security risks; quantity thresholds that would trigger the security plan requirement; packing group criteria; and the availability of hazardous materials outside of transportation.

On November 30, 2006, PHMSA hosted a public meeting to discuss these issues and invite further comments and information concerning the types and quantities of materials that should be covered by the security plan rule. Six persons made presentations at the public meeting. A transcript of the meeting, with the statements of presenters, is available for review in the public docket for this rulemaking.

Written comments were received from offerors, carriers, and private citizens, ID/name/company 1 Clare L. Welker............................. 2 Gregory Sutherland.......................... 3 Clare L. Welker............................. 4 Duplainville Transport...................... 5 Ecolab...................................... 6 Arthur E. Hall.............................. 7 Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME)..... 8 Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator 9 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)............. 10 Thomas L. Dunaway.......................... 11 National Refrigerants, Inc. (NRI).......... 12 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 13 Veolia ES Technical Solutions, L.L.C. 14 Council on Radionuclides and 15 Flavor and Extract Manufacturers 16 Fragrance Materials Association (FMA)...... 17 The Dow Chemical Company (Dow)............. 18 Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings. 19 American Trucking Associations, Inc (ATA).. 20 Dangerous Goods Transport Consulting, Inc.. 21 AirConditioning and Refrigeration 22 Total Petrochemicals USA, Inc.............. 23 American Beverage Association (ABA)........ 24 Reusable Industrial Packaging Association 25 Utility Solid Waste Activities Group 26 Association of Hazmat Shippers, Inc. (AHS). 27 National Paint & Coatings Association, Inc. 28 National Propane Gas Association (NPGA).... 29 Dangerous Goods Advisory Council (DGAC).... 30 Council on Safe Transportation of Hazardous 31 National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. (NTTC).. 32 Battery Council International (BCI)........ 33 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)............. 34 Bill BradshawComments.................... 34 industry associations, identified in the following list.
Date Docket No. 09/28/2006 PHMSA2006258852 10/03/2006 PHMSA2006258853 10/19/2006 PHMSA2006258854 10/25/2006 PHMSA2006258855 11/22/2006 PHMSA2006258856 11/21/2006 PHMSA2006258857 11/30/2006 PHMSA2006258858 12/13/2006 PHMSA2006258859 Facility (Jefferson Lab).
12/18/2006 PHMSA20062588510 12/18/2006 PHMSA20062588511 12/19/2006 PHMSA20062588513 12/19/2006 PHMSA20062588514 (NRC).
12/19/2006 PHMSA20062588515 (Veolia).
12/19/2006 PHMSA20062588516 Radiopharmaceuticals, Inc. (CORAR).
12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588517 Association (FEMA).
12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588518 12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588519 12/19/2006 PHMSA20062588520 12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588521 12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588522 12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588523 Institute (ARI).
12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588524 12/19/2006 PHMSA20062588525 12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588526 (RIPA).
12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588527 (USWAG).
12/21/2006 PHMSA20062588528 12/20/2006 PHMSA20062588529 (NPCA).
12/21/2006 PHMSA20062588530 12/21/2006 PHMSA20062588531 12/22/2006 PHMSA20062588532 Articles, Inc. (COSTHA).
12/27/2006 PHMSA20062588533 01/12/2007 PHMSA20062588534 01/12/2007 PHMSA20062588535 05/17/2007 PHMSA20062588536

The full text of their comments are available for review through the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov).

Most commenters agree that the list of materials for which security plans are required should be revised to include only those materials that pose a significant security threat in transportation. In the words of one commenter, ``[R]egulating hazardous materials transportation security at the placarded load level is inconsistent with a riskbased approach. Using placards as a trigger for hazardous materials security regulations results in the overregulation of materials that are not capable of being used as a terrorist weapon.'' (ATA) Several commenters suggest that our rule should address two types of threats from the misuse of hazardous materials. As one put it: ``First, there are commercial shipments of materials that, based on the hazard and quantity in the package would, if attacked in transportation and catastrophically released, enhance the damage or destruction of the attack. * * * Second, there are other materials whose value to a terrorist is in the theft
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or diversion of the material for manipulation into weapons of mass destruction (WMD).'' (IME) Similarly, ``Risk should be assessed considering the nature of the threat, the vulnerability of the target, and the potential consequences of an incident. Threat scenarios should consider the potential for a serious catastrophic release from a direct attack, the potential for tampering and subsequent downstream impact, and the potential for theft and misuse as a weapon of mass destruction.'' (Dow)

