Federal Register: October 21, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 202)
DOCID: fr21oc09-25 FR Doc E9-25075
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Veterans Affairs Department
CFR Citation: 29 CFR Part 1910
Docket ID: [Docket No. OSHA-2009-0023]
RIN ID: RIN 1218-AC41
NOTICE: Part III
DOCID: fr21oc09-25
DOCUMENT ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUBJECT CATEGORY:
Combustible Dust
DATES: Submit comments in response to this ANPR by January 19, 2010.
DOCUMENT SUMMARY:
In this advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR), OSHA is requesting comments, including data and other information, on issues related to the hazards of combustible dust in the workplace. For the purposes of this notice, the term ``combustible dust'' includes all combustible particulate solids of any size, shape, or chemical composition that could present a fire or deflagration hazard when suspended in air or other oxidizing medium. OSHA plans to use the information received in response to this notice in developing a proposed standard for combustible dust.
SUMMARY:
Labor Department, Occupational Safety and Health Administration
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. Introduction
B. Dust Explosions in Grain Handling Facilities
C. Dust Explosions in Other Industries
D. CSB Combustible Dust Study
E. Congressional Response
F. Existing OSHA Standards
G. Consensus and Industry Standards
H. National Emphasis Program Analysis
I. Regulatory Issues
II. Request for Data, Information, and Comments
A. Industry Background
B. Definition of Combustible Dust
C. Hazard Recognition
D. Hazard Assessment
E. Hazard Communication and Training
F. Consensus, Industry, and Insurance Standards
G. State and Local Codes
H. Engineering Controls
I. Administrative Controls
J. Emergency Response
K. Investigation of Incidents
L. Regulatory Approach
M. Economic Impacts and Benefits
N. Impacts on Small Entities
O. Compliance Assistance
III. Public Participation
IV. Authority and Signature
I. Background
A. Introduction
The hazards of combustible dust encompass a wide array of materials, industries, and processes. Any combustible material can burn rapidly when in a finely divided form. Materials that may form combustible dust include, but are not limited to, wood, coal, plastics, biosolids, candy, sugar, spice, starch, flour, feed, grain, fertilizer, tobacco, paper, soap, rubber, drugs, dried blood, dyes, certain textiles, and metals (such as aluminum and magnesium).
Five elements are needed for a combustible dust explosion to occur. The first three elements are those necessary for a fire: Fuel, heat, and an oxidizer. These three elements form the ``fire triangle,'' in which combustible dust is the fuel, heat is provided by any source of ignition, and oxygen is present in air and in oxidizers.
The fourth element is dispersal of dust into a cloud of the proper concentration. These four conditions are necessary for a deflagration, which is violent combustion accompanied by a pressure wave. The combustion is rapid, but propagates at a speed less than the speed of sound.
[[Page 54335]]
A fifth element, confinement, is necessary for an explosion.
Confinement can be any enclosureincluding, but not limited to, a
building, room, duct, or processing and storage equipment. An explosion
occurs when the pressure developed by a deflagration bursts or ruptures
the enclosure. Together, these five elements (fuel, heat, an oxidizer,
dispersion and confinement) are known as the ``dust explosion
pentagon.'' The minimum explosible concentration is the lowest
concentration of combustible dust suspended in air that will support a deflagration.\1\
\1\ The terms ``deflagration'', ``explosion'', and ``minimum
explosible concentration'' are used in this notice as defined in
NFPA 654 (2006 edition) for combustible dust only. This notice does
not address the terms ``detonation'' or ``explosion'' as they relate to materials classified as explosives.
Secondary explosions or deflagrations occur when pressure waves from an initial (or primary) deflagration or explosion cause dispersal and ignition of combustible dust that has accumulated on surfaces. Secondary explosions are often more devastating than primary explosions due to the increased amount of fuel and the size of the ignition source (i.e., the initial event). In some cases, explosions continue to cascade throughout an area or facility.
OSHA is developing a standard that will comprehensively address the fire and explosion hazards of combustible dust. The Agency's existing standards address some, but not all, of the elements needed to protect workers from these hazards. For example, OSHA's general industry housekeeping standard (29 CFR 1910.22(a)(1)) addresses accumulations of dust, including dusts that may be combustible, and the general industry electrical standard (29 CFR 1910, subpart S) helps to control electrical ignition hazards. When workers are exposed to hazards not currently addressed in the OSHA standards, employers are cited under the General Duty Clause (GDC) specified by Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act; see 29 U.S.C. 654). The information requested in this notice will help the Agency develop a standard that would better protect workers from the hazards of combustible dust.
Industries that may have combustible dust hazards include, among
others: Agriculture, animal food manufacturing, grain handling, food
manufacturing, wood product manufacturing, chemical manufacturing,
textile manufacturing, furniture manufacturing, metal processing,
fabricated metal products and machinery manufacturing, pesticide
manufacturing, pharmaceutical manufacturing, tire manufacturing,
production of rubber and plastics, plastics and rubber products
manufacturing, recycling, wastewater treatment, and coal handling and
processing. To determine which industries may be affected by an OSHA
standard regulating combustible dust hazards, OSHA identified
industries that had previous incidents relating to combustible dust.
Table 1 summarizes this data. Incidents were identified using data from
the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) involving
incidents occurring from 1980 to 2005. For incidents between 2006 and 2008, OSHA used reports gathered by the Web site
``dustexplosions.blogspot.com.'' Using these two data sources, OSHA
assigned a North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code
to each incident using the available information. The groups of NAICS
codes in this table were determined by combining similar industries
together that had explosions in the past. Incidents having insufficient
information to assign a NAICS code to the affected establishment were
classified as ``unknown.'' OSHA's preliminary analyses show that, in
industries for which combustible dust fires or explosions have
occurred, there are 426,000 establishments employing 16 million workers
(see Table 1). The table does not show that these industries include
over 333,000 small businesses with 6.5 million employees. It is
possible that some establishments in these industries do not have significant dust hazards.