Commenters also agree that, in developing this list, PHMSA should consider the potential for a material to be used for a criminal or terrorist act and the consequences of such an action, based on the hazard class and packing group of the material and the quantity or volume transported. Commenters generally oppose a materialspecific list of chemicals and other materials that pose a security risk. ``We urge PHMSA to reject [security sensitive hazardous materials] lists that are materialbymaterial based and to continue to embrace one based on a hazard class approach. * * * Among other advantages, a hazard class approach can be internationally harmonized and it addresses issues created by mixtures and solutions that have plagued materialbymaterial lists in other regulatory venues.'' (IME)

Most commenters suggest that security plan requirements should apply to the list of hazardous materials identified in the UN Recommendations as ``high consequence dangerous goods.'' ``[W]e believe the current Security Plan requirements should be harmonized with the UN Recommendations so that they focus on the types of hazards and volumes that pose a real threat of weaponization.'' (Flavor and Extract Manufacturers Association) Also, ``[t]he UN recommendation to require security plans for 'High Consequence Dangerous Goods' appears to be a reasonable approach, which considers hazard, form of packaging and volume thresholds.'' (Dow) As well, ``the UN Recommendations individually define `significant risk' materials and quantities based on the actual risk factors * * * rather than general transport classifications. Importantly, material identification is accomplished through a stakeholder developed `list of high consequence dangerous goods' ensuring that material is independently peer reviewed before it is assigned a risk level.'' (AirConditioning and Refrigeration Institute).
III. Proposed Modifications to Security Plan Criteria

A. Summary of Proposal

Based on the comments received on the ANRPM and an evaluation of possible security threats posed by specific types and classes of hazardous materials, PHMSA is proposing to modify the list of materials for which a security plan is required. PHMSA agrees with the commenters to the ANPRM that the UN list of high consequence dangerous goods includes most of the hazardous materials that pose a significant transportation security risk. The UN list of high consequence dangerous goods was used as the starting point for our deliberations for this NPRM.

PHMSA worked closely with FRA, FMCSA, and TSA to assess the transportation security risks associated with the different classes and quantities of hazardous materials. To determine the types of materials that should be subject to security planning requirements, PHMSA evaluated specific transportation scenarios in which a terrorist could deliberately use hazardous materials to cause largescale casualties and property damage. In our qualitative risk evaluation, we considered the following factors: (1) Physical and chemical properties of the material or class of materials and how those properties could contribute to a security incident; (2) quantities shipped and mode of transport; (3) past terrorist use; (4) potential use; and (5) availability. One of the most significant security vulnerabilities involves the potential for a perpetrator to take control of a conveyance containing a highrisk material and move it to a site where the material could cause maximum damage or provide unusual leverage. For some hazardous materials, the primary security threat involves theft or highjacking of raw materials for use in weapons of mass destruction.

On the basis of these considerations, PHMSA proposes to modify the current list of materials covered by the security plan requirement, as summarized in the following table:
Proposed Revisions to the List of Hazardous Materials for Which Transportation Security Plans Will Be Required Class Current threshold Proposed threshold Change 1.1................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. 1.2................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. 1.3................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. 1.4................ A quantity requiring Any quantity of UN 0104, Security plan required only placarding. 0237, 0255, 0267, 0289, for detonators and shaped 0361, 0365, 0366, 0440, charges. 0441, 0455, 0456, 0500. 1.5................ A quantity requiring Any quantity................. Security plan required for placarding. all shipments. 1.6................ A quantity requiring Not subject.................. Security plan not required placarding. for any Division 1.6 shipments. 2.1................ A quantity requiring 3,000 L in a single packaging Security plan not required placarding. for less than 3,000 L. 2.2................ A quantity requiring Not subject except for oxygen Security plan not required placarding. and gases with a subsidiary for most nonflammable, non 5.1 hazard (3,000 L in a poisonous compressed gas single packaging). shipments. 2.3................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. 3.................. A quantity requiring 3,000 L in a single packaging Security plan not required placarding. and any quantity of Class 3 for less than 3,000 L except desensitized explosives. for desensitized explosives. 4.1................ A quantity requiring Any quantity desensitized Security plan not required placarding. explosives. except for desensitized explosives. 4.2................ A quantity requiring PG I and II only in Security plan not required placarding. quantities of 3,000 kg or for PG III materials. more in a single packaging. 4.3................ Any quantity................. Any quantity................. None. [[Page 52562]]
5.1................ A quantity requiring PG I and II liquids, Security plan not required placarding. perchlorates, ammonium for PG III liquids or nitrate (including unlisted solids. fertilizers) in quantities of 3,000 L or more in a single packaging. 5.2................ Any quantity of Organic Any quantity of Organic None. peroxide, Type B, liquid or peroxide, Type B, liquid or solid, temperature solid, temperature controlled. controlled. 6.1................ A quantity requiring Any quantity of PG I; 3,000 L Security plan not required placarding; any quantity of for PG II and III. for less than 3,000 L of PG PIH material. II and III. 6.2................ Select agents................ Select agents................ None. 7.................. Shipments requiring Yellow For radionuclides covered by Security plan only required III label; highway route the IAEA Code of Conduct, for Class 7 materials that controlled quantity. Category 1 and Category 2 pose transportation security sources per package; for all risk. other radionuclides, 3000 A2 per package. 8.................. A quantity requiring PG I only in quantities of Security plan not required placarding. 3,000 L or more in a single for PG II and III materials. packaging. 9.................. Capacity >3,500 gallons for Not subject.................. Security plan not required liquid/gas; volumetric for Class 9 materials. capacity >468 cubic feet for

solids.

Our proposed revisions are explained in detail in the following section.

B. System Characteristics and Risks

A number of characteristics of the hazardous materials transportation system create the potential for misuse: (1) Substantial quantities of inherently dangerous materials are transported; (2) these materials are already mobile; (3) these materials are frequently transported in proximity to densely populated areas; and (4) placards or other markings required for safety may communicate hazard information to those who would misuse it.

Following are the hazards of greatest concern from a transportation security perspective:

Explosion and fire. Hazardous materials that pose a risk of explosion or fire may be used to attack large groups of people and critical infrastructure, such as buildings, tunnels, bridges, subways, communication centers, and electrical power grids.

Poison Inhalation Hazards (PIH). PIH materials, either as gases or volatile liquids, can be used to attack people in confined spaces such as buildings or subways. Bulk quantities present dangers to large areas and could affect a significant number of people in urban areas.

Poison liquids or solids. Poisons can be used to attack food or drinking water supplies or to attack groups of people indoors or outdoors.

Infectious substances. Depending on the mode of transmission for a given material, infectious substances can be used to contaminate food or water supplies or to expose large numbers of people to disease. The suspected or possible presence of these materials can result in long term denial of the use of space, facilities, or goods.

Radioactive materials. These materials can cause severe chronic effects on large numbers of people, depending on exposure levels and the time exposed. The suspected or possible presence of these materials can result in longterm denial of the use of space, facilities, or goods.

Other materials of concern. Certain hazardous materials can be mixed to create explosions, intensified burning, and toxic effects or used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of more dangerous substances. For example, mixing poisonous materials with acidic material can generate toxic gases (e.g., sodium cyanide mixed with hydrochloric acid will generate hydrogen cyanide gas).

C. Security Risks for Specific Classes of Materials

A detailed discussion of the transportation security risks posed by specific classes of hazardous materials follows.

1. Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 Explosives

Division 1.1., 1.2, and 1.3 explosive materials (e.g. , certain types of ammunition and cartridges, black powder, gun powder, demolition devices, depth charges, certain types of detonators, certain types of fireworks, rockets, and warheads) pose significant safety and security risks in transportation. A Division 1.1 explosive is one that presents a mass explosive hazard. A mass explosion is one that affects almost the entire load simultaneously. An explosion of Division 1.1 materials creates a pressure pulse that moves faster than the speed of sound. A Division 1.2 explosive has a projection hazard, which means that if the material explodes, it will project fragments outward at some distance. A Division 1.3 explosive presents a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both. If compromised in transit by detonation or as a secondary explosion to an improvised explosive device (IED), these materials could result in significant numbers of fatalities and substantial damage to transportation infrastructure and the surrounding area. When available, these explosives have been the preferred weapon of terrorists. This trend is not expected to change.

Significant quantities of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives are transported by highway and rail for both commercial and military applications. The Department of Defense alone moves approximately 30,000 shipments a year by motor carrier. Motor carrier shipments are transported largely on the nation's interstate highway system, which bisects or adjoins many metropolitan areas offering significant iconic value and critical infrastructure targets. About 500 carloads of these explosives are transported by rail each year. Like the interstate highway system, the rail transportation network intersects many densely populated areas.

The HMR currently require security plans for shipments of any quantity of Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives. PHMSA believes that this requirement provides an appropriate level of security, given the potential
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vulnerabilities and risks associated with these materials and thus proposes to retain this requirement in the NPRM.

2. Division 1.4 Explosives

Division 1.4 explosives are those that present a minor explosive hazard. The explosive effects are largely confined to the package, with no projection of fragments of appreciable size or range. This category of explosives includes detonators used to detonate the Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.2 explosives described above. Detonators are part of all IEDs. Over 500,000 tons of Division 1.4 explosives are transported by rail and highway in the United States every year.