Table 1Industries Having at Least One Recorded Combustible Dust Incident Reported Since 1980, According to
OSHA Research
Incidents
NAICS group \1\ Name of industry \1\ (19802008) Firms \3\ Establishments Employees
\2\ \3\ \3\
115111.................... Cotton Ginning............... 1 260 279 2,654
221000.................... Utilities, Electric Power Gen 28 6,554 17,174 614,427
311000.................... Food Manufacturing (Except 8 5,820 7,786 834,277 311100, 311200, 311300,
311800, 311900).
311100.................... Animal Food Mfg. (Except 2 176 248 16,202 311119).
311119.................... Other Animal Food Mfg........ 5 1,046 1,549 31,971
311200.................... Grain and Oilseed Milling 5 392 658 31,439 (Except 311221 and 311230).
311221.................... Wet Corn Milling............. 21 33 65 8,875
311230.................... Breakfast Cereal Mfg......... 6 43 66 13,410
311300.................... Sugar & Confectionary Product 5 1,581 1,700 66,341 Mfg. (Except 311313).
311313.................... Beet Sugar Manufacturing..... 6 10 33 6,263
311800.................... Bakeries..................... 4 9,301 10,072 288,393
311900.................... Other Food Manufacturing..... 8 2,768 3,205 161,567
312000.................... Beverage and Tobacco Product 4 2,193 2,379 83,531 Mfg. (Except 312110).
313000.................... Textile Mills................ 11 2,770 3,243 187,766
314000.................... Textile Product Mills........ 2 6,456 6,726 155,586
321000.................... Wood Product Mfg. (Except 28 11,192 12,749 449,650 321113 and 321219).
321113.................... Sawmills..................... 7 3,398 3,731 104,666
321219.................... Reconstituted Wood Prod. Mfg. 14 167 255 22,190
322000.................... Paper Manufacturing.......... 18 3,269 5,139 441,430
324000.................... Petroleum & Coal Products Mfg 1 1,166 2,448 102,997
325000.................... Chemical Mfg. (Except 325188 31 7,737 10,749 514,732 and 325410).
325188.................... Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg. 11 390 612 40,589
325410.................... Pharmaceutical & Medicine Mfg 8 1,481 1,886 249,743
326000.................... Plastics and Rubber Products 17 11,365 11,454 846,857 Mfg. (Except 326211).
[[Page 54336]]
326211.................... Tire Manufacturing........... 5 91 138 53,985
327000.................... Nonmetallic Mineral Prod. Mfg 4 11,332 17,350 482,459
331000.................... Primary Metal Manufacturing.. 32 4,310 5,285 449,914
332000.................... Fabricated Metal Product Mfg. 27 54,969 59,064 1,563,713
333000.................... Machinery Manufacturing...... 7 23,842 26,317 1,126,671
334000.................... Computer, Electronic Equip. 2 12,733 14,548 1,057,485 Mfg.
336000.................... Transportation Equipment Mfg. 16 10,552 12,707 1,622,527
337000.................... Furniture & Related Product 2 4,779 5,148 188,908 Mfg. (Except 337100).
337100.................... Household & Institutional 16 15,878 16,301 354,341 Furniture, Cabinet Mfg.
339000.................... Miscellaneous Manufacturing.. 7 29,925 31,239 686,096
423000.................... Merchant Wholesalers (423110, 4 22,669 27,704 432,265 423210, 423310, 423930).
488000.................... Support Activities for 1 29,416 37,083 579,589 Transportation.
493000.................... Warehousing and Storage...... 1 7,176 13,849 595,325
511000.................... Publishing Industries........ 1 22,874 31,821 1,039,739
561210.................... Facilities Support Services.. 1 1,680 4,115 164,637
562000.................... Waste Management and 3 16,189 19,919 345,334 Remediation Services.
Other..................... Unknown Industry Category.... 42 ........... .............. ...........
Total........................ 422 347,983 426,794 16,018,544 Sources:
\1\ North American Industry Classification System, United States, 2008.
\2\ Incident data from U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and http:// dustexplosions.blogspot.com.
\3\ County Business Patterns 2006U.S. Census Bureau.
B. Dust Explosions in Grain Handling Facilities
In the 1970s, agriculture and food processing industries
experienced several combustible dust explosions. A 1977 graindust
explosion in Westwago, Louisiana, killed 36 workers. It remains the
deadliest graindust explosion of the modern era. Five days later,
another graindust explosion in Galveston, Texas, caused the deaths of
9 workers and injured 34 others.\2\ As a result of these and other
graindust explosions in the 1970s, OSHA issued a document entitled
``Grain Elevator Industry Hazard Alert,'' which provided employers,
workers, and other officials with information concerning the hazards and safe handling of grain.
\2\ National Academy of Science, International Symposium on
Grain Elevator Explosions, July 1112, 1978, National Materials
Advisory Board Committee on Evaluation of Industrial Hazards.
Later in the 1970s, the Agency initiated rulemaking to address the
problem of graindust explosions. On December 31, 1987, after extensive
public comment on its proposed rule and several public hearings, OSHA
published its final standard on Grain handling facilities, 29 CFR
1910.272 (52 FR 44592). In its Combustible Dust Hazard Study of
November 2006 (discussed further in Section 1(D) of this notice), the
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board stated: ``OSHA's
Grain handling facilities standard provides a model for OSHA action
that has proven effective in reducing catastrophic dust explosions in the grain industry.'' \3\
\3\ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
Investigation Report No. 2006H1, Combustible Dust Hazard Study; November 2006, page 67.