Currently, the HMR require security plans for placarded amounts of Division 1.4 explosives. Our evaluation suggests that most Division 1.4 explosives do not pose a significant transportation security risk. However, Division 1.4 detonators are an attractive target for theft and use as initiating devices for IEDs. Therefore, in this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to require security plans only for shipments of any quantity of the following types of Division 1.4 explosives (listed by proper shipping name and UN identification number) because they are difficult to produce, are key components to IEDs, and can be used as initiators for other explosives:
(1) Detonator assemblies, non electric for blasting (UN 0361, UN 0500)
(2) Detonators for ammunition (UN 0365, UN 0366)
(3) Detonators, electric, for blasting (UN 0255, UN 0456) (4) Detonators, nonelectric, for blasting (UN 0267, UN 0455) (5) Cord, detonating, flexible (UN 0289)
(6) Cord, detonating, mild effect, metal clad (UN 0104) (7) Charges, shaped, flexible, linear (UN 0237)
(8) Charges, shaped, without detonator (UN 0440, UN 0441) 3. Division 1.5 Explosives

Division 1.5 explosives are very insensitive explosives. This division covers substances that have a mass explosion hazard but are so insensitive that they pose very little probability of initiation or of transition from burning to detonation under normal conditions of transport. In practice, Division 1.5 explosives are activated using a higherenergy explosive charge. Roughly 4.3 million tons of Division 1.5 explosives are transported by rail and highway in the United States every year.

Division 1.5 explosives could be used in attacks on people or infrastructure. While these explosives are insensitive to effects from normal transportation accident conditions, such as fire or violent shock, Division 1.5 explosives can be made to detonate if initiated by an explosive charge. The detonation effects, while less severe than those of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives, are substantial. An example of a Division 1.5 explosive is ammonium nitratefuel oil mixture (ANFO) that, with a properly designed explosive chain, can produce a substantial blast wave. Insensitive bulk blasting agents like ANFO have been used by terrorists in the past, most notably in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.

Currently, the HMR require security plans for placarded shipments of Division 1.5 explosives. In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to require security plans for shipments of Division 1.5 explosives transported in any quantity.

4. Division 1.6 Explosives

Division 1.6 explosives are extremely insensitive articles that do not have a mass explosion hazard and that contain only extremely insensitive detonating substances with only a negligible probability of accidental initiation or propagation. Currently, the HMR require security plans for shipments of placarded amounts of Division 1.6 materials. However, our evaluation concludes that these materials do not pose a transportation security risk. Therefore, in this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to delete Division 1.6 explosives from the list of materials for which security plans are required.

5. Division 2.1 Flammable Gases

Division 2.1 materials are flammable gases that may be transported at ambient pressure in a compressed or liquefied compressed state. Flammable gases will burn if mixed with an appropriate amount of air; confined burning of a flammable gas can lead to detonation. A commonly transported example of a flammable gas is propane, a liquefied compressed gas. When liquid propane is released into the atmosphere, it quickly vaporizes into the gaseous form that is its normal state at atmospheric pressure. This happens very rapidly, and in the process, the propane combines readily with air to form fuelair mixtures that are ignitable over a range of 2.2 to 9.5 percent propane by volume. If an ignition source is present in the vicinity of a highly flammable mixture, the vapor cloud ignites and burns very rapidly (characterized by some experts as ``explosively'').

Over 120 million tons of flammable gas are used and distributed in the United States on an annual basis. A significant portion is transported by pipeline; however, more than 200,000 carloads of these materials are transported by rail, and over 40 million tons are transported by highway each year. These materials generally are consumer products and can be purchased without special licenses or security procedures.

Based on their hazard characteristics and the frequency with which propane and other Division 2.1 materials are transported in this country, PHMSA believes that materials meeting the definition for classification as Division 2.1 materials present a sufficient security risk to warrant the imposition of security plan requirements. Terrorists overseas have used flammable gas in attacks on people and buildings, using an IED to detonate the gas. The resulting disbursement and ignition of the gas creates a significantly larger fireball and heat signature than typical of an explosive detonation.

The HMR currently require security plans for shipments of Division 2.1 materials in amounts that require placardingthat is, amounts greater than 119 gallons in a single packaging or container. In evaluating specific security risks associated with shipments of Division 2.1 materials, PHMSA has concluded that shipments in quantities less than 3,000 L in a single package do not pose a transportation security threat warranting development and
implementation of security plans. As discussed above, the major security threat associated with these materials is their potential use to attack large groups of people and critical infrastructure; a substantial quantity is necessary to achieve a significant effect. Therefore, this NPRM proposes to require security plans for shipments of Division 2.1 materials in amounts greater than or equal to 3,000 L in a single package or container. Security plans would not be required for shipments of Division 2.1 materials in lesser quantities. 6. Division 2.2 Compressed Gases

Division 2.2 compressed gases are those that are neither flammable nor poisonous. Division 2.2 compressed gases are regulated for transportation safety purposes because they pose a physical hazard due to the increased pressure under which the material is maintained. In addition, Division 2.2 compressed gases will displace oxygen if released in a confined space. Without oxygen, people very quickly lose consciousness and will die within three or four minutes.

Currently, the HMR require shippers and carriers of Division 2.2 gases in amounts that require placarding to develop and implement security plans.
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However, the hazard characteristics of these materials do not lend themselves to terrorist or criminal use. Therefore, PHMSA has concluded that Division 2.2 compressed gases generally do not pose a security threat sufficient to warrant specific security planning measures. However, we are proposing to require security plans for oxygen and for other Division 2.2 gases that are oxidizers. In addition to being a Division 2.2 material, oxygen and other oxidizers enhance the combustion of other materials. Oxygen and similar oxidizers will increase the likelihood and intensity of a fire or other chemical reaction. At least 7 million tons of oxygen are transported by motor carriers each year. Because of its oxidizing characteristics and the volume transported, large shipments of oxygen should be subject to security planning requirements. Therefore, this NPRM proposes to require shippers and carriers of oxygen in quantities greater than or equal to 3,000 L in a single package or container to develop and implement security plans. In addition, we are proposing to require security plans for shipments of any Division 2.2 compressed gases with a subsidiary hazard of Division 5.1 oxidizer when transported in quantities of at least 3,000 L in a single package or container. A list of such materials is provided below.
Identification Proper shipping name Hazard class Nos. Label code Air, refrigerated liquid, (cryogenic liquid).............. 2.2 UN1003 2.2, 5.1 Air, refrigerated liquid, (cryogenic liquid) non 2.2 UN1003 2.2, 5.1 pressurized..............................................
Carbon dioxide and oxygen mixtures, compressed............ 2.2 UN1014 2.2, 5.1 Compressed gas, oxidizing, n.o.s.......................... 2.2 UN3156 2.2, 5.1 Gas, refrigerated liquid, oxidizing, n.o.s. (cryogenic 2.2 UN3311 2.2, 5.1 liquid)..................................................
Liquefied gas, oxidizing, n.o.s........................... 2.2 UN3157 2.2, 5.1 Nitrous oxide............................................. 2.2 UN1070 2.2, 5.1 Nitrous oxide, refrigerated liquid........................ 2.2 UN2201 2.2, 5.1 7. Division 2.3 and Division 6.1 PIH Materials

Poison inhalation hazard (PIH) materials are gaseous or liquid materials that are known or presumed on the basis of tests to be toxic to humans and to pose a hazard to health in the event of a release during transportation. PIH materials form a toxic plume upon release into the atmosphere. Dispersion of these vapors can endanger significant numbers of people. Examples of PIH materials include phosgene, chlorine, hydrogen fluoride, and anhydrous ammonia. Each year about 100,000 carloads of PIH materials are shipped by rail, and over 8 million tons of PIH materials are transported by highway. Because of their safety risks, PIH materials are among the most stringently regulated of all hazardous materials.

The most infamous example of the safety risks posed by PIH materials is the 1984 accident in Bhopal, India, in which approximately 10,000 gallons of methyl isocyanate was released from a chemical plant, causing nearly 3,000 deaths and more than 15,000 injuries. A PIH material (sarin) was released by terrorists in a Tokyo subway in 1995, resulting in 12 fatalities and hundreds of injuries. More recently, on January 6, 2005, in Graniteville, South Carolina, a 42car freight train, carrying several tank cars of chlorine, collided with a standing train. The accident resulted in the puncture of one tank car and the release of a cloud of chlorine gas that killed nine people. In addition, terrorists in Iraq have employed tank trucks loaded with chlorine in several attacks.

The transportation security risks of these materials have been amply demonstrated. The HMR currently require security plans for shipments of PIH materials in any quantity. We believe this requirement provides an appropriate level of security, given the potential vulnerabilities and risks associated with these materials. We are not proposing any changes to this requirement in this NPRM.

8. Class 3 Flammable Liquids

Flammable liquids burn vigorously, giving off large quantities of intense heat. Some may produce flammable atmospheres in confined spaces that, when ignited, could cause significant damage through deflagration or detonation. At least 37 million shipments of flammable liquids are moved in commerce in the United States every year, including upwards of 24 million shipments of gasoline from bulk storage facilities through the distribution chain.

Class 3 materials could be used in a terrorist attack to trigger a large, intense fire that could cause deaths, injuries, and damage to buildings and infrastructure. To be effective, such an attack would necessarily involve a large quantity of flammable liquid. The HMR currently require security plans for shipments of flammable liquids in amounts that require placarding. In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to require security plans for shipments of Class 3 materials in amounts greater than or equal to 3,000 L in a single package or container. Security plans would not be required for shipments in lesser quantities.