During a review of the Grain handling facilities standard in 2003,
OSHA received comments from union representatives claiming that, since
its promulgation, grain explosions were down 42 percent, and injuries
and deaths from grain explosions were reduced by 60 percent and 70
percent respectively.\4\ Figure 1 shows the number of graindust
explosions per year since 1978. For the ten years prior to the standard
(19781987), the average number of explosions per year was 20.5. This
average decreased to 10.3 explosions per year from 1988 to 1997 and
further decreased to 6.3 per year from 1998 to 2007. OSHA gathered this
data from the Regulatory Review of OSHA's Grain Handling Standard,\5\
Kansas State University in cooperation with USDA Federal Grain
Inspection Service,\6\ and USDA Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administration.\7\
\4\ Regulatory Review of OSHA's Grain Handling Standard [29 CFR 1910.272], February 2003.
\5\ Regulatory Review of OSHA's Grain Handling Standard [29 CFR 1910.272], February 2003.
\6\ Kansas State University, in cooperation with USDA Federal
Grain Inspection Service, available online at: http:// www.oznet.ksu.edu/pr_histpubs/Dust_Exp.htm.
\7\ USDA Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards
Administration, personal email communication from USDA to OSHA, Jul 10, 2009, with attachment entitled, ``Explosion Data.''
[[Page 54337]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21OC09.035
C. Dust Explosions in Other Industries
The flammability and explosiveness of various types of organic and inorganic dusts has been recognized for well over a century. The devastating effects of secondary explosions resulting from accumulated dust have also been well documented, particularly since the early years of the 20th century; the hazards of some dusts, particularly coal dust, mineral dusts, and flour, were recognized many years before the 20th century. However, no national organizations focused on the hazards of combustible dusts until the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) established a committee to do so in 1922. The NFPA's work resulted in a wealth of knowledge about the prevention and control of dustexplosion hazards in material handling and manufacturing processes. In 1923, NFPA published the first national consensus standard to address the prevention of dust explosions in grain terminals and flour mills.\8\ \8\ Cashdollar, K. L., & Hertzberg, M., eds (1987) Industrial Dust Explosions, ASTM International, U.S., p. 345.
Over the past 15 years, a number of industries have experienced
serious dust explosions, causing loss of life and injuries, as well as
property damage. The first of these incidents, an explosion and fire in
a textile factory in Methuen, Massachusetts in 1995, injured 37 people
and destroyed several large buildings.\9\ After a detailed
investigation of this incident, OSHA issued a Hazard Information Bulletin in 1998 for the textile industry.
\9\ U.S. Fire Administration Technical Report
In 1999, an automotive plant near Dearborn, Michigan experienced an
explosion in one of the boilers in its power plant. Analysis of the
explosion indicated that the initial boiler explosion may have caused
accumulated coal dust on plant surfaces to become airborne, fueling a
secondary explosion that destroyed part of the facility. Six workers were killed and 36 were injured.\10\
\10\ Michigan Department of Energy, Labor & Economic Growth, CIS
Reaches Historic Settlement Agreement with Ford and UAW, 1999
available online: http://www.michigan.gov/dleg/0,1607,715410573_ 1147252301,00.html.
In the same year, there was an explosion at a foundry in
Springfield, Massachusetts, involving powdered phenolic resin in the
iron castings manufacturing process. This explosion killed three
workers and injured nine. Investigators found heavy resin deposits in
ducts and other surfaces. From this finding, they concluded that a
primary explosion in a dust extraction duct had dispersed the settled
dust, and that the dispersed dust then fueled secondary explosions in the facility.\11\
\11\ U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), 1999. Joint Foundry
Explosion Investigation Team Report, Jahn Foundry Corporation, Springfield, MA, February 25, 1999.
A rubberdust explosion at a rubber recycling plant in Vicksburg,
Mississippi in 2002, resulted in five fatalities and seven injuries.
Part of the recycling process involved grinding rubber tires; the
grinding process produced rubber dust, which accumulated on building
surfaces and in a product bagging bin that was not equipped with
explosion vents. A fire started on the roof of the plant. When it
spread to the bagging bin, it dispersed the layers of dust in the bin and on the surrounding surfaces, fueling an explosion.\12\
\12\ OSHA, 2002, Region 4 Report on Explosion at Rouse Polymerics, U.S. Department of Labor.
A massive explosion in 2003 at a pharmaceuticals device
manufacturing facility in Kinston, North Carolina, injured 38 workers
and killed 6. In a process in which rubber strips were dipped into a
polyethylene slurry, fans were used to help dry the coated rubber,
causing fine polyethylene powder to be disbursed. Employees diligently
cleaned the visible areas of the process room; however, most of the employees were unaware that combustible polyethylene
[[Page 54338]]
dust was accumulating in the enclosed space above the suspended
ceiling, carried there by the building ventilation system. Due to the
extensive damage to the facility, and the deaths of potential
witnesses, investigators were unable to definitively determine the ignition source or the method of dust dispersal.\13\
\13\ Investigation Report, Dust Explosion, West Pharmaceutical
Services, Inc., U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), September 2004.
That same year, phenolic resin again fueled a fatal dust explosion,
this time in an acoustic insulation manufacturing facility in Corbin,
Kentucky. As workers were cleaning fugitive dust accumulations with
compressed air, a cloud of phenolic resin formed near a malfunctioning
appliance, which likely ignited the cloud of dust. The initial
deflagration dispersed large quantities of combustible dust that had
accumulated on surfaces throughout the facility. The resulting dust
clouds fueled several secondary explosions. The building was destroyed, 7 workers were killed, and 37 were injured.\14\
\14\ CSB, 2005, Investigation Report, Combustible Dust Fire and Explosions, CTA Acoustics, Inc., February 2005.