9. Class 3 and Division 4.1 Desensitized Explosives

Desensitized explosive substances are explosive materials that have been rendered nonexplosive, according to the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria, by means of adding a diluting liquid or solid. The diluted substances, once tested and found not in Class 1, are regulated under the HMR as Division 4.1 flammable solids or Class 3 flammable liquids, depending on their physical state and hazardous properties. Water is the most commonly used diluent/desensitizing material, even if it is not miscible (dissolves in) with the explosive. Other diluents can include flammable or nonflammable liquids or solids that have no explosive properties in and of themselves, but prevent the ability of the explosive substance to initiate or sustain a detonation or deflagration. Plasticizing liquids like triacetin, dibutyl phthalate, vegetable oil, or paraffin oil are sometimes used. Simple solid diluents for explosives include bentonite clay, plastic granules, gypsum and waxes of various types. Some diluents like water are easily separated from the explosive and the explosive is easy to reconstitute by drying. Some diluents can be extracted by dissolving them away from the explosive (or vice versa) with various solvents. Large quantities of desensitized explosives are moved by commercial rail and motor carrier every year in support of mining and other industrial operations.

Desensitized explosives have been used in terrorist attacks here and overseas. Urea nitrate, for example, has been used in a number of terrorist
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attacks, most notably the first vehicleborne improvised explosive device attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. Currently, the HMR require security plans for placarded shipments of Class 3 or Division 4.1 desensitized explosives. Because many desensitized explosives can be readily reconstituted into explosive materials, this NPRM proposes to require security plans for shipments of any quantity of Class 3 or Division 4.1 desensitized explosives. Other materials within Division 4.1 would not be subject to the security plan requirement under this NPRM.

10. Division 4.2 Spontaneously Combustible Material

Division 4.2 spontaneously combustible materials are pyrophoric or selfheating materials. Division 4.2 materials in Packing Group I are pyrophoric materials. A pyrophoric material is a liquid or solid that, even in small quantities and without an external ignition source, can ignite when it comes in contact with air. Division 4.2 materials in Packing Groups II and III are selfheating materials. A selfheating material is likely to selfheat when in contact with air. About one million tons of these materials are shipped in commerce each year.

Currently, the HMR require security plans for placarded shipments of Division 4.2 materials. In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to retain the security plan requirement for shipments of 3,000 kg or more in a single packaging of Division 4.2 materials in Packing Groups I and II and to eliminate the security plan requirement for Division 4.2 materials in Packing Group III because assessment indicates that the security risks associated with these materials are not sufficient to warrant development and implementation of security plans.

11. Division 4.3 Dangerous When Wet Material

Division 4.3 materials are water reactivethey emit flammable or toxic gases upon contact with water. The most hazardous Division 4.3 materials spontaneously ignite on contact with water. These are industrial chemicals easily available with no security restrictions. Roughly one million tons are shipped by highway each year, in addition to about 3,000 yearly shipments by rail. Division 4.3 materials may be of interest to terrorists planning a toxic gas attack on crowded venues like subways, buses, shopping centers, or movie theaters.

Currently, the HMR require security plans for shipments of Division 4.3 materials in any quantity. PHMSA believes this requirement provides an appropriate level of security, given the potential vulnerabilities and risks associated with these materials; therefore, this NPRM proposes to retain this requirement.

12. Division 5.1 Oxidizing Material

An oxidizer is a material that may cause or enhance the combustion of other materials, generally by yielding oxygen. Some oxidizers may explode when heated. Perchlorates are a subset of Division 5.1 materials. Both potassium perchlorate and ammonium perchlorate are used extensively in the pyrotechnics industry; ammonium perchlorate is a component of solid rocket fuel. Ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate fertilizers are also examples of oxidizing materials. As a strong oxidizing agent, ammonium nitrate makes an explosive mixture when combined with a fuel such as a hydrocarbon, usually diesel fuel (oil) or, sometimes, kerosene.

Division 5.1 oxidizing materials are frequently used as components of IEDs. On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh blew up the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City with a bomb made from fertilizer and fuel oil. Division 5.1 materials are industrial chemicals easily available with no security restrictions. Approximately nine million tons of Division 5.1 materials are shipped by motor carrier each year. The railroads transport about 50,000 shipments yearly.

Currently, the HMR require security plans for placarded shipments of Division 5.1 materials. This NPRM proposes to require a security plan for shipments of Division 5.1 materials in Packing Groups I and II, perchlorates, and ammonium nitrate (including fertilizers) in a single packaging, in a quantity of 3,000 kg or more for solids or 3,000 L or more for liquids. Except for perchlorates and ammonium nitrate, we are proposing to eliminate the security plan requirement for Division 5.1 materials in Packing Group III.