Even finely divided metals can cause dust explosions. Again in
2003, one worker was killed and several injured in an aluminum dust
explosion at a wheel manufacturing facility. At the point in the
process in which scrap aluminum was reduced to small chips, aluminum
particles were drawn into a dust collector. An initial explosion in the
dust collector spread through the ventilation system, causing a
secondary explosion involving the dust accumulated on overhead beams, ducts, and other structures.\15\
\15\ CSB, 2003, Investigation Report, Hayes Lemerz Dust Explosions and Fire, September 2003.
As a result of this series of incidents in 2003, OSHA produced a Safety and Health Information Bulletin (SHIB), Combustible Dust in Industry: Preventing and Mitigating the Effects of Fire and Explosions. This widely disseminated guidance document provided employers and workers with information on combustible dust explosions, including mitigation. It contains references to both the applicable OSHA standards and the related industry consensus standards. However, incidents continued to occur despite the availability of these standards and the guidance in the SHIB.
In early 2008, a catastrophic incident at a sugar refinery in Port Wentworth, Georgia, killed 14 workers and seriously injured 36 others. The CSB investigated \16\ and determined that an initial dust explosion occurred in an enclosed steel belt conveyor below three 105foottall silos, most likely ignited by an overheated conveyor bearing. Large quantities of sugar dust that had accumulated on surfaces throughout the plant fueled a series of massive secondary explosions and fires, destroying much of the facility. The plant had a history of previous, smaller initial explosion incidents that did not result in significant damage or secondary explosions. The fine OSHA proposed for this employer is the thirdlargest fine ever proposed for a single incident. \16\ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Investigation Report No. 2008051GA, Sugar Dust Explosion and Fire; September 2009.
The sugar plant incident highlighted a lack of hazard awareness and a failure to comply with existing Federal standards and State codes. OSHA took prompt action to further heighten awareness of this hazard by producing additional guidance for employers and workers, including a Web page, a fact sheet, and a poster. The Agency mailed the SHIB directly to 30,000 employers suspected of having combustible dust hazards, and also focused enforcement efforts on sugar plants. D. CSB Combustible Dust Study
The CSB conducted a study of dust explosion incidents between 1980
and 2005. The 2006 report from that study identified 281 incidents that
killed 119 workers and injured 718.\17\ From 2006 through 2008, OSHA
has found records of an additional 16 deaths and 84 injuries; these
records are included in Table 1 above. Among CSB's findings and conclusions were the following:
\17\ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
Investigation Report No. 2006H1, Combustible Dust Hazard Study; November 2006, p. 31.
The report of CSB's combustible dust study also listed five
recommendations for OSHA. This notice addresses the first of these recommendations:
``Issue a standard designed to prevent combustible dust fires and
explosions in general industry. Base the standard on current National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) dust explosion standards (including NFPA 654 and NFPA 484), and include at least
The second CSB recommendation requested that OSHA revise its Hazard Communication Standard (HCS) (29 CFR 1910.1200) to clarify the coverage and requirements related to combustible dust. This recommendation is being addressed in a separate rulemaking.
The third and fourth CSB recommendations suggested that OSHA, respectively, communicate with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe the need to amend the Globally Harmonized System to address combustible dust hazards, and provide combustible dustrelated training through the OSHA Training Institute. Both of these recommendations have been accomplished.
The fifth CSB recommendation suggested that OSHA initiate a Special Emphasis Program for Combustible Dust, to include an outreach program focused on the information in OSHA's Safety and Health Information Bulletin, Combustible Dust in Industry: Preventing and Mitigating the Effects of Fire and Explosions. The Agency went beyond CSB's recommendation and implemented a National Emphasis Program (NEP) to increase OSHA's enforcement activities throughout the country and to focus on specific industry groups that experienced either frequent combustible dust incidents or combustible dust incidents with catastrophic consequences. The NEP was launched on October 17, 2007, and is ongoing. It was revised in 2008 to more closely focus on sugar plants.
E. Congressional Response
Interest intensified in regulatory action during the months after
the sugarplant incident in 2008. Employee unions expressed support for
CSB's rulemaking recommendations. On May 1, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a bill
[[Page 54339]]
entitled H.R. 5522, Worker Protection Against Combustible Dust
Explosions and Fires Act of 2008. This bill directed OSHA to issue an
interim combustible dust rule and an amendment to the HCS in 90 days,
and a final rule in 18 months. H.R. 5522 was passed by the House and referred to the Senate.
Two Congressional hearings were held on H.R. 5522. The first hearing was held by the House Committee on Education and Labor on March 12, 2008, and the second hearing was held by the Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety of the Senate Housing, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee on July 29, 2008. Assistant Secretary of Labor Ed Foulke testified for OSHA at these hearings; also testifying were representatives of CSB, NFPA, and the Georgia sugar plant that sustained the 2008 explosion.
On February 4, 2009, H.R. 849, Worker Protection Against Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires Act of 2009, was introduced into the current session of Congress. The provisions of this resolution are the same as H.R. 5522.
F. Existing OSHA Standards
The Agency does not have a single, comprehensive standard that
addresses combustible dust hazards across all industries. Current OSHA
standards provide limited protection from dust hazards in two ways:
First, certain standards address some dust hazards for specific industries. Among these standards are the following:
Second, some general industry standards address one or more of the
elements that can contribute to dust explosions, such as ignition
sources and dust accumulations, or the standards require the
communication of information that employers and workers need to address dust hazards. Among these standards are:
As noted earlier, OSHA's existing standards for combustible dust do not provide a comprehensive set of requirements to fully address all of the prevention and mitigation methods specific to combustible dust hazards. Accordingly, some ignition sources are specifically covered (e.g., electrical installations, powered industrial trucks), while other ignition sources are not covered (e.g., mechanical sparks, friction, open flames). Additionally, OSHA standards address the accumulation of fugitive dust (i.e., dust that escapes from equipment or areas where it is normally present), but do not include measures that would prevent the escape of dust in the first place. Also, many builtin engineering controls (including the design of facilities, explosion venting, suppression systems, and explosion protection systems) are not addressed in the OSHA standards. OSHA is asking a series of questions about the need to address these areas in a new combustible dust standard to afford adequate and complete protection to workers.
G. Consensus and Industry Standards
NFPA issues a number of national consensus standards that address the hazards of combustible dust. For example, NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, addresses the hazards of combustible dust in a general manner. Specific industries are excluded from NFPA 654, but are covered by other NFPA standards, including NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Processing Facilities; NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals; NFPA 655, Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosions; and NFPA 664, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities.
These five NFPA combustible dust standards have mandatory secondary references to a large number of other standards. The 2006 edition of NFPA 654 mandates compliance with 36 other NFPA standards. These 36 secondary references, in turn, reference additional standards. In effect, no one standard comprehensively addresses the hazards of combustible dust, which may pose difficulties for some employers trying to develop programs to mitigate combustible dust hazards. In addition, the provisions of these five NFPA standards differ, which may add to these difficulties. Some elements of protection are addressed in some standards but not in others; other elements are addressed in different ways in the various standards. For example, NFPA 61, 484, and 654 contain provisions for drive belts, while NFPA 655 and 664 have no provisions directly addressing drive belts.
In addition to the NFPA standards listed above, NFPA issues a number of standards that cover the design and installation of protection systems specific to deflagration and explosion hazards, including combustible dust. Two of these standards are NFPA 68, Standard on Explosions Protection by Deflagration Venting, and NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems. NFPA also has a series of standards that cover automatic fire suppression and alarm systems for a variety of facilities and hazards, but are not specific to combustible dust, deflagrations, or explosions.
A large majority of State and local jurisdictions in the United States have adopted the NFPA standards because both of the model fire codes used in this country (i.e., International Code Council's International Fire Code, and NFPA's Fire Code) make these NFPA standards mandatory. However, the 2006 report on CSB's combustible dust study indicates that enforcement of these fire codes at the State and local level is ``inconsistent and largely ineffective.'' For example, the 2008 sugarplant incident occurred in Georgia, a State having a fire code that mandated compliance with, among other combustible dust related consensus standards, NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Processing Facilities.
NFPA standards are updated on a regular basis, usually every three years. In the Agency's experience, consensus standards incorporated by reference into OSHA rules quickly become out of date, making it difficult for employers to comply when the outofdate consensus standards become difficult to obtain. Furthermore, OSHA cannot legally update NFPA or other consensus standards used in its rules by referring to the ``current'' or ``most recent'' edition of the consensus standards.
Despite the aforementioned challenges with the application and
enforcement of NFPA standards, the standards are used to a significant
extent throughout industry, particularly by large companies,
engineering consultants, and firms designing facilities with
combustible dust hazards. Therefore, OSHA is asking for comment [[Page 54340]]
on how best to incorporate the provisions of the consensus standards. H. National Emphasis Program Analysis
OSHA analyzed the results of its Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) to better understand where combustible dust hazards exist and where improvements may be needed to ensure that workers are protected from combustible dust hazards. Between November 1, 2007, and February 24, 2009, OSHA conducted 813 inspections under this NEP665 in States under Federal OSHA authority, and 148 in States having an OSHAapproved State Plan. OSHA cited employers for 3,662 violations.
Of the 665 Federal NEP inspections, 160 citations were issued under the General Duty Clause (GDC) for hazards related to combustible dust. Therefore, the rate of GDC usage for combustibledustrelated hazards in the NEP inspections was 24 percent during the time period noted above (These statistics were derived from the information available at the time this notice was developed; the numbers may change over time through the informal conference and settlement process.)
The 160 GDC violations referenced 32 different industry or consensus standards developed by 6 different standardsdeveloping organizations. The eleven most frequently referenced consensus standards were as follows, in descending order of frequency:
It has been necessary to cite the GDC extensively to address the various aspects of combustible dust hazards. GDC citations focused on each of the elements that could contribute to a dust fire or explosion, including containment or control of dust, isolation or control of ignition sources, and explosion venting or suppression systems. The following hazards were the most commonly cited GDC violations:
This list provides some indication of the areas in which current standards do not cover combustible dust hazards in general industry. Only the last two items on the list are administrative or operational in nature, involving maintenance, work practices, policies, and procedures. The other ten items involve engineering controls, such as fixed facilities or protection features built into the plant or the processing systems. These specific GDC violations point to areas that may be appropriate to cover in a prospective OSHA standard for combustible dust. Therefore, OSHA arranged the questions it is asking to solicit information separately for engineering controls and administrative controls.
The main finding of this NEP analysis is the unusually high rate of GDC use in combustible dust inspections (24 percent). Ordinarily, the GDC is used on a much more limited basis. For the same time period between November 1, 2007 and February 24, 2009, the 48,969 Federal OSHA inspections that were conducted outside the NEP yielded 1,736 GDC citations (a rate of 3.5 percent). Therefore, the GDC was used almost seven times as often for combustibledustrelated citations than for all other citations. This unusually high proportion suggests the need for a comprehensive OSHA standard.
I. Regulatory Issues
The CSB recommended that OSHA issue a standard to prevent combustible dust fires and explosions. The CSB determined that many tragic accidents in the past decade could have been avoided or minimized if employers had complied with applicable national consensus standards. OSHA recognizes that regulatory action needs to be considered as part of its overall approach to protecting workers from combustible dust hazards. The Agency already has made significant efforts to address the need for additional information and training on combustible dust hazards. Among these efforts are OSHA's SHIB, fact sheet, and poster; additional information provided on the Agency's Web site; outreach to employers; and specialized training for compliance officers. In addition, through the NEP, OSHA also enhanced compliance through strengthened enforcement of existing standards and citations under the General Duty Clause.