13. Division 5.2 Organic Peroxides

Organic peroxides are temperature sensitive, selfreacting materials that pose both a fire and explosion hazard, and may be both toxic and corrosive. Once an organic peroxide reaches a certain temperature (called the selfaccelerating decomposition temperature or SADT), its reaction will proceed uncontrollably. Organic peroxides are assigned to types A through G according to their reactivity. The most dangerous organic peroxides will detonate much like a lowenergy Division 1.1 explosive. The most dangerous organic peroxides, assigned to Type A, are prohibited from transportation; those that are permitted in transportation are stringently regulated in terms of the quantities that may be transported and the type of packaging that may be utilized. Organic peroxides with SADTs in the ambient temperature range must be transported with temperature controls. Type B organic peroxides are the most reactive and, hence, the most dangerous organic peroxides permitted in transportation.

Organic peroxides were used in the July 2005 terrorist bombings in London, and were planned for use by terrorists recently plotting to destroy aircraft flying from the United Kingdom to the United States. Terrorists call these materials ``Mother of Satan,'' an indication of their attractiveness as weapons or components of weapons. Minimal amounts of Division 5.2 organic peroxides are transported on a regular basis.

The HMR currently require security plans for liquid or solid Type B, temperature controlled Division 5.2 organic peroxides transported in any quantity. PHMSA believes that this requirement provides an appropriate level of security, given the potential vulnerabilities and risks associated with these materials and proposes to retain this requirement in this NPRM.
14. Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials (Other Than PIH Materials)

Division 6.1 materials may be toxic to humans through oral ingestion or dermal exposure. As defined in the HMR, Division 6.1 materials have a range of toxicity values; the most toxic materials are assigned to Packing Group I. Division 6.1 materials can be used to contaminate food and water supplies; however, the effectiveness of such an attack would depend on the toxicity level of the material and the quantity utilized. More than eight million tons of these materials are shipped in commerce on a yearly basis. Of this, approximately two million tons are transported by highway; railroads move more than 30,000 shipments each year.

The HMR currently require security plans for placarded shipments of Division 6.1 materials in all packing groups. In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to require security plans for shipments of Division 6.1, Packing Group I materials in any amount and shipments of 3,000 L or more of Division 6.1, Packing Groups II and III materials. Security plans would not be required for shipments of Division 6.1, Packing Groups II and III in amounts less than 3,000 L.
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15. Division 6.2 Infectious Substances and Select Agents

A Division 6.2 infectious substance is a material that contains a pathogen, which is a microorganism or other agent that can cause disease in humans or animals. The degree of risk associated with the transportation of a given Division 6.2 material depends on the nature of the material, including the virulence of the material, the way it is transmitted between humans or animals, the manner and ease of transmission between humans or animals, and the availability of preventive measures and treatment protocols.

Select agents are infectious substances and toxins determined by the Center for Disease Control and United States Department of Agriculture to present a significant public health risk. Examples include ebola viruses, ricin, small pox, avian flu virus, footand mouth disease virus, and anthrax. Use and movement of these materials are very strictly controlled.

Because of the potential for select agents to be developed as weapons to cause serious and significant outbreaks of disease in humans and animals, the HMR require security plans for shipments. This requirement provides an appropriate level of security, given the potential vulnerabilities and risks associated with these materials. Therefore, PHMSA proposes to retain this requirement in this NPRM. However, in addition to the proposed requirement for pathogens that affect humans and animals, expansion of the security plan requirements to include pathogens that affect plants is also being considered.

In accordance with 9 CFR part 121 we currently require security plans for biological agents and toxins with the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, to animal health, or to animal products. As a result of concerns expressed by USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), PHMSA believes that the expansion of the security plan requirements to include biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to plant health or to plant products is appropriate. To achieve this, the current security plan requirements for Division 6.2 materials to include materials listed in 7 CFR part 331 would be expanded. Part 331 implements the provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 setting forth the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins. APHIS supports the inclusion of select agent plant pathogens to the list Division 6.2 materials requiring security plans. Stakeholders are urged to fully consider the implications of requiring security plans for select agent plant pathogens and to provide comments.

16. Class 7 Radioactive Materials

The United States transportation system annually moves millions of shipments of radioactive materials, the largest share consisting of small packages containing radiopharmaceuticals. The HMR security plan requirements currently apply to a person who offers for transportation or transports a highway routecontrolled quantity (HRCQ) of a Class 7 (radioactive) material. The HMR also require security plans for any shipment that requires placarding under subpart F of part 172; this includes shipments of packages with radioactive Yellow III labels and exclusive use shipments of low specific activity material and surface contaminated objects.

Our evaluation suggests that these thresholds must be expanded to include additional materials that, by virtue of their relative radiation levels and physical characteristics, pose similar security threats. Security concerns surrounding the transport of radioactive materials reflect their potential use in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) (or ``dirty bombs''), designed to spread radioactive material from the detonation of conventional explosives or other means, and radiological exposure devices (REDs), designed to expose people to radiation. The consequences of an RDD or RED event would depend on the specific radioactive material and quantity involved, the dispersal or exposure mechanism, and the environmental conditions.

This NPRM proposes to adopt the security thresholds recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for radioactive materials in transport. These levels reflect research conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the IAEA on the attractiveness of radionuclides for malevolent use. The IAEA ``Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources'' (IAEA/CODEOC/2004) was revised to take account of international concerns following the events of September 11, 2001. The United States played a key role in revising the Code of Conduct and has been successful in gaining national commitments to the Code of Conduct by more than 80 countries. One of the essential features of the Code of Conduct is the cataloging of radioactive sources based on their relative potential to cause immediate injury or death. There are three categories that range from Category 1, posing the highest shortterm exposure risk to Category 3, posing relatively little risk of permanent injury through brief exposure.

The IAEA has used the Code of Conduct in the development of the recently issued Nuclear Security Series Guide, ``Security of Radioactive Material during Transport'' (in draft, expected to be issued 2009). This document is intended to provide IAEA Member States with guidance on implementing security measures for the transport of radioactive material. The threshold values outlined in this Notice were derived on the basis of the potential radiological consequences of malicious acts involving radioactive material. The Guide calls for enhanced security of radioactive material in transport, including adoption and compliance with security plans for consignments that include at least one package meeting one or both of the following activity threshold values:

For radioactive sources and other forms of radioactive material containing radionuclides covered by the Code of Conduct, Category 1 and Category 2; or

For all other radionuclides, 3000 A2 per package.

The Code of Conduct values are universally understood and implemented for security of radioactive sources internationally as well as domestically by the NRC. For radionuclides not included in the Code of Conduct, a value of 3000 A2 can be used to identify packages that are subject to the enhanced transport security measures, since the A2 value of a radionuclide never exceeds the A1 value.

17. Class 8 Corrosive Materials

For purposes of the HMR, a Class 8 corrosive material is a liquid or solid that causes full thickness destruction of human skin at the site of contact within a specified period of time. Class 8 materials in Packing Group I cause full thickness destruction of human skin tissue within 60 minutes after an exposure time of 3 minutes. These materials can cause irreversible damage to human tissue. Examples include nitric acid, sodium hydroxide (caustic soda or lye), and hydrochloric acid. Class 8 materials also exhibit corrosive properties towards other materials, most notably aluminum and steel.

Given the rate at which they react with human skin, aluminum and steel, these materials could be used to sabotage infrastructure, cause mass injury through proper dispersion, and
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present a method for sabotaging other hazardous material containers such as cylinders, tank cars, and cargo tank motor vehicles. Approximately 90 million tons of these materials are transported in commerce each year, including more than 50 million tons transported by motor carrier. Rail carriers annually move more than 270,000 shipments of Class 8 corrosive materials.

The HMR currently require security plans for placarded shipments of Class 8 materials in all packing groups. In this NPRM, PHMSA proposes to retain security plan requirements for shipments of Class 8, Packing Group I materials in amounts greater than or equal to 3,000 L in a single package or container. Lesser amounts of PG I and PG II and III corrosive materials pose little, if any, security risk. Therefore, security plans would not be required for shipments of Class 8 materials, Packing Group I, in amounts less than 3,000 L, nor would security plans be required for shipments of Class 8 materials in Packing Groups II or III.

18. Class 9 Materials

Class 9 materials are materials that present a hazard during transportation but do not meet the definition of any other hazard class. Class 9 covers elevated temperature materials and materials that pose a risk to the environmenthazardous substances, hazardous wastes, and marine pollutants. Although it is possible that Class 9 materials could be deliberately used to contaminate the environment, the likelihood of such a terrorist action is remote because of the quantities of material that would be required and the relatively minor result that would be achieved.

Currently, the HMR require security plans for Class 9 materials transported in a bulk packaging with a capacity equal to or greater than 13,248 L (3,500 gallons) for liquids or gases or greater than 13.24 cubic meters (468 cubic feet) for solids. This NPRM proposes to eliminate this requirement; the security risks associated with the transportation of these materials are not sufficient to warrant development and implementation of security plans.

IV. Additional Revisions to Security Requirements

This NPRM also proposes a number of amendments to clarify and enhance current security requirements, including requirements for security plans and for training. These proposals are detailed below. A. Revisions to Security Plan Requirements

Section 172.802 of the HMR establishes the components that must be included as part of a hazardous materials transportation se

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT Susan Gorsky or Ben Supko, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2023668553.