The existing regulatory regime is fragmented and incomplete. The
Agency's analysis of the combustible dust NEP, above, shows that
existing OSHA standards do not regulate important elements of
combustible dust hazards. The consensus standards related to
combustible dust are large, complex, numerous, and interrelated, which
make it difficult for employers to comply with them. In addition, where
these consensus standards have been adopted as part of State or local
codes, available evidence shows that they are poorly enforced at the
local and State levels.\18\ Therefore, OSHA has preliminarily concluded that national consensus standards alone, even when
[[Page 54341]]
adopted by State or local governments, are insufficient to adequately protect workers from these hazards.
\18\ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
Investigation Report No. 2006H1, Combustible Dust Hazard Study; November 2006, page 68.
As noted earlier, combustible dust hazards are present in a wide range of industries. Many different materials, both organic and inorganic, can produce dust capable of fueling explosions. OSHA plans to evaluate affected industries to determine the most effective way to regulate the combustible dust hazards present in these industries. It may be appropriate for OSHA to treat specific industries differently, based at least in part on current national consensus standards.
OSHA must consider many factors in developing a comprehensive
standard for combustible dust. Some of these factors relate directly to
the characteristics of the hazard and the range of variables
encountered in the workplace, which affect the combustibility or
explosibility of dusts. For any dust materials having a specific
chemical composition, the chance of a combustible dust deflagration depends on many variables, including:
Many more variables come into play for combustible dust incidents than for scenarios involving flammable gases, flammable liquids, or largersized flammable solids. The ignition of vaporair mixtures, especially at rest, is much more predictable and reproducible than the ignition of combustible dust. Consequently, some mitigation methods used to address combustible dust hazards are not straightforward. Prescriptive requirements may not be reasonable or effective in such a scenario.
Another factor involves whether and how to integrate current and future national consensus standards into a regulatory scheme. One means of doing so may be for OSHA to require compliance with various NFPA standards, rather than to develop a governmentunique standard. Some of the issues with this approach are discussed earlier in section I(G) of this notice. Another approach may be to reference NFPA standards as acceptable compliance options.
OSHA must also consider the interrelationship of a combustible dust standard and other OSHA standards that address different features of the hazard, for example, the hazard communication, electrical, grain handling, and other standards noted earlier in section I(F) of this notice.
The information currently available indicates that the risk of combustible dust explosions is considerable and that a single, comprehensive standard addressing all of these hazards will likely provide clarity for employers and increased safety for exposed workers. OSHA is requesting information and comment from the public to evaluate what regulatory action it should take to further address combustible dust hazards within the general industry standards.
II. Request for Data, Information, and Comments
OSHA is providing the following questions to facilitate the collection of needed information and to facilitate public comment on relevant issues. OSHA invites commenters to respond to any questions for which they have specific knowledge, data, or information, regardless of their involvement with combustible dust, e.g., employer, employee, consultant, researcher, fire or building code enforcement official. Commenters also are encouraged to address any aspect of combustible dust safety that they believe would assist the Agency in considering appropriate regulatory action on the matter. OSHA requests that commenters provide a detailed response to questions, including a rationale or reasoning for the position taken, rather than simply replying ``yes'' or ``no.'' Also, relevant data that may be useful to OSHA's deliberations, or that may assist it in conducting an analysis of the impacts of future Agency actions, should be submitted. To assess the costs, benefits, or feasibility of any possible regulatory intervention, the Agency needs specific quantitative information on various safety measures. Therefore, for those recommendations involving specific interventions, any data in terms of costs and benefits associated with the recommendation would be helpful. To assist it in analyzing comments, OSHA requests that commenters reference the question number to which they are responding.
A. Industry Background
OSHA is interested in determining the extent of combustible dust hazards. The following questions address the extent of the hazards, and provide a context in which to understand your answers to subsequent questions.
1. What business are you in? What NAICS industry or industries are you in?
2. How many employees do you have? How many are production employees? How many employees work in areas where combustible dusts are present? What types of jobs do they perform?
3. What is the area of your facility? What percentage of this area has combustible dusts normally present? What percentage is subject to possible fugitive dust accumulations?
4. What type or types of combustible dusts are present?
5. Would you expect other firms in your industry to have similar combustible dusts hazards or are the products or processes that generate combustible dust in your facility unusual for your industry? Why?
B. Definition of Combustible Dust
No single, universally accepted definition of combustible dust is
available. Even among standards promulgated by the same standards
developing organization, the definitions vary significantly. NFPA 654
and 655 define combustible dust in general terms without regard for
particle size. This approach recognizes that factors such as particle
shape, agglomeration, and other characteristics listed earlier in this
notice, can affect explosibility. Other standards (such as NFPA 61,
484, and 664) define combustible dust in terms of a minimum particle
size. The definition in previous editions of NFPA 654 (which may still
be used in some areas of the country) was also sizebased.\19\
Furthermore, OSHA's grain standard uses a sizebased definition for ``fugitive grain dust.''
\19\ The 2006 edition of NFPA 654 explains in Annex section
A.3.3.4 the reason that the previous sizebased definition is no
longer used: ``Dusts traditionally have been defined as a material
420 [micro]m or smaller (capable of passing through a U.S. No. 40
standard sieve). Combustible particulates with an effective diameter
of less than 420 [micro]m should be deemed to fulfill the criterion
of the definition. However, flat plateletshaped particles, flakes,
or particles of fibers with lengths that are large compared to their
diameter usually do not pass through a 420 [micro]m sieve yet still pose a deflagration hazard.''
Many different materials may form combustible dust, and several
laboratory tests are available to characterize them. Some of these
tests help determine a dust's basic explosibility. Other tests yield results on the degree of
[[Page 54342]]
explosibility; these tests are useful for designers of builtin
protective features or systems. In some cases, the hazards of certain
dusts are widely known (for example, wood dust). In these cases, basic
testing to determine whether the dust is explosive may not be
necessary. OSHA is interested in data on the extent to which different materials are, or may form, combustible dust.
6. Do you determine whether a dust is considered a combustible dust by reference to data, testing, or some other means? Please explain.
7. What additional tests do you conduct to determine the level of combustibility of a particular dust?
8. Do you have any dusts that you assume to be combustible, and, thus, preclude the need or expense of testing? If so, please indicate what type of dust.
9. Certain definitions, in particular those definitions based on particle size alone, would not cover some materials that can present an explosion hazard in certain situations. Accordingly, identify any dusts that can explode that would not be included in your definition. Would your definition include some dusts for which explosions are very rare or unknown? If so, which ones?
C. Hazard Recognition
The CSB report on its combustible dust hazard study, as well as the investigative reports of specific combustible dust incidents discussed above, show a pattern of employers and workers being either unaware of the hazards posed by combustible dust, or of the seriousness of the hazards. As a result, many workers were not adequately protected from these hazards. Employers who have recognized the hazards were made aware of them in a variety of ways. OSHA is interested in data on the contributions of inhouse experts, outside consultants, insurance representatives, and local or State code authorities in improving awareness of the hazard.
10. How did you become aware that you had combustible dust present in your facility?
11. Who is responsible for determining if a dust is combustible? What expertise do they have?
12. How do you determine if dust is combustible? Do you use published data, and if so, from what source? Do you sample dust for laboratory testing, and if so, how often? Do you rely on labels or data sheets, including MSDSs, developed by others? Do suppliers provide you with information related to combustible dust? Please explain.
13. To what extent do the local code authorities, insurance representatives, or other outside experts determine the presence of combustible dust in your facility?
D. Hazard Assessment
Hazard assessments are systematic approaches to evaluating a hazard and selecting control or mitigation methods. CSB's report on its combustible dust hazard study recommends hazard assessments as necessary for the mitigation of combustible dust hazards. It should be noted that NFPA 654 refers to a hazard assessment as a ``Process Hazard Analysis.'' In addition to information about how employers perform hazard assessments, OSHA is also interested in the extent to which experts (both external and onstaff) are involved in hazard assessments.
14. Do you conduct assessments of combustible dust hazards? How often? What assessment method do you use? Describe the information you use in performing the assessment, as well as the information the assessment yields and how you use this information.
15. On whom do you rely for technical assistance when performing the assessment? Inhouse staff, local/State authorities, insurance representatives, or consultants?
16. How do you decide when outside expertise or assistance is necessary? How do you assess the capability of outside experts?
17. Are your employees involved in the hazard assessment? Does their involvement improve the assessment? Does their involvement improve their understanding of the hazard and its mitigation? E. Hazard Communication and Training
OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard (HCS), 29 CFR 1910.1200, comprehensively addresses the evaluation of the potential hazards of chemicals and the communication of hazard information to workers. Regarding dusts and other particulates, as with all chemicals covered by the HCS, a hazard evaluation must be conducted, taking into consideration all discernible hazards, including explosibility. It is incumbent upon manufacturers and importers to provide information on the potential for, and control of, combustible dusts.
The HCS standard has three main components that are essential to the effective functioning of a program. First, chemical manufacturers and importers must review available scientific evidence concerning the physical and health hazards of the chemicals they produce or import to determine if they are hazardous. This procedure is called a hazard determination or hazard evaluation. Second, for every chemical found to be hazardous, the chemical manufacturer or importer must develop Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) and container labels to be transmitted to downstream users of the chemicals. Employers are required to maintain an MSDS in the workplace for each hazardous chemical that they use. Third, all employers must develop a written hazard communication program and provide information and training to employees about the hazardous chemicals in their workplace.
Regarding combustible dusts, anticipated operations, uses, and downstream material processing that generate dusts should be considered normal conditions when using a substance. These conditions include operations and uses such as abrasive blasting, cutting, grinding, polishing, or crushing materials; conveying, mixing, sifting, or screening dry materials; and the buildup of dried residue from processing wet materials.
The HCS requires chemical manufacturers and importers to develop an MSDS for each hazardous chemical they produce or import. The following MSDS requirements are applicable to combustible dust hazards: Chemical and common names of the hazardous chemical and all ingredients determined to present a physical hazard, physical and chemical characteristics of the hazardous chemical, any generally applicable precautions for safe handling and use, any generally applicable control measures, date of MSDS preparation or last revision, and the name, address, and telephone number of the responsible party preparing the MSDS.
During its combustible dust study, CSB reviewed MSDSs of 140 known substances that produce combustible dusts, and found that information regarding potential combustible dust hazards was poorly or inadequately transmitted to employers and workers; according to this report, 41 percent of the MSDSs reviewed in the CSB study did not warn users about potential explosion hazards. Of the remaining 59 percent of MSDSs sampled, most of the information was not stated in a place or manner clearly recognized by employees, or not specific to hazards related to combustible dusts. The CSB concluded that many of the MSDSs did not identify the potential for combustible dust explosions that could reasonably have been anticipated during downstream material processing.
Training is also a critical component of any program to control
combustible dust and prevent fires and explosions. Employees need to understand the
[[Page 54343]]
hazards, how to prevent the hazards, and what to do in the event of a fire or explosion.
The following questions address MSDSs and training related to combustible dust hazards.
18. Do the MSDSs you develop or use identify the risks associated with combustible dust hazards? Do they list mitigation measures? Are you aware of MSDSs that should identify combustible dust as a hazard and do not? If so, please explain.
19. Do you communicate information on the risks of, and controls for, combustible dust hazards to your employees as a part of your hazard communication program?
20. Do you train your employees on the hazards of combustible dust and its mitigation? Do you also provide refresher training? What is covered in each type of training that you provide? How many of your employees receive each type of training that you provide? How many hours of training is provided and at what frequency (on hire, annually, as needed)? Who provides the training? What are their qualifications? Do you use standardized training materials (such as films, books, and computer classes)?
21. Do you have any means of determining if employees understand the training? Do you have any means of determining if employees are applying the training? If so, describe these means.
F. Consensus, Industry, and Insurance Standards
Under the OSH Act, OSHA must consider the provisions of national consensus standards, such as those promulgated by NFPA, in its rulemaking efforts. In addition to this mandate, OSHA may consider standards that are not developed using the consensus standards process when determining appropriate protective measures for employees. The following questions refer to these standards.
22. Do you follow the provisions in NFPA standards for combustible dust? If so, which standards? Is this use voluntary, or based on mandates by local authorities, insurance carriers, or other entities? Do you have any difficulty in using the NFPA standards because of conflicting definitions, varying requirements, secondary references to other standards, or any other reason? If so, describe these difficulties.
23. Do you use FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 776, Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires, as an aid in determining how to mitigate the hazards of combustible dust? Is this use voluntary or mandated by your insurance carrier?
24. Are there any other standards or guides you use to address the hazards of combustible dust? If so, please indicate which ones, or describe them.
G. State and Local Codes
NFPA standards carry the force of law when adopted by a jurisdiction (Federal, State, county, or municipal); these standards also can be mandated by an insurance company or other entity. In some cases, even when not mandated, employers comply with these standards (or portions of them) as a matter of policy. Many State fire codes contain mandatory references to NFPA's combustible dustrelated standards either directly, or by the adoption of a model fire code. The two model fire codes used in this country (i.e., International Code Council's International Fire Code and NFPA's Fire Code) both mandate compliance with NFPA's combustibledustrelated standards. Despite the existence of consensus and insurance standards, and State fire codes, major incidents continue to occur, as described earlier in this notice.
The CSB's 2006 report on its combustible dust hazard study concluded that State and local enforcement of NFPA standards was inadequate to protect workers. The reasons found include limited resources, insufficient training, and enforcement efforts that concentrate on facilities other than industrial facilities.
OSHA's National Emphasis Program for combustible dust has resulted in many employers abating combustible dust hazards in their facilities. Some employers voluntarily upgraded their facilities, procedures, and policies based on outreach and guidance material made available by a variety of organizations (including OSHA) or in response to the publicity surrounding major dust explosions. These efforts increased worker and employer awareness of the benefits of complying with NFPA standards. Nevertheless, it is difficult to project trends for hazards that result in infrequent, major incidents such as combustible dust explosions. Because of the variability of the many components required for a significant combustible dust explosion, facilities can operate for decades without an incident, yet suffer a catastrophic event after a slight change in conditions. The following questions address enforcement issues involving combustible dust.
25. Does the fire or building code (State, local, or other) in your area specifically address the hazards of combustible dust? If so, how?
26. Has your facility been inspected by State or local authorities? Is this a regular occurrence? If so, at what frequency? Were these inspections initiated by the authorities, or did you take the initiative to contact them? Did the inspections include combustible dust hazards? Did the inspection officials have expertise on combustible dust hazards? What action did you take as a result of State or local inspections?
27. Do you know if State or local enforcement efforts have been effective in controlling combustible dust hazards? If you have information on any studies of this issue other than the CSB's study (for example, studies conducted by insurance organizations, code authorities, trade associations, consultants, or unions), please provide information on them.
H. Engineering Controls
Various methods of controlling occupational hazards fall into a
hierarchy in order of their effectiveness. A typical hierarchy (beginning with the most effective method) is:
Administrative controls include work practices, personnel scheduling, operational procedures, and equipment maintenance. Engineering controls are fixed measures that are built into a facility or processing equipment to either remove a hazard (i.e., preventing it from occurring) or to minimize the effects of an incident (after a fire or explosion has begun). OSHA believes that, for combustible dust hazards, these two types of engineering controls may belong at different levels in the hierarchy. Those engineering controls that prevent the occurrence of an incident, hereinafter referred to as ``primary engineering controls,'' belong where they are normally seen in the hierarchy; ahead of administrative controls. Those engineering controls that minimize deaths, injuries, or damage after a fire or explosion has begun, hereinafter referred to as ``secondary engineering controls,'' may be more appropriately placed in the hierarchy after administrative controls. Therefore, OSHA has grouped the questions in this section into two categories: (a) Primary engineering controls, and (b) secondary engineering controls.
Collectively, primary and secondary engineering controls often include features of building design, processing
[[Page 54344]]
systems, ventilation systems, protective systems, and alarm systems. In
NFPA 654, these provisions are not retroactive; that is, facilities,
equipment, structures, or installations that existed or were approved
prior to the standard becoming effective may remain as is. While
retrofitting of most equipment is not mandated under this standard, it
allows the authority having jurisdiction to require retrofitting of
equipment or features in situations presenting an unacceptable degree of risk.
If OSHA were to incorporate provisions for engineering controls in a combustible dust standard, it would need to address whether any of these controls should be (1) retrofitted for all existing facilities immediately, (2) mandated after a specified date or period (i.e., a delayed effective date), or (3) required only for facilities built after a specified date or period (i.e., a ``grandfather'' clause). The Agency is, therefore, asking the following questions regarding engineering controls.
28. Do your facilit
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
Information regarding this ANPR is available from the following sources: